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The results of many observational and experimental studies reveal an economically and 
socially important paradox: people sometimes behave morally in certain situations but then 
behave immorally (or, at least, less morally) under conditions that differ for reasons that seem 
morally irrelevant. These patterns are inconsistent with both theories of rational self-interest as 
well as with theories that incorporate stable moral preferences. This paper presents a theory that 
reconciles many of these phenomena, including the depressing effects on moral behavior of 
experimentally introducing uncertainty, social distance, and options to delegate, to exit, to 
remain ignorant, and to take from or destroy the earnings of others. The theory introduces the 
concepts of moral salience and virtue preferences, which together with a model combining 
fairness and altruism explain not only the paradoxes but also a wide range of classic findings on 
distributive preferences and reciprocity. The results of an experiment that tests the theory out-of-
sample proves consistent with the theoretical predictions. 
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A pedestrian gives money to beggars but, if possible, crosses the street to avoid them. 
Different ethnic groups live peacefully together, until genocide normalizes the destruction of life 
and property, as during the Bosnian War. Companies hire consulting firms to recommend or 
carry out the firing of their employees, although the companies could implement the firings 
themselves and save the consulting fees. Otherwise law-abiding citizens join in looting during 
civil disturbances and natural disasters. Donors in developed countries give to local causes but 
neglect more critical need in distant developing countries, where their support could do much 
more good. Some people employ uncertainty about climate change as an excuse not to act on it, 
even when they support measures to address less severe environmental issues. People reward or 
punish politicians and CEOs not only for their good or bad choices but sometimes also for 
uncontrollable luck. And, in the lead-up to the 2007-08 financial crisis, lenders, who were 
formerly prudent, chose willful ignorance and avoided documenting applicants’ incomes. There 
are countless economically and socially important instances such as these of “Dr. Jekylls,” who 
under certain circumstances act morally, but then, for reasons that seem morally irrelevant, 
behave less morally or even immorally, transmogrifying into “Mr. Hydes.” 
Of course, the examples above do not necessarily require an appeal to inconsistent moral 
preferences but might instead be explained by a variety of other factors, such as risk preferences, 
social image concerns, imperfect information, preemptive retaliation, strategic self-interest, fear 
of punishment, expectations about the behavior of others, or the benefits of specialization. 
Nevertheless, the results of laboratory and field experiments demonstrate that these paradoxes 
persist, even when one carefully controls for such factors. In an initial round that began in the 
1980s (e.g., Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982, Camerer and Thaler, 1995), experimental 
economists began uncovering instances of behavior at variance with the single-minded pursuit of 
material self-interest. In time, these initial anomalies became the “classic” results, which 
prompted numerous theories of stable moral (or social) preferences (e.g., see Camerer, 2003). 
Then, in the late 2000s, seminal experimental work, including by Dana, Weber and Kuang 
(2007) on “moral wiggle room,” produced new “anomalies.” Subjects act fairly under certain 
conditions but then act unfairly under slightly different conditions in ways that are inconsistent 
with both pure self-interest and theories that combine self-interest with stable moral preferences. 
One such anomaly, studied by Bardsley (2008) and List (2007), is what I will call the 
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“taking effect.” In the standard version of an experiment called the dictator game, one subject, 
called the dictator, is permitted to share part of an unearned endowment with another anonymous 
subject, called the recipient. Most dictator experiments show that most dictators transfer a 
positive amount. But when dictators are permitted not only to give but also to take from 
recipients’ endowments in an otherwise identical treatment, many dictators take, and positive 
transfers also decrease in frequency. For dictators, who are fair enough to share in the standard 
version, the option to take in the second treatment should not matter, but it often does. 
This paper introduces a theory of moral salience, conditional altruism and virtue 
preferences that reconciles both the classic findings on moral preferences as well as the newer 
anomalies that contradict both pure self-interest and stable moral preferences. It also reports the 
results of a new experiment that tests the theory out-of-sample and proves supportive of it. The 
theory concerns the preferences of an agent, who acts on a passive person, or the patient. The 
decision context is defined as the set of choices and information related to the choices, and it 
contains moral and non-moral elements that systematically affect moral salience, i.e., the 
prominence of moral considerations in the decision. The focus here is on the subset of moral 
preferences I call conditional altruism, which are allocative preferences that consist of fairness 
preferences and altruism, i.e., unconditional preferences to help or harm. Agents act based on the 
strength of their intrinsic moral preferences, which vary across agents, and the salience of those 
preferences, which depends on the decision context. In addition, agents are assumed to have 
virtue preferences: they are motivated to reward and punish others for their good or bad moral 
character. Moral character refers collectively to virtues, which are actions based on an intrinsic 
willingness to comply with different moral preferences, such as altruism and fairness. 
The theory is consistent with a wide range of stylized facts, including classic findings 
about fairness and reciprocity as well as the anomalous results, while providing guidance about 
the conditions under which one can retain a social preference approach and when and how to 
extend it to account for anomalies. It is also related to the oldest school of thought in Western 
moral philosophy, virtue ethics. Along lines of this school, Ashraf and Bandiera (2017) explore 
how altruistic acts affect altruistic capital, and Konow and Earley (2008) discuss the relationship 
between virtue and happiness. The current theory relates to other features of virtue ethics, 
including multiple ethical principles, context-dependent morality, and a concern for virtues. 
The theory is formulated around explaining and predicting non-strategic behavior in 
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simple experiments because of several advantages of that approach. A growing literature has 
demonstrated the external validity of non-strategic experiments on moral preferences quite 
generally, that is, pro-sociality in experiments is correlated with such behavior in the field. For 
example, dictator generosity is positively correlated with honesty in the field (Franzen and 
Pointner, 2013) and with a willingness to take costly steps to reduce the exposure of others to 
Covid-19 (Campos-Mercade, Meier, Schneider and Wengström, 2020). In addition, the more 
recent experiments on anomalies provide persuasive evidence of the internal validity of the claim 
that there is something inherent to moral preferences that is inconsistent with existing theories. 
Moral preferences are clearly relevant to important economic phenomena, such as cooperation, 
but cooperation is impacted by a complex set of considerations, as Dal Bó and Frechette (2018) 
argue. Specifically, strategic self-interest can confound inferences about morals in many contexts 
but should play no role in non-strategic decisions, such as in the dictator game. In particular, 
“virtue signaling,” or feigning morally motivated behavior for strategic reasons, can distort 
signals about true allocative preferences as well as about virtue preferences, which are a function 
of the former. This accounts for the focus of this paper on non-strategic allocation decisions. 
Finally, simple experimental decisions enable the parallel development of a simple and tractable 
theory. That said, reference will occasionally be made to results from designs where strategic 
concerns play a potential role, in particular, with experiments where strategic concerns are likely 
negligible and results from non-strategic designs are not available. 
A word is in order about what this paper tries, and does not try, to do. It proposes a theory 
of moral preferences that is novel, tractable, and capable of explaining a wide range of evidence 
on moral preferences, including various Jekyll and Hyde paradoxes. It reports the results of a 
new experiment that tests and finds support for the theory and makes some comparisons with 
other theories. But, for various reasons, it does not conduct a beauty contest and makes relatively 
few comparisons with alternative explanations. For one thing, it is already a very ambitious 
undertaking, a fact confirmed, in part, by its length, and further theoretical or empirical analysis 
is beyond the scope of a single paper. For another thing, I find many other explanations plausible 
in the particular cases they address, so the aim here is not to displace them. Instead, I see the 
chief contributions of this paper as offering a theoretical framework that is new and distinct from 
others, tractable, and more general in its applications to many types of behavior that are impacted 
by moral preferences (indeed, it might be seen as a generalization of some prior theories). 
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Section 2 presents the theory in general terms. Section 3 discusses some general 
applications of allocative preferences and section 4 some general applications of virtue 
preferences. The two sections thereafter address classes of anomalies: section 5 helping and 
harming, including the new experiment, and section 6 norm avoidance. Section 7 discusses 
briefly a different type of moral salience called point salience, and section 8 concludes. 
2. Theory 
This section introduces a theory of moral salience, integrates salience into and 
generalizes a model of allocative preferences called conditional altruism, and presents a theory of 
preferences to reward and punish called virtue preferences. 
2.1. Moral Salience 
Economists have cited salience in connection with various phenomena, including 
consumer choice (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2013, 2016), strategic decision-making 
(Crawford, Gneezy and Rottenstreich, 2008, Crawford and Iriberri, 2007), taxation (Chetty, 
Looney, and Kroft, 2009), and the endowment effect (Bordalo, Gennaeioli, and Shleifer, 2012). 
This paper also presents a theory of salience as prominence but, like Benabou and Tirole (2006), 
in a specifically moral context. It is, however, distinct from prior formalizations, to my 
knowledge. Moral salience concerns how the decision context affects the prominence of moral 
considerations in individual choices. This subsection introduces a concept of salience that 
characterizes how properties of subsets of the context affect the prominence of moral 
preferences. This is the primary concept of moral salience employed in this paper, but a different 
type of moral salience will be discussed briefly in section 7 of the paper, which involves the 
prominence of specific actions within the set of available actions. 
Consider a person, called the agent, who makes a decision that materially affects a 
passive individual, called the patient.1 This might be a sponsor choosing how much to donate to 
a child supported by a charitable organization or a dictator deciding how much of an endowment 
to transfer to a recipient in a dictator game. The agent may take an action, x, from the set of 
available actions, X. In most of the situations considered in this paper, the action is the same as 
 
1 Lacking a general and commonly agreed upon term in economics for a person who is acted upon by a moral agent, 
I borrow the term patient from philosophical ethics. 
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the material effect on the patient, e.g., the transfer received by the recipient in a dictator game, 
which is selected from the range of permissible transfers, i.e., 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑋. The agent also possesses 
information that might be seen as morally relevant to the choice of actions. For example, a 
dictator might be informed that the recipient has an endowment, y, among other elements of the 
set of information about the decision, i.e., 𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑌. Such actions and information are elements, c, 
of the decision context, C, i.e., 𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐶, whereby 𝐶𝐶 = 𝑋𝑋 ∪ 𝑌𝑌. 
Moral set salience is the weight attached to the agent’s moral preferences as a result of 
the decision context. For example, the taking effect described in the Introduction is consistent 
with the interpretation that adding taking options to the set of available actions in a dictator game 
reduces the weight on moral preferences and, therefore, the level of dictator transfers. Similarly, 
information indicating greater social distance between dictator and recipient can lower the 
weight on the agent’s moral preferences, as discussed later. 
We will consider in future sections various ways in which qualitative elements of context 
can affect moral salience. But let us first restrict attention to quantitative contextual elements, 
such as giving and taking options in a dictator game: 
C = {𝑐𝑐}, 𝑐𝑐 ∈ ℝ. 
Let C be partitioned into those elements in the moral context, 𝐶𝐶+, and those in the non-moral 
context, 𝐶𝐶−: 
 C = {𝐶𝐶+,𝐶𝐶−} 
The elements of the former are positively valenced and increase moral salience, e.g., 
opportunities to help another person. The latter comprise those elements that are negatively 
valenced and diminish moral salience, e.g., opportunities to harm another. Non-moral context 
can also include amoral, or morally neutral, elements, e.g., the possibility of inaction. Define a 
function, 𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖), of these partitions, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = {𝐶𝐶+,𝐶𝐶−}, that satisfies the properties of a measure, viz., 
non-negativity (𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) ≥ 0∀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶), null empty set (𝑚𝑚(∅) = 0), and countable additivity 
(𝑚𝑚(⋃ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) = ∑ 𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖 ). Denote the moral measure, 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶+), and the non-moral measure, 
𝑛𝑛 = 𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶−). Distinguishing moral and non-moral context and constructing measures of them 
requires, of course, some judgment and depends on the decision context. In the various 
applications that follow, we discuss different commonsensical specifications for these measures. 
Now we come to moral salience, which is related to the usual understanding of salience 
in neuroscience and social psychology. In those disciplines, salience typically refers to how an 
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object, or set of objects, stands out relative to its environment. Here, moral salience refers to how 
subsets of elements of the decision context affect the prominence of moral considerations and, 
therefore, the weight on an agent’s moral preferences. This is a version of salience I call “set 
salience,” and it involves collections of objects that are all disjoint subsets of a superset. The 
elements of each subset share some feature(s) (here, whether they are moral or non-moral), and 
each subset distinguishes itself in this way from other subsets. I focus here on the case in which 
the context may be bifurcated into measurable subsets. Set salience refers to the tendency for the 
subset with smaller measure to have disproportionate prominence relative to the contrasting 
subset with larger measure. For example, a five-year-old does not stand out in a Kindergarten but 
does in a retirement home. The set salience I propose further specifies a non-linear relationship 
between salience and measures of the subsets of context. Returning to our anthropomorphic 
example, a comparatively small group of children situated among older people is prominent, but 
the marginal salience of the first child is greater than that of the second and the marginal salience 
of the second is greater than that the third, etc. Moral set salience formalizes this property for 
moral preferences. The addition of moral context to a mostly (or entirely) non-moral context, and 
the related increase in the moral measure, increases moral salience and does so at a decreasing 
rate. Conversely, the addition of elements of non-moral context to a mostly (or entirely) moral 
context, and the attendant increase in the non-moral measure, decreases moral salience at a 
decreasing rate, that is, the first addition non-moral context causes a larger decrease in the 
prominence of moral considerations than the second, etc. 
Formally, consider the following definition, which reflects these properties. 
DEFINITION 1: Moral set salience, 𝜎𝜎(𝑝𝑝,𝑛𝑛), is a function with support on the non-negative real 
numbers that maps the moral and non-moral measures of the decision context into the unit 
interval: 
 𝜎𝜎:ℝ+2 → [0,1]. 





















It proves convenient in the subsequent analysis to flesh out this function in a more 





. Many decisions, however, involve some fixed moral salience with variation in only 
a subset of the moral context. For example, in a dictator game, variation in the amounts one may 
transfer might impact moral salience through its effects on the measures p or n, but there are 
often some baseline moral considerations, e.g., triggered by the very fact of being endowed and 
paired with another person. In such cases, the context contains a baseline, or fixed, moral set 
salience denoted 𝜎𝜎� ∈ [0,1) in addition to the subsets of moral context that are variable, p and n. 
This leads to the following specification for moral salience: 
(1) 𝜎𝜎 = (1 − 𝜎𝜎�) ∙ 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕+𝑛𝑛
+ 𝜎𝜎�. 
This expression satisfies the conditions that define moral salience: its maximum is 𝜎𝜎(𝑝𝑝, 0) =
(1 − 𝜎𝜎�) ∙ 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕
+ 𝜎𝜎� = 1, its minimum is 𝜎𝜎(0,𝑛𝑛) = 0
𝑛𝑛
= 0 when 𝜎𝜎� = 0, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕









= −(1− 𝜎𝜎�) 𝜕𝜕
(𝜕𝜕+𝑛𝑛)2
< 0, and 𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛2
= (1 − 𝜎𝜎�) 2𝜕𝜕
(𝜕𝜕+𝑛𝑛)2
> 0. 
Figure 1 illustrates how moral salience varies with the moral and non-moral measures. 
The aforementioned effects of moral and non-moral context on moral salience are reflected in the 
properties of 𝜎𝜎 being increasing and concave in p for a given 𝑛𝑛� and decreasing and convex in n 
for a given ?̅?𝑝. Fixed moral salience, 𝜎𝜎�, represents the lower bound of moral salience. 
FIGURE 1. – Moral salience. 
The remaining sections analyze numerous contextual factors that affect moral salience. 
Some cases involve binary decisions, such as whether or not to remain ignorant of information 






𝜎𝜎 (𝑝𝑝, 𝑛𝑛�) 
𝜎𝜎 (?̅?𝑝, 𝑛𝑛) 
?̅?𝑝 > 0, 𝑛𝑛� > 0 
8 
 
of incremental changes in moral or non-moral context. For instance, moral salience may vary 
with the amounts that may be given to or taken from a patient, physical proximity to the patient, 
and probability that the agent’s decision is actualized. These cases lend themselves to cardinal 
measurement, so that one can observe not only the direction of the effect of context on moral 
salience but also differences in the rate of change in that effect. 
Another practical aspect is that people are sometimes confronted with multiple decisions 
in similar moral contexts at the same time. This occurs, for example, in experiments that present 
the same group of subjects with similar decisions in a within-subjects design. It also arises, 
though, outside the laboratory, e.g., when someone receives multiple solicitations to donate to 
different charities. In such cases, I make the following assumption. 
ASSUMPTION 1: Denote the contexts of decisions 1 and 2, respectively, 𝐶𝐶1 and 𝐶𝐶2. Suppose 
they are related, meaning choices are made jointly from decision contexts that are identical 
except for some element, 𝑐𝑐: {𝐶𝐶1/𝑐𝑐1} = {𝐶𝐶2/𝑐𝑐2} and 𝑐𝑐1 ≠ 𝑐𝑐2. Then the decisions share the 
common context 𝐶𝐶 = {𝐶𝐶1⋃𝐶𝐶2} with the same measures and the same moral salience. 
The examples stated thus far indicate that moral set salience is affected by a variety of 
contextual factors, which differ qualitatively. These factors are worked out in further sections of 
the paper, but in order to sort through these factors, it is helpful to clarify in general terms how to 
distinguish what properties of the context affect moral set salience and in what way. I approach 
this by identifying the properties that make for the highest moral salience and arguing that 
relaxing these lowers moral salience. It is based on the following “empirical” assumption, i.e., an 
assumption about the estimation or empirical interpretation of a theoretical construct. 
ASSUMPTION 2: Moral salience is highest when there is a single agent and single patient, who 
stand in the close proximity. In addition, the choices open to the agent comprise only non-
harming actions, the effects of the actions on the patient are certain and common knowledge, 
moral norms relevant to the context are explicit and common knowledge, and there are no 
opportunities to avoid actions or information about the consequences of actions that relate to 
moral norms. 
Thus, the focus of the analysis of moral salience in this paper is on the ways in which 
non-moral context may reduce salience. These include by adding context that reduces proximity, 
adds harmful actions to the choice set, or provides self-serving opportunities to avoid or delegate 
the decision or to avoid information about the consequences of the decision. Note that, since the 
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moral context includes the information provided, Y, moral salience can be subject to framing 
effects, e.g., a dictator’s transfer can be affected by whether the task is worded as a choice to 
“give” or to “distribute” money.2 Such changes in presentation might or might not affect choices, 
depending on whether they affect moral salience. But the effects on moral salience are not 
limited to framing effects, since moral salience is also a function of the actual set of available 
choices, X, and not just their presentation, e.g., whether a dictator may take as well as give. Thus, 
context can affect choices mediated by salience even under perfect information due to 
differences in choice sets. 
2.2. Conditional Altruism with Moral Salience 
As already stated, the theory presented here seeks to offer a unified framework that is 
consistent with both classic and anomalous results on moral preferences. This theory weights 
moral preferences by moral salience, but a critical question concerns the type of moral 
preferences. As previously stated, this paper focuses on allocative preferences, specifically, the 
model of conditional altruism introduced in Konow (2010). This section has several goals. It 
extends this model, generalizing the altruism term, elaborates new implications of the model, and 
analyzes some implications of integrating moral salience into it. 
Conditional altruism has three components: material utility and two moral motives, 
fairness and altruism. Material utility, 𝑢𝑢:ℝ+ → ℝ+, is assumed to be a twice continuously 
differentiable function of the agent’s material allocation, 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖. Specifically, I assume material 
utility, 𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖), is as follows 
𝑢𝑢(0) = 0,𝑢𝑢′(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖) > 0, and 𝑢𝑢′′(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖) ≤ 0. 
The “conditional” part of conditional altruism involves fairness, which refers here to 
moral preferences over the patient’s allocation that are conditioned on any distributive norm, 
whether equality, equity, efficiency, need or something else. I assume that the relevant moral 
norm depends on the context. The behavior of stakeholders, however, such as dictators in 
dictator games or proposers in ultimatum games, typically reflects not only moral preferences but 
also self-interest. So, I propose that the moral norm, which I will call the entitlement, be inferred 
empirically from the behavior of third-party allocators, as stated in the following assumption. 
 
2 See Bergh and Wichardt (2018) for evidence of the effects of this wording on dictator transfers. In fact, 
information might even be false but relevant to the agent’s actions, if it influences moral salience, although 
providing false information is typically taboo in economics experiments. 
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ASSUMPTION 3: The entitlement, denoted 𝜂𝜂, refers to the moral allocation or allocative rule 
that is the governing moral norm of stakeholders in a given context, C. The entitlement can be 
inferred from the allocations of spectators, or third-party allocators, in C. 
This method for eliciting impartial moral views was introduced in Konow (2000) and has 
been employed and elaborated in numerous subsequent studies, including Aguiar, Becker and 
Miller (2013), Almås, Cappelen and Tungodden (2020), Cappelen, Konow, Sørensen and 
Tungodden (2013), Croson and Konow (2009), Konow (2005, 2012), Konow, Saijo and Akai 
(2020), and Møllerstrom, Reme and Sørensen (2015). Various studies compare stakeholder and 
spectator decisions and reveal properties that bolster the case for employing spectator allocations 
to gauge the role of moral norms on stakeholder behavior. Stakeholder decisions correlate 
significantly with the entitlements inferred from spectators, and the variance around spectator 
decisions is significantly lower than that around stakeholder decisions, as one would expect, if 
stakeholders differ in their relative degree of self-interest. Thus, I will sometimes refer in this 
paper to evidence from spectator views, both in prior studies as well as in the new experiments 
reported here, to identify the entitlement that is relevant in a given context. 
Here fairness is based on one or more values or rules from a set of possible moral norms 
and not only the more narrow understanding of fairness as equality or equity but also, for 
example, possibly efficiency or need. This is expressed as a function, 𝑓𝑓:ℝ2 → ℝ≤0, that captures 
the preference of the agent, i, over the material allocation, 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗, of the patient, j, relative to the 
patient’s entitlement, 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗. Specifically, I assume f is the twice continuously differentiable function 
𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖(𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 − 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗)�, 
where 𝑓𝑓(0) = 0,𝑓𝑓′(𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤) ∙ 𝑤𝑤 < 0 for 𝑤𝑤 = 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 − 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗 ≠ 0 and 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 > 0, and 𝑓𝑓′′(𝑤𝑤) < 0. 
Agents are assumed to differ in the strength of their fairness preference, which is captured by the 
fairness coefficient 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℝ+. This coefficient is distributed according to the cumulative 
distribution function Φ(𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖), where Φ(𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖) has support [𝜙𝜙,𝜙𝜙] with 0 < 𝜙𝜙 < 𝜙𝜙 < ∞ and 0 <
Φ�𝜙𝜙� < 0.5. The assumptions about 𝜙𝜙 help establish predictions that are consistent with 
behavior discussed later, viz., that all agents care somewhat about fairness and that minimally 
fair types constitute a minority. Furthermore, fairness is assumed to be homogeneous of degree 
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λ, such that this term may also be written 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓�𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 − 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗�.3 Note that agents experience disutility, 
when patients have more or less than their entitlement. That is, fairness is never utility 
increasing, which reflects the idea that moral norms signify an obligation rather than an 
opportunity. This is a critical factor for later explaining a number of empirical findings. 
The “altruism” part of conditional altruism refers to a moral preference that is personal 
and unconditional. As with standard theories of altruism, it is not conditioned on a moral norm, 
such as equality or efficiency, or on the behavior of others, such as a desire to reward or punish 
deviations from norms. Here I generalize the prior version of this model, which formally 
resembled warm glow (e.g., Andreoni, 1989), to include explicitly not only positive but also 
negative altruism (i.e., spite), as in Levine (1998). Unlike pure altruism but like warm glow, it is 
assumed to be a function solely of that part of the patient’s allocation that can be attributed to a 
personal choice of the agent, e.g., a dictator making a transfer to or from a recipient in a standard 
dictator game. Unlike pure altruism, it is not a function of the patient’s total allocation or of any 
amounts the patient receives from others. Altruism is also personal in that it assumed to apply to 
agent-patient relationships but not to impartial third party, or spectator, decisions. Altruism is 
expressed as a function, 𝑔𝑔:ℝ → ℝ, of the amount, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗, the patient receives from the agent. 
Specifically, I assume altruism is the twice continuously differentiable function 
𝑔𝑔�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� 
where 𝑔𝑔(0) = 0,𝑔𝑔′�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� > 0 for 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 > 0,𝑔𝑔′�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� < 0 for 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 0, 𝑔𝑔′�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� = 0 for 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 =
0, and 𝑔𝑔′′(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥) < 0 for 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ≠ 0. Agents differ according to their altruism coefficient, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℝ, and 
are categorized as altruistic, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 > 0, selfish, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 0, or spiteful, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 0. The altruism coefficient 
is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function Α(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖), which has support [𝛼𝛼,𝛼𝛼] 
with −∞ < 𝛼𝛼 < 0 < 𝛼𝛼∗ < 𝛼𝛼 < ∞, where 𝛼𝛼∗ = {𝛼𝛼|𝑢𝑢′(𝑋𝑋 − 𝜂𝜂) = 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′(𝛼𝛼𝜂𝜂)} where 𝜎𝜎 denotes the 
level of salience in the standard dictator game. I assume 0 < Α(0) < 0.5, 0 < Α(𝛼𝛼) − Α(𝛼𝛼∗) <
0.5, Α(𝛼𝛼) − Α(0) > 0.5, and ∫ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖
𝛼𝛼
𝛼𝛼 𝜌𝜌(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 > 0, where 𝜌𝜌(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) is the probability density 
function of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖. That is, I assume a minority of agents is spiteful, a majority is altruistic, and the 
average type is altruistic. In addition, a minority in the standard dictator game is so altruistic 
(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 > 𝛼𝛼∗) that their marginal altruism exceeds their marginal material utility evaluated where 
 
3 This homogeneity assumption later proves convenient for identifying threshold values of fairness for different 
categories of behavior, when the choice space is discrete. 
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their transfer equals the patient’s entitlement. The altruism term accommodates positive transfers 
to the patient, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 > 0, as well as negative ones, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 < 0, i.e., taking from the patient. Note that a 
given 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 can increase or decrease an agent’s utility. For example, for an altruistic agent, giving 
increases utility and taking reduces utility. The giving case is similar to warm glow, but this term 
additionally incorporates disutility from taking. Note that this term is upward sloping for 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 > 0 
and downward sloping for 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 0, i.e., the utility of a spiteful agent decreases with giving and 
rises with taking. Finally, I also assume that 𝜙𝜙 and 𝛼𝛼 are not negatively correlated. That is, 
although there can be exceptions, fairer agents are not, on average, less altruistic. This seems like 
a reasonable assumption, and it proves useful later when dealing with virtue preferences. 
I assume additively separable utility, keeping with most social preference models, e.g., 
Charness and Rabin (2002), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Rabin (1993). Letting the moral preference terms be weighted by 
moral salience, 𝜎𝜎, the utility of agent i, 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖, becomes 
(2) 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖) + 𝜎𝜎 ∙ 𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖(𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 − 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗)� + 𝜎𝜎 ∙ 𝑔𝑔�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�. 
There are sometimes arguments for separate moral salience variables for different moral 
preferences, i.e., for distinguishing fairness salience, 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓, from altruism salience, 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔. 
Nevertheless, the results almost never depend on such independent variation, indeed, only one 
part of one theorem, viz., the last claim in Theorem 5.3.1, hinges on such a difference, so I 
simplify the analysis and use a single moral salience term. One question that must be addressed, 
though, is the treatment of salience in the case of spiteful agents. For spiteful agents, the salience 
variable that is applied to their altruism term will be defined as 𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏 ≡ 1 − 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔, where 𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏 ∈ [0,1]. 
This has an intuitive implication: a context that, for altruistic agents, increases the utility 
(disutility) from giving (taking), for spiteful agents, reduces the utility (disutility) from taking 
(giving). Finally, when uncertainty is involved, I assume that decision-makers are expected 
utility maximizers. 
As previously stated, the theory is formulated for non-strategic decisions, and much of 
the focus is on the dictator game and variations on it. So, I adapt equation (2) to this experiment 
and simplify some notation to represent the utility of the dictator. Let X represent the endowment 
of the dictator and x the dictator’s transfer to the recipient such that 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥. The recipient’s 
endowment, in those cases where it is relevant, is denoted Y such that 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 = 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥. Then, for the 
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dictator game, equation (3) can be written (suppressing subscripts for individuals) 
(3) 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎 ∙ 𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙(𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂)) + 𝜎𝜎 ∙ 𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥). 
Now we turn to some theorems about transfers in the dictator game, which will come in handy in 
the later analysis. All refer to the mean dictator and, therefore, involve interior solutions, and 
their proofs appear in the Appendix. 
I begin with the effects of moral salience. 
THEOREM 2.2.1: The optimal transfer, x, is increasing in 𝜎𝜎. 
As stated above in the section 2.1, the analysis proceeds from a reference point of high moral 
salience and focuses on the effects of non-moral context, n, on reducing salience. So, it proves 
useful to establish the relationship between n and 𝑥𝑥, which is addressed in Theorem 2.2.2. 
THEOREM 2.2.2: The optimal transfer, x, is decreasing in n. Assuming x is weakly convex in 𝜎𝜎, 
x is strictly convex in n. 
This theorem states that non-moral context decreases giving due to the reduction in moral 
salience. In addition, it establishes that, in the case of cardinal measures of n, giving decreases at 
a decreasing rate, assuming x is weakly convex in 𝜎𝜎.4 That is, the initial addition of non-moral 
context causes a larger decrease in giving than the next. 
For two reasons, the remainder of this paper focuses on the effects of variation in n rather 
than p. First, theory yields a stronger prediction about n: from Theorem 2.2.2, 𝜕𝜕
2𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛2




 is ambiguous due to the concavity of 𝜎𝜎 in 𝑝𝑝. Second, most of the experimental 
evidence related to moral salience seems more directly related to variation in 𝑛𝑛. Moreover, the 
few studies of which I am aware that explicitly relate to variation in 𝑝𝑝 are consistent with the 
theoretical claim that 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
> 0 but do not involve cardinal measures needed to shed light on the 
second derivative, e.g., dictator giving increases significantly with the addition of a short 
 
4 Note that the assumed relationship between x and 𝜎𝜎 is a feature of several commonly used parametric utility 
functions. For example, for the standard dictator game, suppose we can write 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎ℎ, where ℎ = 𝑓𝑓 + 𝑔𝑔. 
This formulation treats material utility as linear in the dictator’s payoff, as commonly assumed in many social 
preference theories, e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004, Falk and Fischbacher, 
2006, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, and Rabin, 1993, and as a special case of the current theory (since 𝑢𝑢′ > 0 and 𝑢𝑢′′ ≤
0). This assumption seems innocuous for economics experiments, where the stakes are usually modest relative to 
subjects’ income or wealth. Then, it is straightforward to show that, if ℎ = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏 ∙ ln 𝑥𝑥 , 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏 > 0, then 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎� = 𝑏𝑏 >
0 and 𝑑𝑑
2𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎2� = 0, and, if ℎ = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏 ∙ 𝑥𝑥
1/2, 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏 > 0, then 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎� =
1
2





𝑏𝑏2 > 0, both of 
which are consistent with (weak) convexity of x in 𝜎𝜎. 
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statement about the recipient’s reliance on the dictator (Brañas-Garza, 2007), and trading volume 
in an experimental market decreases when a negative externality is added (Sutter et al., 2020). 
Finally, consider the effects on transfers of changes in 𝜙𝜙, 𝛼𝛼, and 𝜂𝜂. 
THEOREM 2.2.3: The optimal transfer is increasing in the fairness coefficient, 𝜙𝜙, except for 
super-fair dictators, for whom it is decreasing in 𝜙𝜙. 
THEOREM 2.2.4: The optimal transfer is increasing in 𝛼𝛼. 
THEOREM 2.2.5: The optimal transfer is increasing in the entitlement, specifically, 0 <
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂� < 1. 
Thus, stronger moral preferences result in higher transfers, except for super-fair dictators, who 
experience increased disadvantageous inequity aversion. Theorem 2.2.5 implies that a one unit 
increase in the entitlement produces a less than one unit increase in the transfer, which is due to 
diminishing marginal altruism and the increasing marginal material disutility. 
2.3 Virtue Preferences 
The utility function presented thus far is entirely consequentialist, i.e., it represents 
preferences over outcomes or the consequences of decisions. Material utility reflects the material 
allocation of the agent. Conditional altruism, captured by fairness and altruism, are allocative 
preferences with respect to the fair transfer and the agent’s endowment, respectively. This 
section presents an additional moral motive, viz., to sanction, that is, to reward or punish others.5 
Although we do not explore this aspect here, in a dynamic framework, such preferences might 
serve to undergird virtue, indeed, Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2014) find that punishment is a critical 
force that sustains the favorable effects of increased moral salience on cooperation. 
Most theoretical accounts of sanctioning are reciprocity theories, e.g., Charness and 
Rabin (2002), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), Rabin (1993), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
(2004). These theories formulate a motive to reward or punish others based on their so-called 
intentions. Good or bad intentions are inferred based on both others’ (expected) choices and their 
available choice set. For example, one formulation considers whether the expected consequences 
of another’s action exceed or fall short of some “fair” benchmark, whereby the benchmark is 
 
5 In the absence of any other generally agreed upon term, I use the term sanction collectively for both reward and 
punishment, since its meanings include both kind and unkind actions, viz., in verb form, “to give approval to” and 
“to impose a penalty upon” (Merriam-Webster.com). 
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defined relative to the other’s available choice set. An alternative approach is to formulate this 
motive with respect to moral types. Levine (1998) introduced such a model in which the 
sanctioning motive depends jointly on the altruism (or spite) of both the agent and the patient. In 
his model, an agent might be altruistic or spiteful but is more altruistic (spiteful) toward a more 
altruistic (spiteful) patient. 
This paper introduces a theory of sanctioning I will call virtue preferences. This 
represents an interpretation of virtue ethics, which is the oldest school in Western moral 
philosophy. Its advocates span centuries and include Aristotle (1925), Adam Smith (1759), and 
Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (1993). It should be noted that there are different schools of 
thought within virtue ethics, but the theoretical concepts presented here are variations on 
common positions that can be found in that branch of ethics. Morality is viewed as pluralistic, 
i.e., consisting of multiple virtues, whereby in the present case of allocative preferences, these 
virtues constitute fairness and altruism.6 As interpreted in the present theory, a virtue is a specific 
type of willingness to act morally, e.g., to be fair or altruistic, that is actually acted on. This 
differs from the approaches reviewed above in subtle but important ways. Unlike intentions in 
reciprocity theories, virtue is not a consequence (or intended consequence), because it is a 
function of moral motivation. Virtue is closer to the moral types approach, given its link to moral 
preferences, but it is also distinct in several ways. First, moral preferences must be realized in 
action, and, unlike the moral types approach, the relevant metric is behavioral and not the latent 
variable of moral preferences. Second, and in a related point, the sanctioning motive in virtue 
preferences is not over the moral preferences of others but over their actions. For example, in a 
dictator game, fair dictators are not rewarded for having fair preferences per se but for behavior 
that manifests their fairness preferences. Neither intent alone nor action alone suffices: rather, 
virtue is intent (understood as moral preferences) coupled with action. Finally, virtue is the 
notional willingness to behave morally, even if the effective, or actual, behavior differs due to 
obstacles that preclude more precise expression of that willingness because choice is subject to 
constraints or uncertainty. For example, a dictator, who is willing to share $12 with a recipient is 
more virtuous than a dictator, who is only willing to share $10, even both share the same $10 due 
to experimental rules that cap transfers at $10. Note, however, that, to count as virtue, action 
 
6 In the standard Aristotelian terminology, these two virtues correspond to justice and liberality, respectively, 
although Aristotle also discussed other virtues, among them prudence, courage, truthfulness, and friendship. 
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must be involved, even if the effective action differs from the notional one. 
Moral character refers to an individual’s set of virtues. Of course, depending on the 
context, multiple virtues might be in play. For example, in the contexts examined here, 
conditional altruism predicts that moral behavior reflects both fairness and altruism. Virtue 
ethicists argue that the relative importance of the different virtues in determining right action is 
context-dependent. The theory introduced here proposes the form of this context-dependence: 
moral and non-moral context determine the relative and absolute salience of the virtues. In the 
context of allocative preferences, moral character reduces to intrinsically motivated generosity, 
that is, the willingness to sacrifice materially, whether for the sake of fairness, altruism or both. 
Denote this 𝛾𝛾, where 𝛾𝛾 ∈ ℝ, and suppose 𝛾𝛾 is distributed according to the cumulative distribution 
function Γ(𝛾𝛾), where Γ(𝛾𝛾) has support [𝛾𝛾,𝛾𝛾] with −∞ < 𝛾𝛾 ≤ 0 < 𝛾𝛾 < ∞. This is the variable 
that individuals are assumed to be motivated to sanction.7 Specifically, the morally relevant 
generosity is notional, so I will conceptualize it with the following reference state. Consider an 
agent, who may make a unilateral, anonymous and unlimited transfer of resources to or from a 
patient. There is no role for strategic self-interest, and the agent’s only motivation for departing 
from narrow material interests is moral preferences. The reference state is like a standard dictator 
game, except that the dictator has unlimited access to the entire material endowments of both 
parties. Further assume that, in this hypothetical dictator game, even the most generous dictator 
would keep some his or her own endowment (𝛾𝛾 < 𝑋𝑋) and that even the most selfish dictator 
would not take all of the recipient’s endowment (�𝛾𝛾� < 𝑌𝑌). Although not necessary, this 
assumption simplifies the analysis, but it also seems plausible, at least for populations akin to 
those that participate in economics experiments and who would likely neither give away their 
last material possession nor take away the last possession of another. 
Virtue preferences are preferences over moral character, specifically, preferences to 
reward the good, or praiseworthy, moral character of another, or to punish the bad, or 
blameworthy, moral character of another. In the present case, moral character is an expression of 
allocative preferences, which reduces to generosity, so that virtue preferences are preferences 
 
7 Note that the moral types formulation produces a counterintuitive implication for fairness preferences with super-
fair agents: in this case, a fairer agent is less generous (Theorem 2.2.3) but more deserving of reward. Formulating 
the variable that is sanctioned in behavioral terms, in which only disadvantageous inequity aversion contributes to 
generosity, avoids this implication. 
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over others’ generosity. These sanctioning preferences consist of several parts. Let us begin with 
an agent, denoted k, who is capable of sanctioning others. This person may, depending on the 
decision context, be stakeholder or a third party. This agent may transfer an amount to or from 
another, denoted 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘 ∈ ℝ, whereby the range of possibilities considered in this paper comprises 
𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘 ∈ [𝑧𝑧,𝑍𝑍], where −∞ < 𝑧𝑧 ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ 𝑍𝑍 < ∞. The agent may make transfers for allocative 
reasons but also in order to sanction, i.e., to reward or punish another beyond what allocative 
preferences alone demand. The agent’s ideal level of sanctioning is denoted ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘, and this depends 
on k’s estimate of the moral character (in the present case, k’s estimate of the sanctioned person 
j’s notional generosity), 𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗. Since the decision context differs from the thought experiment 
described above, j’s actual moral character, 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗, is not known and must be estimated. As 
explained in later sections, 𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗 is based on j’s choices as well as the decision context, including 
the reigning moral salience and constraints on j’s choices. In addition, for each agent k and given 
the level of salience in the reference state, 𝜎𝜎�, there is a threshold value of 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗, denoted 𝛾𝛾�𝑘𝑘, where 
𝛾𝛾 < 𝛾𝛾�𝑘𝑘 < 𝛾𝛾. Above this threshold, agent k judges j’s character as praiseworthy and deserving of 
reward and, below it j’s, character is viewed as blameworthy and deserving of punishment. This 
“character threshold” may differ across sanctioning agents. 
The ideal sanction, ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘, is assumed to depend on 𝛾𝛾�𝑘𝑘 and 𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗 through the term 𝑟𝑟:ℝ → ℝ, 
which is the twice continuously differentiable function 
𝑟𝑟�𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗 − 𝛾𝛾�𝑘𝑘� 
where 𝑟𝑟(0) = 0, 𝑟𝑟′�𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗 − 𝛾𝛾�𝑘𝑘� > 0, and 𝑟𝑟′′�𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗 − 𝛾𝛾�𝑘𝑘� < 0. 
This implies a positive ideal sanction, ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘 > 0, when estimated character exceeds the threshold, 
𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗 > 𝛾𝛾�𝑘𝑘, and a negative ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘 < 0, when the opposite is the case, 𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗 < 𝛾𝛾�𝑘𝑘. In addition, the concavity 
of 𝑟𝑟 captures the idea that blameworthy character implies greater punishment than the reward for 
praiseworthy character of an equal degree. I assume that agents k care in differing degrees about 
sanctioning, denoted 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘 ≥ 0, which is distributed according to the cumulative distribution 
function Θ(𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘), where Θ(𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘) has support [𝜃𝜃, 𝜃𝜃] with 0 = 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃 < ∞, and Θ(0) > 0. That is, 
there is a mass of people, who care not a whit about sanctioning. To 𝑟𝑟 and 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘 we add the scale of 
the sanction, 𝑥𝑥′, which specifies the magnitude of reward or punishment appropriate to the 
context. This provides a measure of the importance of the action, and to ignore the scale of the 
decision context, when choosing how to sanction character, would have implausible 
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implications, such as taking a bad person, who is curt with a waiter, to be equally deserving of 
punishment as someone of equally bad character, who robs a bank. Since virtue is willingness 
coupled with action, and people are not sanctioned merely for being, character must be matched 
with a context that involves choice. In contexts with certainty about the mapping of choices to 
allocations, I propose defining the scale as the transfer called for by the moral norm, viz., the 
patient’s entitlement such that 𝑥𝑥′ = 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗 (I will present a more general specification that includes 
uncertainty later). Thus, the ideal sanction can be expressed 
?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘 = 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑟𝑟�𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗 − 𝛾𝛾�𝑘𝑘� ∙ 𝑥𝑥′. 
Finally, to sanction means to increase or decrease the patient’s payoff beyond what is 
called for by distributive preferences alone (i.e., 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗), so ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘 is incorporated into the fairness 
function. The complete specification of the utility function of an agent with material utility, 
fairness, altruism and virtue preferences is 
(6) 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖) + 𝜎𝜎 ∙ 𝑓𝑓 �𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘 − 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗 − ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘�� + 𝜎𝜎 ∙ 𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘). 
Various specifications of this utility function will be fleshed out in the sections that follow. Note 
that subscripts are suppressed, wherever subject roles are clear. 
3. Applications of Allocative Preferences 
One of the main goals of this paper is to reconcile stylized facts from a wide range of 
prior experiments with the theoretical framework advanced here. This section discusses 
applications of the allocative theory with moral salience to findings that frequently emerge 
across various contexts, including both classic and anomalous results. 
3.1. Classic Results 
This section demonstrates the consistency of the theory with classic results of social 
preference experiments. Below is a list of stylized facts (SF), each of which is accompanied by 
(and sometimes identical to) a theorem that asserts a claim about the consistency of the SF, or 
parts of it, with the theory. This is followed by proofs, which are based on the theory, explicitly 
stated additional assumptions and/or previously stated stylized facts. Note that parts of some SF 
are simply taken as empirical regularities and are not proven, and some may be used in 
subsequent proofs. Minor or lengthier proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
SF 3.1.1: There is a mass at null transfers in the standard dictator game (e.g., 36%, on average, 
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across multiple studies in the survey of Engel, 2011). 
THEOREM 3.1.1: Suppose for the least fair dictators (i.e., those with 𝜙𝜙) in the standard dictator 
game with salience denoted 𝜎𝜎 it is the case that 𝑢𝑢′(𝑋𝑋) > 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′ �−𝜙𝜙𝜂𝜂�. Then there is a 
mass at null transfers in the standard dictator game. 
PROOF: In the standard dictator game, transfers are constrained to be non-negative, so a corner 
solution results at 𝑥𝑥 = 0 among that fraction of dictators who are comparatively self-interested, 
i.e., for whom 𝑢𝑢′(𝑋𝑋) ≥ 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′(−𝜙𝜙𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′(0). Specifically, sufficient conditions for this are 
the mass of dictators, who are both not altruistic (i.e., Α(0) > 0), and who are also the least fair 
such that at 𝑢𝑢′(𝑋𝑋) > 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′ �−𝜙𝜙𝜂𝜂�. 
SF 3.1.2: Some dictators in the standard game make “super-fair” transfers, i.e., transfers of more 
than one-half (e.g., 13%, on average, across various studies in Engel, 2011, 6% in the 
Standard treatment in Konow, 2010). This is a minority of dictators that is smaller than 
the fraction of those who make null transfers. 
THEOREM 3.1.2: In the standard dictator game, a minority of dictators makes “super-fair” 
transfers, which are not optimal in the absence of altruism. 
PROOF: The assumption that 0 < Α(𝛼𝛼) − Α(𝛼𝛼∗) < 0.5, where 𝛼𝛼∗ = {𝛼𝛼|𝑢𝑢′(𝑋𝑋 − 𝜂𝜂) =
𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′(𝛼𝛼𝜂𝜂)} in the standard dictator game, implies there is a minority of dictators, whose optimal 
transfers are super-fair, since for them 𝑢𝑢′(𝑋𝑋 − 𝜂𝜂) < 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′(0) + 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′(𝛼𝛼𝜂𝜂) when 𝑥𝑥 = 𝜂𝜂. Such 
transfers are never optimal in the absence of the altruism term since, in that case, 𝑢𝑢′(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) >
𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′(0) = 0. 
Note that the part of SF 3.1.2 regarding the fraction of super-fair dictators being smaller than 
those who make null transfers does not follow from previous assumptions, but this stylized fact 
is used in the proof of the next claim. 
SF/THEOREM 3.1.3: If null transfers are more numerous than super-fair transfers, then the 
mean transfer in the standard dictator game is strictly between zero and one-half of the 
stakes (e.g., Camerer, 2003, Engel, 2011). 
PROOF: See Appendix 1. 
On the basis of this theorem, and the facts, one can disregard super-fair dictators, whenever the 
focus is on the mean behavior of dictators. In fact, except where otherwise stated, the analysis in 
this paper refers to mean behavior. 
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SF/THEOREM 3.1.4: In the standard dictator game, some dictators transfer amounts that 
equalize or come close to equalizing allocations (e.g., Camerer, 2003, Engel, 2011). 
PROOF: According to Assumption 3, the entitlement can be inferred from spectator allocations 
in the same context. In the standard dictator game, which lacks information about effort, need or 
other distributive norms, the entitlement reduces to equal splits according to spectator 
allocations, e.g., Croson and Konow (2009, RZ treatment) and Konow (2000, 
benevolent/exogenous treatment). Combined with Theorem 2.2.3, transfers closer to equality in 
these games are consistent with dictators, who have higher values of 𝜙𝜙. 
Note that strict equality does not emerge from fairness preferences alone, since 𝜙𝜙 < ∞, but it can 
with the added effect of altruism. An argument for the mass at equality will be discussed later. 
Another design, which I call the “tax experiment,” consists of dictator games in which a 
fixed total endowment (𝑀𝑀�) is distributed differently across treatments between dictator (X) and 
recipient (Y), where 𝑋𝑋 > 𝑌𝑌 and 𝑀𝑀� = 𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌. 
SF/THEOREM 3.1.5: Crowding out is partial (or incomplete) in the tax experiment. Incomplete 
crowding out means that the average dictator transfer, x, decreases by less than any 
increase in the recipient’s endowment (e.g., Bolton and Katok, 1998, Korenok, Millner 
and Razzolini, 2017, Cox, List, Price, Sadiraj, and Samek, 2019). 
PROOF: See Appendix 1 for the proof of incomplete crowding out, i.e., −1 < 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌� < 0. 
Fairness alone predicts complete crowding out, i.e., 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌� = −1, so this underscores the 
importance of including altruism in the agent’s moral preferences. 
Another piece of corroborating evidence for altruism can be found in the study of 
Crumpler and Grossman (2008). In what I will call the “futile dictator” experiment, the 
experimenter makes a preset charitable donation, and dictators can also contribute to the charity, 
but then the experimenter’s donation is reduced by the same amount as the dictator’s gift, so that 
the amount received by the charity remains the same. Nevertheless, most dictators (57%) 
contribute a significant fraction of their endowment (20%, on average). This result is also 
consistent with our theory, as proven in the following theorem. 
THEOREM 3.1.6: Some dictators contribute a positive amount in the futile dictator experiment. 
PROOF: See Appendix 1. 
Such transfers cannot be explained by fairness but are consistent with agents, whose altruism is 
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sufficiently strong. The estimates from Crumpler and Grossman not only provide further 
evidence supportive of altruism (or warm glow) but are also consistent with our assumption that 
the lower bound on the fraction of agents with altruistic preferences (𝛼𝛼 > 0) is greater than one-
half. 
In what I call the “subsidy experiment,” the dictator’s endowment is held constant (𝑋𝑋�) 
while the recipient’s endowment is varied across treatments. 
SF/THEOREM 3.1.7: Crowding out is partial in the subsidy experiment. Thus, the average 
dictator transfer, x, decreases by less than any increase in the recipient’s endowment (e.g., 
Konow, 2010, Korenok, Millner and Razzolini, 2012). 
PROOF: See Appendix 1 for the proof of partial crowding out, i.e., −1 < 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌� < 0. 
Altruism alone predicts complete crowding out, i.e., 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌� = 0, so this validates the inclusion 
of fairness in the agent’s moral preferences. 
SF/THEOREM 3.1.8: When information relevant to moral norms is added, stakeholder 
allocations are significantly positively related to spectator norms involving inequality, 
including equity/proportionality (e.g., Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren, 2002, Konow 
2000, Konow, Saijo and Akai, 2020, Korenok, Millner and Razzolini, 2017, Oxoby and 
Spraggon, 2008), need (e.g., Benz and Meier, 2008, Eckel and Grossman, 1996, Konow, 
2010, 2019, Muller and Renes, 2017) and efficiency (Almås, Cappelen, and Tungodden, 
2020, Charness and Rabin, 2002, Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, Faravelli 2007). 
PROOF: This follows from Assumption 3 and Theorem 2.2.5. 
This theory can be applied to explain or predict numerous types of stylized facts, 
including about mean behavior of agents or subgroups of agents, and the distribution of behavior 
based on salience, fairness types, altruism types, and action sets. But I am postponing discussion 
of one type of stylized fact until section 7: preference-based masses that are often observed in 
certain social preference experiments, e.g., a spike at equal splits in many standard dictator 
games. Preference-based masses are distinct from those due to a constrained action space, which 
can be explained within the current theory (e.g., SF 3.1.1 above). Later I offer salience-based 
explanations for preference-based masses by employing a type of moral salience, called point 
salience, that is different from the set salience otherwise used in this paper. 
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3.2 Moral Proximity 
Effective altruism is a philosophical and social movement that, simply put, advocates for 
directing charitable resources to where they will do the most good. As compelling as that 
argument seems, though, it is inconsistent with much charitable behavior: many donors in 
developed countries prefer local or domestic causes over charities in developing countries, 
although their donations could make a much bigger difference in the lives of more people with 
the latter. In this section, I argue that one of the most important and common examples of an 
anomaly that can be explained by moral salience is what I will call moral proximity. This 
provides an explanation for the effects on moral behavior of, inter alia, physical distance, 
homophily, familial relations, friendship, in-groups, or information about the agent or patient. 
These effects often seem so intuitive that they hardly strike us as anomalous, although it is still 
sometimes surprising how easily they can be triggered. And yet they are not predicted by most 
social preference theories, and I am unaware of theoretical accounts that are able to cast all the 
different examples in a unified framework. 
One of the most important practical moral questions is how to identify one’s moral 
group, that is, the set of persons to which one is obliged to be moral. Most of philosophical 
ethics concerns moral principles in general terms and scarcely addresses the question of moral 
groups (although there are exceptions, e.g., Walzer, 1983). Although equal moral consideration 
of all seems noble, it is self-evident that moral obligations cannot extend indefinitely, and the 
boundaries are very much in dispute: some people draw the line at one’s family, clan, religious 
group or ethnic group, some claim we are obliged to our fellow citizens, some to the unborn, 
some to all people in the world, and some also to animals (which raises the further question of 
“which animals?”). Even a broad conception of moral group cannot plausibly maintain that all 
members of that group are equal: surely, the obligation to one’s child differs from that to a 
securities trader in a distant country. The identification of the moral group is paramount to 
economic policy. For example, suppose one seeks to promote fair earnings (or efficient earnings 
or any other normative goal). The first order of business is to identify the set of persons whose 
earners should be targeted: those within a firm, city, county, state, country, the world? There is 
also the sticky question of which generations to include, which is critical for so many policies 
including climate change, i.e., do we include only the current generation or also future ones, and, 
if so, which? There are practical reasons for favoring one answer or the other, but the moral 
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question must still be factored in, and its resolution is less than obvious. 
I will not attempt to resolve these normative questions here, but they are offered as 
motivation for the importance of the topic and as inspiration for the current descriptive 
undertaking. The descriptive importance of the topic is suggested by various phenomena, 
including by the effects of co-workers on productivity, e.g., see Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 
(2010). The focus here is on analyzing of how moral behavior is affected by contextual factors 
that make the patient’s membership in the agent’s moral group more or less salient. That is what 
is meant by moral proximity, and we proceed, as usual when operationalizing moral salience, 
from a high salience reference point to help identify the properties that affect salience. 
Assumption 2 in section 2.1 outlined high salience. To elaborate the proximity aspect of that 
assumption, consider the following assumption. 
ASSUMPTION 4: Patients are most morally proximate and, therefore, salient, when, ceteris 
paribus, they are physically near, personal information about them is abundant and/or stresses 
their membership in the agent’s moral group, they are associated with other proximate persons, 
others possess abundant personal information about the agent, agent and patient communicate 
with one another, and agent and patient share traits in common, even ones that might seem 
superficial and morally irrelevant. In the case of cardinal measures of distance, let the patient, 
who is most proximate to the agent, have positive measure, 𝑝𝑝 > 0 and the additional distance to 
a more distant patient be non-moral context, n. 
The variables listed above are not presented as exhaustive, since the question of what 
affects perceptions of moral groups is an empirical one. But take first the case of moral 
proximity and physical distance. Specifically, consider an agent, who may transfer something of 
material value to a patient, whereby the distance to different patients varies. The factor that 
varies in this context, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖, is physical distance, and 𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) is a measure of it. Then, define p and n 
for this cardinal measure as in Assumption 4. Further, denote the total distance δ = 𝑝𝑝 + 𝑛𝑛 and 
normalize the measure of the distance of the most proximate patient, i.e., 𝑝𝑝 = 1. Then, 
remembering our specification for moral salience, this can be expressed 
(6) 𝜎𝜎 = (1 − 𝜎𝜎�) ∙ 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕+𝑛𝑛
+ 𝜎𝜎� = (1 − 𝜎𝜎�) ∙ 1
δ
+ 𝜎𝜎�, 
which, if 𝜎𝜎� = 0, reduces to 𝜎𝜎 = 1
δ
. It is interesting to note that 1
δ
 also captures a feature of visual 
salience, viz., the relationship between distance and perceived size: an object at twice the 
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distance appears half as large. Now we turn to some recent evidence on giving and physical 
distance. 
SF/THEOREM 3.2.1: Agent contributions decrease at a decreasing rate with physical distance to 
patients (Touré-Tillery and Fishbach, 2017, Dejean, 2020, Kühl and Szech, 2017). 
PROOF: This follows from Assumption 4 and Theorem 2.2.2 under the assumptions stated there. 
FIGURE 2. – Generosity and Non-moral Context. 
Sources: (a) Touré-Tillery and Fishbach (2017) Study 2, (b) Kühl and Szech (2017) laboratory experiment, (c) 
Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), (d) Grossman (2015) P&O condition, (e) List (2007) baseline, Take $1 and Take 
$5, and (f) Zhang and Ortmann (2013) baseline, $1 and $5 giving decisions. 
Some recent studies find that physical distance influences contributions to others. Touré-
Tillery and Fishbach (2017) report that alumni giving to a large private US university is 
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inversely related to physical distance (Study 2). Figure 2 summarizes the relationships between 
generosity and non-moral context for six studies. I will return to panels (c) to (f) later in the 
paper, but note now the consistency of the results with Theorem 2.2.2 across diverse measures of 
generosity and diverse measures of non-moral context: they are all inversely related, and the 
generosity measures appear convex in non-moral context, 𝑛𝑛, in every case where it is possible to 
detect it, that is, wherever there are more than two levels of 𝑛𝑛 (i.e., except for d). Panel (a) of this 
figure illustrates the results of a regression based on the data of Touré-Tillery and Fishbach that 
employs the natural log of distance, which provides a better fit than a linear specification or a 
non-linear one that adds the square of distance. These results are consistent with moral 
proximity: donations decrease with physical distance at a decreasing rate. The authors report that 
the inverse relationship is robust to various controls, including age, income, graduation year, etc. 
That said, observational studies cannot rule out omitted variable bias, although they can 
sometimes shed light on it. Dejean (2020) studies the relationship between rewards-based 
crowdfunding and physical distance. Using a log specification, he finds investments to decrease 
with distance at a decreasing rate, viz., they are half as large at twice the distance. Nevertheless, 
the effect of distance is significantly reduced when social networks are taken into account. Social 
networks are consistent with a different kind of moral proximity, but this effect weakens claims 
about physical distance, per se.8 Such issues are not a concern with the experimental studies of 
anonymous giving by Kühl and Szech (2017), which permit stronger causal inferences about the 
effect of physical distance. Their field experiment finds donations to local refugees decrease 
significantly with distance to their camp, holding other factors constant. Their laboratory 
experiment comes to similar conclusions about donations to charities, although the relationship is 
insignificant at longer distances.9 Figure 2b shows the decrease in average contributions with 
 
8 One should be cautious, though, about trying to transfer lessons from Dejean’s study to the topic of generosity. 
Rewards-based crowdfunding arguably relates partially to generosity, given that the rewards are often uncertain and 
not commensurate with the investments, but there is an expectation of some “reward,” even if only a thank you note, 
which leaves a role for the confounding force of strategic self-interest. In addition, the dependent variable is the 
number of contributions rather than their value. 
9 The effect at longer distances of up to 6000 miles is likely confounded by other factors. Participants report lower 
feelings of responsibility toward more distant recipients, consistent with moral proximity, but their contributions are 
not significantly related to distance. The authors attribute this to participants failing truly to have constant beliefs 
across distances despite the authors attempts to hold all else constant, e.g., through claims about similar per capita 
GDP. That seems plausible, since Germany, where the study was conducted, has one of the highest per capita GDPs 
in the world, and their questionnaire results show a much higher focus on people at longer distances being in need. 




distance for their laboratory experiment. Although the convexity appears subtle in this case, that 
is due to the short distances, and the change in the slope is actually comparable to that in Dejean 
and greater than that in Touré-Tillery and Fishbach for comparable distances. 
Many of the other factors that influence moral proximity have often been characterized as 
“social distance” (in the pre-COVID-19 sense of the term). For example, transfers rise, when 
even limited information about the dictator is provided to the experimenter (Hoffman, McCabe 
and Smith, 1996), the recipient (Bohnet and Frey, 1999, Grossman, 2015), or both (Alevy, 
Jeffries, and Lu, 2014). In fact, giving rises, even if the mere existence of a dictator, who remains 
anonymous, is revealed to the recipient (Dana, Cain and Dawes, 2006). Even three dots on a 
screen in a “watching eyes” position, instead of a neutral position, can increase dictator transfers 
(Rigdon et al., 2009). Some of these effects can plausibly be attributed, at least in part, to social 
image concerns, even under anonymity (see the discussion in the following section of Andreoni 
and Bernheim, 2009). Nevertheless, social image does not easily explain other factors that fall 
under the rubric of moral proximity. Dictator giving rises, if the recipient reveals one-way his/her 
identity to the dictator (Bohnet and Frey, 1999), indeed, even if only the recipient’s family name 
is revealed (Charness and Gneezy, 2008). Conversely, dictator gifts fall, if it is revealed that the 
recipient is a member of an out-group (Whitt and Wilson, 2007), and Candelo, Eckel and 
Johnson (2018) report that dictator transfers to a family member are greater than those to a 
community group or stranger. In addition, transfers increase, if recipients can send a message to 
the dictator (Bohnet and Frey, 1999, Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008, Xiao and Houser, 2009). 
Unlike physical distance, these social distance factors typically do not lend themselves to 
cardinal measures of p and n. But they provide plausible examples of moral proximity, and we 
will occasionally return to this effect in later sections. Moreover, the direction of the effect of a 
factor on salience in these cases is obvious, and that suffices where we employ such qualitative 
variables to explain categorical changes due to salience. 
3.3 Moral Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is present in virtually all economic decisions, and it can often be managed to 
some degree. Nevertheless, people sometimes use uncertainty as an excuse to avoid costly 
 
recipients really do enjoy the same average income, levels of inequality elsewhere are surely higher, meaning that 
the distant poor are likely needier than the local poor. 
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actions that are otherwise justified on both economic and moral grounds, such as taking steps to 
address climate change (Finus and Pintassilgo, 2013). Many studies have demonstrated the 
relevance of uncertainty to economic decision making, including in economics experiments 
involving moral preferences, e.g., Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (2005), Brock, Lange and 
Ozbay (2013), Cappelen, Konow, Sørensen and Tungodden (2013), Rey-Biel, Sheremeta and 
Uler (2018), Van Koten, Ortmann and Babicky (2013), and Zizzo (2003). In particular, the 
controlled methods of experiments can help show that the reduction in moral conduct with 
increased uncertainty is associated with moral preferences themselves and cannot be dismissed 
as being due solely to other forces, such as risk preferences. 
Moral uncertainty refers to the depressing effect on moral salience because of uncertainty 
in the context about the agent’s choice. Assumption 5 specifies the kind of experimental 
uncertainty considered here as well as its relationship to moral salience. 
ASSUMPTION 5: In the “uncertainty game” allocations may be randomly determined by an 
agent or by default, the latter because either the agent is randomly precluded from choosing 
allocations or the agent’s choice is not randomly chosen for realization. The probability of such a 
default constitutes non-moral context, 𝑛𝑛, where 𝑛𝑛 ∈ [0,1]. Moral context has some positive 
measure, 𝑝𝑝 > 0, the value of which depends inversely on the sensitivity of 𝜎𝜎 to 𝑛𝑛 in the selected 
context. Baseline moral salience, 𝜎𝜎�, depends inversely on the unfairness of the default. 
Thus, this assumption means that the possibility that allocations will not be based on the agent’s 
choice reduces the moral salience of that choice. Moreover, salience is further reduced as the 
probability increases that the agent’s choice will not matter and as the default becomes less fair. 
In this framework, the moral measure, p, represents a certain implicit moral context and a 
parameter that effectively calibrates the sensitivity of 𝜎𝜎 to 𝑛𝑛. Similarly, the assumption about 𝜎𝜎� 
captures the concept that a less fair (fairer) default lowers (raises) moral salience given that 𝜎𝜎 =
(1 − 𝜎𝜎�) ∙ 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕+𝑛𝑛
+ 𝜎𝜎�. Assuming a specific form for the utility function, p and 𝜎𝜎� might be estimated 
empirically, but the theoretical analysis here does not depend on any particular values for these 
parameters beyond Assumption 5. 
Although numerous economics experiments have investigated uncertainty, I am aware of 
only a small number with designs suitable to the criteria considered here. As usual, the design 
must involve non-strategic decisions, and probabilities should be manipulated at two levels at a 
minimum. Some studies that satisfy these conditions must nevertheless be ruled out because their 
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design activates risk preferences (e.g., Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2010) or fairness preferences over 
risk because subjects choose levels of risk-taking (e.g., Cappelen et al., 2013). I focus on two 
studies that satisfy all requirements while representing two different and important categories of 
moral uncertainty. They lead to the following stylized fact and theorem. 
SF/THEOREM 3.3.1: Dictator transfers decrease at a decreasing rate with the probability of the 
default. The fairer the default, the greater the mean transfer and the greater (less negative) 
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛�  (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009, Grossman, 2015, P&O treatment). 
PROOF: The claims about transfers follow from Assumption 5 about n and Theorem 2.2.2 under 
the assumptions stated there. The claims about the effects of the fairness of the default follow 










FIGURE 3. – Uncertainty game of Andreoni and Bernheim (2009).  
Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) report the results of a dictator game, the design of which 
is illustrated in extensive form in Figure 3. Nature (N) first decides whether the Dictator (D) or 
Nature will allocate stakes, 𝑋𝑋�, of $20 between D and a recipient (R). Nature allocates with 
probability n, whereby this probability varies across four levels within subjects, viz., 𝑛𝑛 ∈
{0,0.25,0.5,0.75}. If Nature allocates, there is an equal chance, 𝑞𝑞 = 0.5, either that 𝑋𝑋� − 𝑥𝑥0 goes 
to D and 𝑥𝑥0 to R or that 𝑥𝑥0 goes to D and 𝑋𝑋� − 𝑥𝑥0 to R, where 𝑥𝑥0 ∈ {0,1} is varied between 
subjects. With probability 1 − 𝑛𝑛, the allocations will follow the decision of D, who can choose 
any amount, 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 = [0,20]. Consider panel c of Figure 2, which was introduced in the prior 
section and shows the results of regressions of the fraction of stakes transferred by D to R on n 
for 𝑥𝑥0 = 0 and 𝑥𝑥0 = 1, separately. The slope and rate of change in fractional transfers are 
consistent with the predictions: transfers decrease with the probability of the default at a 
decreasing rate. The height and slope of transfers are also consistent with the predicted effects of 
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the fairness of the default: the curve for the fairer 𝑥𝑥0 = 1 treatment displays higher transfers and 
a flatter slope than the one for 𝑥𝑥0 = 0. 
Note that, if D finds him/herself in this branch of the game tree, the decision is entirely ex 
post. That is, the uncertainty has been resolved, and D knows with certainty that his/her transfer 
will be realized. This type of uncertainty should not matter in standard social preference theories. 
Andreoni and Bernheim make a persuasive case, however, for their theory of social image that is 
consistent with the results of this experiment. My aim here is not to fault the social image 
argument, which I find credible, but rather to provide an explanation based on moral salience 
that predicts these and additional results, while noting that the two accounts are not mutual 
exclusive. 
FIGURE 4. – Uncertainty game of Grossman (2015).  
The moral uncertainty argument does not require that the agent’s action set, 𝑋𝑋, be subject 
to uncertainty, because moral salience can be affected by information about uncertainty in the 
decision context, Y. This explains how non-moral elements of Y can reduce moral salience, even 
when, as in this experiment, decisions are ex post. According to this account, an experiment in 
which one subject might have been randomly chosen to receive an unfair share of (almost) all of 
the stakes diminishes the prominence of moral considerations and, therefore, of moral 
preferences, more so, as the probability of the default increases and as the default becomes less 
fair. In addition, the moral salience explanation has five uniquely attractive features. First, it can 
explain not only the decrease in x with n but also the decreasing rate of change. Second, it 
predicts the decreased rate of change (i.e., flatter slope) at higher levels of 𝑥𝑥0. Third, it explains 
the increase in x with 𝑥𝑥0 among those Ds giving more than 𝑥𝑥0 due to higher fixed moral salience. 
This effect is not predicted by, and, in fact, is inconsistent with, social image, which predicts that 
the higher transfer, when 𝑥𝑥0 = 1, should be due solely to the shift by Ds, who would otherwise 
give zero at 𝑥𝑥0 = 0. Fourth, the theory is simple and parsimonious. Fifth, moral salience is 
consistent with a wide range of other anomalies that are not predicted by alternative accounts 
30 
 
such as social image.10 
Grossman (2015) reports a variation on a dictator experiment designed to test his theory 
of social-image and self-image. Dictators not only make ex post decisions, which follow the 
resolution of some uncertainty as in Andreoni and Bernheim, but also face ex ante uncertainty. 
The experimental design in illustrated is Figure 4. This is a binary dictator game with only two 
possible pairs of payoffs to D,R of (H,L) or (F,F), where 0 ≤ 𝐿𝐿 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐻𝐻 and 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐻𝐻 < 2𝐹𝐹, 
specifically, in Grossman (2015), 𝐻𝐻 = 7, 𝐹𝐹 = 5, 𝐿𝐿 = 1. Nature first determines with equal 
probability, 𝑞𝑞 = 0.5, which of two games the dictator will play, 1 or 2, and this random 
assignment is common knowledge. These games differ based on whether the default is Fair, i.e., 
(F,F), in game 1 or Unfair, i.e., (H,L), in game 2. Subjects are randomly assigned one of two 
probabilities of the default obtaining, 𝑛𝑛 ∈ {0, 2
3
}, which is also common knowledge. Dictators 
choose the payoffs ex ante in the event their decision is chosen, either the Unfair option A (A1 in 
game 1 or A2 in game 2) or the Fair option B (B1 in game 1 and B2 in game 2). 
Ds make these decisions in three treatments of a between-subjects design that differ with 
respect to the information that is available to Rs. They can observe the D’s choice (C), the 
outcome (O) or both the probability and outcome (P&O). Comparing variation in the fraction of 
Fair choices with probabilities in the three treatments, the results produce little support for self-
image and mixed results on social image. On the other hand, the results are significantly 
consistent with most predictions of moral uncertainty in two of three treatments (C, P&O) and 
insignificantly opposite it in the third (O). This last fact is perhaps because social image concerns 
muddy the waters somewhat, especially, where they are predicted to do so in O. The results of 
the treatment with the information conditions closest to the standard dictator game (viz., P&O) 
are summarized in panel d of Figure 2. This shows that the average transfer to R, or equivalently 
here, the fraction of Ds choosing Fair, decreases with n, and the fairer default results in higher 
average transfers and a flatter slope. Note that there is one claim of Theorem 2.2.2 to which the 
Grossman study cannot speak: since these experiments only vary the probability of the default at 
two levels, these results cannot shed light on the rate of change of x with n. 
 
10 The later section on moral point salience presents an additional salience-based argument for the higher average 
transfers when 𝑥𝑥0 = 1 than when 𝑥𝑥0 = 0 as well as for masses at those values. 
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4. Applications of Virtue Preferences 
This section applies the model that includes virtue preferences to classic results about 
reciprocity and to anomalous findings about the so-called outcome bias. 
4.1. Reciprocity 
Reciprocity refers to a type of behavior, where people return kindness with kindness, 
called positive reciprocity, or unkindness with unkindness, called negative reciprocity. Such 
behavior has been found in numerous experimental designs, including with the seminal gift 
exchange game of Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993), the trust game of Berg, Dickhaut and 
McCabe (1995), the triadic design of Cox (2004), and the moonlighting game of Abbink, 
Irlenbusch and Renner (2000). These results can be summarized in the following statement. 
SF 4.1.1: Stakeholders sanction (Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982, Berg, Dickhaut and 
McCabe, 1995, Cox, 2004, Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner, 2000). Moreover, they 
sanction asymmetrically, punishing low generosity more strongly than they reward high 
generosity (Croson and Konow, 2009, Cushman, Dreber, Wang and Costa, 2009, 
Offerman, 2002). 
Further studies show that subjects exhibit generalized reciprocity, acting not only when they are 
the objects of kindness or unkindness but also as third parties sanctioning kindness or unkindness 
by others toward others, e.g., Almenberg, Dreber, Apicella and Rand (2011), and Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2004). 
A critical question is the extent to which such behavior reflects reciprocal altruism, i.e., a 
preference to reward or punish, or some other motive (see Sobel, 2005, for an excellent 
theoretical treatment of types of reciprocity). As an illustration of this distinction, consider the 
ultimatum game, in which a “proposer” proposes a division of a fixed sum of money between 
him/herself and a “responder,” and the responder either accepts, and the sum is divided as 
proposed, or rejects, in which case both earn nothing (Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982). 
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under that standard assumptions of rational, self-
interested agents is for the responder to accept any amount and for the proposer, therefore, to 
offer the minimum amount. Nevertheless, the results of hundreds of replications show that 
proposers typically offer non-negligible positive amounts and responders often reject offers of 
less than one-half (Camerer, 2003). But there are various alternative motives at play in this game. 
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For example, responders might reject for purely distributive, or fairness, reasons and not to 
punish the proposer, or the responder might care about efficiency, or the responder might have 
altruistic preferences toward the proposer. Even if the responder wishes to punish the proposer, 
though, even a comparatively generous proposer’s intentions are clouded by motives other than 
fairness, such as a self-interested desire to avoid rejection, which is further confounded by risk 
preferences. Indeed, comparison with other games imply decisions in the ultimatum game result 
from a confluence of motives, e.g., Forsythe , Horowitz, Savin and Sefton (1994). 
For those reasons, I discuss a non-strategic dictator experiment on reciprocal motives. 
Croson and Konow (2009) introduced a two-stage dictator game in which a dictator first chooses 
one of six divisions with a recipient, {(10-0), (8-2), (6-4), (4-6), (2-8), (0-10)}, of a sum of 
money, 𝑋𝑋 = 10. Then, there follows a previously unannounced second stage, in which a 
different subject chooses a division between the same subjects of an additional sum of money, 
𝑍𝑍 = 20, in any integer amounts. In one experimental condition, the second stage dictator and 
recipient are the first stage recipient and dictator, respectively. For clarity, I will refer to them 
according to their first stage roles as D and R, respectively. In this condition, R is a stakeholder, 
or party to the allocations. In another condition, the second stage allocator is a third party, or 
spectator, who is paid a fixed sum to allocate Z between D and R. Another pair of treatments is 
identical to these two with stakeholder and spectator versions, except the first stage allocation is 
not chosen by anyone but rather is randomly assigned, so this is a 2 × 2 between-subjects design. 
The strategy method is employed for second stage allocations: all second stage allocators choose 
a division of Z for each of the six possible first stage divisions. The variable of interest is the 
allocation decisions about Z by the second stage allocators based on whether they were 
themselves a stakeholder or spectator and on whether the first stage division was chosen by a 
dictator or randomly determined. 
Take first the case of the stakeholder, R, who is endowed with the amount received from 
the first stage, x, plus the second stage sum, Z, and can transfer any amount, 𝑧𝑧 ∈ [0,𝑍𝑍], to D 
(note f refers here to D as the second stage recipient). This R’s utility function can be written 
 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥 + 𝑍𝑍 − 𝑧𝑧) + 𝜎𝜎 ∙ 𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝑧𝑧 − 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 − 𝜃𝜃 ∙ 𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑥𝑥′)� + 𝜎𝜎 ∙ 𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝑧𝑧) 
where the entitlement of the current recipient is 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 = 𝑍𝑍 2� − 𝑋𝑋 + 𝑥𝑥 + 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥. That is, D is entitled to 
one-half of the current endowment, 𝑍𝑍 2� , since this is a simple D game. In addition, 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 reverses 
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any inequity in how much D took in the first stage, 𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥, where 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 = 𝑋𝑋 2�  is the fair 
division of the first stage stakes, again equal splits because this is a simple D game. We can also 
specify virtue preferences more precisely for this experiment. As explained in section 2.3, 
threshold generosity, 𝛾𝛾�, is the break-even level of generosity for reward or punishment and 
depends on moral salience in the reference state, 𝜎𝜎�. But since the choice of reference state is 
arbitrary and salience depends on many aspects of moral and non-moral context, we can define 
the reference state to correspond to one in which moral salience is at the same level as in the first 
stage of the dictator game at hand. In that case, threshold generosity, 𝛾𝛾�, equals the threshold 
transfer of D in the first stage, 𝑥𝑥�. Similarly, R’s estimate of D’s generosity, 𝛾𝛾�, then corresponds 
to D’s actual generosity in the first stage, 𝑥𝑥.11 Finally, the scale is the fair division of the second 
stage sum, i.e., 𝑥𝑥′ = 𝑍𝑍 2� . Then, R’s utility function in the second stage can be written 
 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥 + 𝑍𝑍 − 𝑧𝑧) + 𝜎𝜎 ∙ 𝑓𝑓 �𝜙𝜙�𝑧𝑧 − 𝑍𝑍 2� +
𝑋𝑋
2� − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜃𝜃 ∙ 𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥�) ∙
𝑍𝑍
2� �� + 𝜎𝜎 ∙ 𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝑧𝑧). 
Now we come to the following theorem about stakeholders in this experiment. 
THEOREM 4.1.1: In the two-stage dictator game, second stage allocators, who are stakeholders, 
partially adjust for first stage transfers that are random, i.e., 0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥� < 1, but some 
stakeholders sanction first stage dictators, i.e., 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�  increases, when those dictators 
choose first stage allocations. 
PROOF: See Appendix 1. 
When first stage endowments are random, the sanction term, ?̃?𝑧, drops out, and the partial 
adjustment of 𝑧𝑧 to 𝑥𝑥 is merely an application of Theorem 3.1.5 to the two-stage dictator game. 
When first stage dictators reveal their character through their choices, however, this term 
increases to include sanctioning. 
Note that one part of SF 4.1.1 that is not claimed in Theorem 4.1.1 is asymmetric 
sanctioning. Stakeholder allocations do not produce a clear measure of this asymmetry, given the 
confluence of additional motives, including material self-interest, inequity aversion and altruism, 
so we turn now to spectators, whose decisions are predicted to generate an undistorted measure. 
The utility function of a spectator in this experiment can be written 
 
11 To be exact, 𝛾𝛾� = 𝑥𝑥 for interior solutions, but further specification of 𝛾𝛾� is needed in the case of corner solutions. 
This refinement is unnecessary for the current focus on mean behavior, but it will be addressed in section 5.2, where 
it provides insight into an additional finding that becomes apparent in the design discussed there. 
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 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑧𝑧̅) + 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 �𝜙𝜙�𝑧𝑧 − 𝑍𝑍 2� +
𝑋𝑋
2� − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜃𝜃 ∙ 𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥�) ∙
𝑍𝑍
2� ��. 
where 𝑧𝑧̅ represents the fixed payment the spectator receives for making this decision. Remember 
that no altruism term is included in a spectator’s utility function, since the relationship is 
impartial rather than personal.12 Theorem 4.1.2 follows. 
THEOREM 4.1.2: In the two-stage dictator game with randomly assigned first stage allocations, 
second stage allocators, who are spectators, equalize, adjusting completely for first stage 
transfers that are random, i.e., 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥� = 1. When dictators choose first stage allocations, 
some spectators sanction them, i.e., 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥� > 1, and some equalize. Those who sanction 
have different thresholds, 𝑥𝑥�, and sanction, on average, asymmetrically, punishing more 
strongly than they reward. 
PROOF: See Appendix 1. 
 FIGURE 5. – Sanctioning in Croson and Konow (2009). 
Spectator allocations are motivated solely by fairness and virtue preferences. Following 
SF 3.1.4, fairness reduces to equality in a simple dictator game of this sort. When first stage 
allocations are random, spectators adjust z to x one-for-one, but, when they are chosen by first 
stage dictators, virtue preferences kick in, and spectators sanction. The asymmetry follows from 
the fact that 𝑑𝑑
2𝑧𝑧
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥2� < 0 due to the concavity of r. Figure 5 illustrates results from Croson and 
 
12 Note also that the fairness preference is formulated with respect to the first stage dictator, because that is the 
subject, who has revealed something about his character. A term could be added for fairness toward the first stage 
recipient, but unfairness toward one first stage subject is simply mirrored by unfairness in the opposite direction 
toward another, and the conclusions are qualitatively unaffected, so I avoid this clutter as in previous analysis of 















Konow of spectator reward or punishment as the mean amounts by which their transfers to the 
first stage dictator, z, fall short of or exceed equalizing transfers for each level of transfer chosen 
by first stage dictators. The mean sanctions of all spectators are illustrated in the light columns, 
but only 50% of spectators sanction, consistent with the assumption that some agents place zero 
weight on sanctioning (Θ(0) > 0). Another 37% equalize, and the other 13% cannot be put into 
either category.13 The mean reward and punishment of only those who sanction are illustrated in 
the darker columns. Figure 5 suggests an asymmetry, which is corroborated in more formal 
analysis in Croson and Konow and is generally consistent with third party sanctioning in other 
studies, such as Almenberg et al. (2011) and Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). Moreover, one 
observes the assumed heterogeneity in thresholds: 27% of spectators stop punishing (and 
thereafter either equalize or begin rewarding) at a first stage transfer of 0, 40% at 2, 20% at 4, 
and 13% at 6.  
4.2. Outcome Bias 
Numerous studies across multiple disciplines have established a preference for rewarding 
or punishing individuals based on uncontrollable (or brute) luck, including in politics (e.g., 
Healy, Malhotra, and Mo, 2010), sports (e.g., Kausel, Ventura and Rodriguez, 2019), and CEO 
compensation (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). In the law, someone, who kills another 
accidentally, can be sentenced more harshly than someone, who meant to kill another but failed 
(Cushman et al., 2009). In economics, this so-called outcome bias has also been extensively 
studied experimentally, especially, in the context of the principal-agent problem (e.g., Charness 
and Levine, 2007, Rubin and Sheremeta, 2016). Although the optimal contract rewards effort 
and disregards luck, people sanction luck, even when decision makers are clearly not responsible 
(Gurdal, Miller and Rustichini, 2013) and even when those who are sanctioning are third parties 
(Brownback and Kuhn, 2019). Outcome bias is also enigmatic from the perspective of 
reciprocity theories in behavioral economics, which conceptualize reward and punishment in 
terms of intended consequences (e.g., Rabin, 1993, Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). Outcome bias 
has additionally been a focus of philosophical deliberation (e.g., Williams, 1981). 
In this section, I argue that, although outcome bias is inconsistent with optimal contracts 
 
13 The comments of the 13% in the post-experimental questionnaire indicate that half misunderstood their task and 
that the other half believed (mistakenly) that some aspect of the decisions was strategic. 
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and reciprocity theories, it is consistent with moral intuition and virtue preferences. Indeed, in a 
more general specification of virtue preferences, outcome bias is not a bias, at all. Consider the 
intuition: two individuals, who are operating a motor vehicle, run a stop sign, the one without 
consequence and the other causing the death of a family. Do we legally, and should we morally, 
really hold the two equally accountable? In the one case, the driver might pay a fine of a few 
hundred dollars, whereas, in the other case, the driver can be found guilty of manslaughter and 
serve jail time. I claim that “outcome bias” is a feature, not a bug, of moral preferences: the 
relevant sanctioning motive is with respect to intent coupled with consequential action, as treated 
in virtue preferences and its philosophical inspiration, virtue ethics. Specifically, the difference 
in sanctions reflects the intuition exemplified above, which can be incorporated by scaling virtue 
preferences according to whether or not the intended outcome obtained. Consider the following 
stylized facts from economics experiments on this topic. 
SF 4.2.1: When an agent can choose actions with uncertain outcomes, others sanction the agent, 
meaning these rewards and punishments are not explained by distributive preferences 
alone. Sanctions are asymmetric: low generosity is punished more strongly than high 
generosity of equal magnitude (Cushman et al., 2009, de Oliveira, Smith and Spraggon, 
2017). 
SF 4.2.2: Sanctions are based not only on the chosen action (and its expected outcome) but also 
the realized outcome, for which the agent is not responsible. The sanctions for actions 
leading to outcomes that are both expected and realized are greater than those for 
outcomes that are expected but not realized (Charness and Levine, 2007, Gurdal, Miller 
and Rustichini, 2013, Rubin and Sheremeta, 2016), and both stakeholders as well as third 
parties exhibit this behavior (Brownback and Kuhn, 2019, Gino, Shu and Bazerman, 
2010, Sezer, Zhang, Gino and Bazerman, 2016). The sanctions for realized outcomes that 
agree with expected outcomes are roughly the same as those for the same outcomes 
chosen with certainty (Cushman et al., 2009). 
Despite considerable variation in features of these experiments, including in the role of 
uncertainty, effort, information and payoff functions, the findings are quite consistent. Given 
these design differences and the focus of the current analysis, therefore, I will analyze a hybrid 
design that captures elements of different studies and fits the focus here on non-strategic 
decisions. In what I will call the “fair luck game,” there are two stages, whereby first stage Ds 
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select an option from a discrete set of risky choices that differ in their expected fairness, and 
then, in a second stage, the Rs may sanction the Ds based on the latter’s choices and the realized 
payoffs. This game is similar to Cushman et al. (2009), except the risky options number two, as 
in Sezer et al. (2016), rather than three, both in order to simplify the analysis and because there is 
empirically little difference between the second and third choices. Specifically, suppose the first 
stage payoffs to D,R can be either “fair” (F,F) or “unfair” (H,L), where 0 ≤ 𝐿𝐿 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐻𝐻 and 𝐿𝐿 +
𝐻𝐻 = 2𝐹𝐹 = 𝑋𝑋. The first stage D makes a risky choice, 𝑥𝑥 ∈ {𝑓𝑓, 𝑢𝑢}, involving probability 𝑞𝑞 > 0.5, 
which results in expected payoffs to R, 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓 and 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑢𝑢, respectively, of 
𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹 + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐿𝐿 
𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑢𝑢 = (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐹𝐹 + 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 
where, obviously, 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓 > 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑢𝑢. 
The subject matter of outcome bias is sanctioning, so we focus on the second stage. A 
potential problem is that first stage dictators anticipate sanctioning in the second stage, in which 
case their choices might be distorted by strategic self-interest. This can be obviated by a 
previously unannounced second stage, as in Croson and Konow (2009), or by a negligible 
probability (viz., 0.1) that the sanction will be implemented, as in Cushman et al. (2009). 
Formally, the analysis treats all decisions as non-strategic, but the results that follow are robust 
under more general experimental conditions as long as first stage choices preserve the ranking of 
Ds by their generosity. At any rate, in the second stage, the first stage R may sanction the first 
stage D by adding money to, or deducting money from, D’s payoff (I will refer to them 
consistently as R and D according to their roles in the first stage). This game requires 
specification of moral character, or generosity in this context, 𝛾𝛾, to accommodate decisions under 
uncertainty. Analogous to deterministic decisions, consider a reference state in which the first 
stage D may choose a benefit to the R but now let 𝛾𝛾 denote the expected payoff to R, which is 
distributed on the interval [𝛾𝛾, 𝛾𝛾]. In addition, suppose R expects there is a D type, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖, who is 
indifferent between 𝑓𝑓 and 𝑢𝑢, where 𝛾𝛾 < 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑢𝑢 < 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 < 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓 < 𝛾𝛾 . Whereas 𝛾𝛾 represents notional 
generosity, effective generosity is constrained in this game to a binary choice between 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑢𝑢 and 
𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓. Thus, R’s estimate of D’s notional generosity, 𝛾𝛾�, is either 𝛾𝛾�𝑓𝑓 or 𝛾𝛾�𝑢𝑢, depending on D’s 
choice of either 𝑓𝑓 or 𝑢𝑢, which, respectively, equal 






 𝛾𝛾�𝑢𝑢 = ∫ 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾
𝑖𝑖
𝛾𝛾 𝜌𝜌(𝛾𝛾)𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾 ∫ 𝜌𝜌(𝛾𝛾)𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾
𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖
𝛾𝛾� . 
Note that 𝛾𝛾�𝑢𝑢 < 𝛾𝛾�𝑓𝑓, and it is further assumed that 𝛾𝛾�𝑢𝑢 ≤ 𝛾𝛾� ≤ 𝛾𝛾�𝑓𝑓, i.e., R’s threshold for sanctioning 
D lies within the interval of D’s estimated generosity. 
Now consider R’s payoff in the second stage. In the fair luck game, R receives a fixed 
amount from the first stage, 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟, i.e., the realization of D’s choice in the first stage. Next is the 
question of the price R pays to sanction D. In the two-stage D game discussed in section 4.1, R 
allocates a fixed sum between D and R. That is, letting 𝑧𝑧 be the amount added to or subtracted 
from D’s payoff in the second stage and 𝑌𝑌 the amount, as a result of 𝑧𝑧, that is added to or 
subtracted from R’s payoff, then in the two-stage D game, 𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� = −1. The fair luck game is 
different in that sanctioning is free and produces neither gains nor losses for R, that is, 𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� =
0. Unlike the prior case, then, there are efficiency implications of R’s decision. As previously 
noted, a large volume of research finds evidence that social preferences include, and sometimes 
are even dominated by, efficiency concerns (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002, Engelmann and 
Strobel, 2004). The results of experiments on sanctioning discussed here are also consistent with 
the idea that, when agents can sanction and 𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� = 0, efficiency preferences crowd out other 
allocative preferences (e.g., Bartling et al., 2014, Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012, Cushman et 
al., 2009).14 I model this effect with the parameter 𝛽𝛽 = −𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� , whereby, in the cases 
considered here, 𝛽𝛽 ∈ [0,1]. The D’s entitlement in the second stage is assumed to be 
 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 = �
1+(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏
2
�𝑍𝑍 − 𝛽𝛽(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥). 
Thus, in the prior two-stage D game where 𝛽𝛽 = 1 and efficiency plays no role, 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 = 𝑍𝑍 2� − 𝑋𝑋 +
𝑥𝑥 + 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥, which, as before, splits the second stage sum equally and corrects any inequity from the 




where 0 < 𝑏𝑏 < 1. The highest possible payoff is 𝑍𝑍, which equals zero in games with only 
punishment, and 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 = 0. In games with reward, 𝑍𝑍 > 0 and 
1
2
𝑍𝑍 < 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 < 𝑍𝑍 because 0 < 𝑏𝑏 < 1.15 
 
14 In fact, they are so strong in Cushman et al. that 17% of second stage allocators transfer the maximum regardless 
of first stage actions or outcomes. 




The R’s utility function in the fair luck game can, therefore, be written 
(7) 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟) + 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙(𝑧𝑧 − 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 − 𝜃𝜃 ∙ 𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑥𝑥′)) + 𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝑧𝑧). 
This reflects R’s fixed payment from the first stage. In addition, as stated, when agents sanction 
and 𝛽𝛽 = 0, efficiency is assumed to crowd out other allocative preferences, so the effect of 𝛽𝛽 on 
altruism is technically included but superfluous, in this case. The final step in specifying virtue 
preferences to accommodate outcome bias involves the scale, 𝑥𝑥′. So far, choices, if implemented, 
have had certain consequences in the cases considered, and the scale was defined as the patient’s 
entitlement. Now the consequences of choices are uncertain, and outcome bias is a reflection of 
the dependence of sanctions not only on choices but also outcomes. In the fair luck game, the fair 
allocation from the first stage sum of 𝑋𝑋 is 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 = 𝐹𝐹, so it makes sense for this to be the scale, when 
intended and realized outcomes align, whether choices are under certainty or uncertainty. In this 
case, I will write the choice and realized outcome as the pair (𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟) ∈ {(𝑓𝑓,𝐹𝐹), (𝑢𝑢,𝑈𝑈)}. What 
about the cases, when intended and realized outcomes do not agree, i.e., (𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟) ∈
{(𝑓𝑓,𝑈𝑈), (𝑢𝑢,𝐹𝐹)}? It is natural, in this case, to think in terms of expected outcomes. As attempted 
murder is not punished as harshly as murder, so also the scale responds to the difference between 
expected and realized outcomes. And as attempted murder is punished more severely than 
attempted robbery, so also the scale responds to differences in expected outcomes. I propose 
defining the scale in these cases as the expected value from the choice, i.e., 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓 if the choice is 
fair, and 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑢𝑢 if the choice is unfair. Then, the scale of sanctions can be defined as 
𝑥𝑥′ = �
𝐹𝐹 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟) ∈ {(𝑓𝑓,𝐹𝐹), (𝑢𝑢,𝑈𝑈)}
𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟) = (𝑓𝑓,𝑈𝑈)
𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑢𝑢 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟) = (𝑢𝑢,𝐹𝐹)
. 
 These two theorems follow, the proofs of which may be found in the Appendix. 
THEOREM 4.2.1: In the fair luck game, agents in the second stage sanction, i.e., they allocate 
beyond what is called for by distributive preferences alone. Specifically, they reward first 
stage dictators more, or punish them less, for choosing 𝑓𝑓 than for choosing 𝑢𝑢, ceteris 
paribus, i.e., for a given scale, 𝑥𝑥′. 
THEOREM 4.2.2: Choices are sanctioned, even when the intended outcomes do not obtain, but 
fair choices are rewarded more strongly and unfair choice punished more strongly when 
 
such experiments, some second stage allocators set their goal above equality but, on average, somewhat below the 
maximum possible reward 𝑍𝑍. 
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realized outcomes are aligned with choices. Sanctions for realized outcomes that agree 
with expected outcomes are the same as for the same outcomes chosen with certainty. 
These theorems predict most of the stylized facts as well as the specific findings of Cushman et 
al. while adding a theoretical underpinning for them in terms of fairness preferences. The theory 
is also consistent with the asymmetry in sanctioning in SF 4.2.1 from the concavity of r, but this 
cannot be proven for the fair luck game, given that it produces only a binary signal of 
preferences. Further corroborative evidence of this specification of virtue preferences will be 
discussed in section 6.2 on willful ignorance and section 6.3 on delegation. 
5. Helping and Harming 
This section analyzes anomalies that involve the distinction between helping versus 
harming others. The specific manifestations of helping considered involve increasing the payoffs 
of others and of harming decreasing the payoffs of others. 
ASSUMPTION 6: In contexts with high moral salience, 𝑝𝑝 > 0 and is increasing the set of 
helping choices, and  𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0 and is increasing the set of harming choices. 
Although fairness preferences are often involved in the findings discussed in this section, the 
moral preference that relates most directly to helping and harming is altruism, so it is not 
surprising that explanations for some of the anomalies here rest on differences across agents in 
altruism. One might think of altruism salience as being more important than fairness salience in 
this section, although that is not a necessary assumption for any of the claims here. 
5.1. The Taking Effect 
During civil disturbances and natural disasters, otherwise law-abiding citizens sometimes 
join in looting (e.g., Green, 2007, Khazan, 6/2/2020, The Atlantic, Quarantelli and Dynes, 1968). 
Scholars have offered many explanations for such behavior, but the results of economics 
experiments have demonstrated that extrinsic incentives, such as reduced expectations of being 
punished, cannot, at least solely, explain such abandonment of morals, when opportunities to 
take from others are offered. Consider an anonymous between-subjects dictator game, in which 
Rs are also endowed but at a lower level than Ds, and Ds are permitted not only to give in a 
“Give” treatment but also to take in an otherwise equivalent “Take” treatment. The results show 
that some Ds take money from Rs in the Take version. Of course, this might be due to Ds, who 
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in the Give version are otherwise constrained to a corner solution at zero, but that does not 
explain the lower fraction of Ds who choose positive transfers in the Take version versus the 
Give version (Bardsley, 2008, List, 2007). This taking effect means that the addition of taking 
options results in less generous givers, indeed, some givers become takers. 
From a moral salience approach, it is natural to view giving as moral context, p, and 
taking as non-moral context, n. The following assumption fleshes out Assumption 6 for giving 
and taking. 
ASSUMPTION 7: In a dictator game whose Ds and Rs are endowed with X and Y (𝑋𝑋 > 𝑌𝑌 > 0), 
respectively, giving options constitute p and taking options n. For concreteness, assume the 
moral measure is 𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) = max{𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖} − min{𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖}, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = {𝐶𝐶+,𝐶𝐶−}, where 𝐶𝐶+ is the set of 
non-negative transfers from D to R and 𝐶𝐶− the set of negative transfers, i.e., transfers from R to 
D. 
I summarize below many of the rich findings from experiments with taking and propose 
explanations for them based on moral salience. 
SF/Theorem 5.1.1: Consider a standard between-subjects dictator game with endowed Ds and 
Rs, where 𝑋𝑋 > 𝑌𝑌 > 0. Adding taking options to this game reduces giving on both the 
intensive and extensive margins, i.e., the mean transfer and the frequency of positive 
transfers fall (e.g., Cappelen et al., 2013, Cox et al., 2019). The reduction in mean 
transfers increases, if taking options are enlarged, but less than proportionately (Bardsley, 
2008, Korenok, Millner and Razzolini, 2014, List, 2007, Zhang and Ortmann, 2013). The 
taking effect diminishes, if the D’s choice is observable to the experimenter and other 
subjects (Alevy, Jeffries, and Lu, 2014). 
Proof: By Assumptions 6 and 7, adding taking options reduces moral salience, say, from 𝜎𝜎ℎ to 
𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 . By Theorem 2.2.1, all dictators for whom 𝑥𝑥 > 0 under 𝜎𝜎ℎ, transfer a lower amount 
under 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 , with some, who are on the margin, transferring zero or taking. Those, who are 
constrained at zero under 𝜎𝜎ℎ, take under 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙. The effect on transfers is less than 
proportional with taking options from Theorem 2.2.2. The effect of observability follows 
from Assumption 4 and Theorem 2.2.1. 
The results of two studies that vary taking options are presented in panels e and f of Figure 2 
(List, 2007, Zhang and Ortmann, 2013, respectively). These illustrate a less than proportionate 
decline in mean transfers with taking options. 
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Some dictator experiments vary the endowments of Ds and Rs along with giving and 
taking options. Specifically, several allow comparisons between a giving game, that is, a 
standard dictator game where the total endowment, 𝑀𝑀, is initially all given to the D (𝑋𝑋 = 𝑀𝑀, 𝑌𝑌 =
0) and giving is unrestricted, with a taking game, in which 𝑀𝑀 is provisionally allocated to the R 
(𝑌𝑌 = 𝑀𝑀, 𝑋𝑋 = 0) and D taking is unrestricted. Consider now some stylized facts of such games. 
SF 5.1.2: In a between-subjects design, where subjects choose under only one condition, R 
payoffs (𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 = 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥) do not differ significantly between the giving and taking games 
(Chowdury, Jeon, and Saha, 2017, Dreber et al., 2013, Grossman and Eckel, 2015, 
Korenok, Millner, and Razzolini, 2014, Smith, 2015). In a within-subjects design, where 
subjects choose under both conditions, R payoffs are lower in the giving game than the 
taking game, and, given a choice between playing the giving or taking game, most Ds 
prefer the giving game (86% in Korenok, Millner and Razzolini, 2018). 
The utility functions of Ds in the giving and taking games can be written, respectively, as 
 𝑈𝑈𝐺𝐺 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑀𝑀 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎 ∙ 𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂)) + 𝜎𝜎 ∙ 𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥), 
 𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑀𝑀− 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎 ∙ 𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂)� + 𝜎𝜎 ∙ 𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼(𝑥𝑥 −𝑀𝑀)). 
That is, for a given x, the D’s utility is the same except for the final altruism terms, which reflect 
the utility from giving from the agent’s endowment, in the first case, versus the loss from taking 
from the patient’s endowment, in the second. This leads to the following theorem. 
Theorem 5.1.2: In a between-subjects design, it is indeterminate, whether R payoffs will be 
higher in the giving or the taking game. In a within-subjects design, mean R payoffs are 
higher in the taking game, and, given the choice between the two games, most Ds prefer 
the giving game. 
Proof: In a within-subjects design, salience is the same for both decisions by Assumption 1. By 
the concavity of 𝑔𝑔, 𝑔𝑔′(𝛼𝛼(𝑥𝑥 −𝑀𝑀))> 𝑔𝑔′(𝛼𝛼(𝑥𝑥)), at least for altruistic agents, who are 
assumed to be the average and the majority type (Α(𝛼𝛼) − Α(0) > 0.5), implying a larger 
𝑥𝑥 and lower utility in the taking game than the giving game. But in a between-subjects 
design, salience is lower in the taking game due to the high non-moral context, which we 
can write 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 < 𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺 , which implies a lower 𝑥𝑥 by Theorem 2.2.1. Thus, the two effects 
operate in opposite directions in a between-subjects design such that the overall effect on 
giving is theoretically indeterminate. 
Thus, in the absence of a salience effect, transfers should be larger in the taking game. This is, in 
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fact, what materializes, when salience is the same in the within-subjects design. But when moral 
salience is lower in the between-subjects taking game, the effect on 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 is ambiguous. Although 
indeterminacy is a nonspecific prediction, it is not predicted without the effect of salience, and it 
is consistent with the insignificant differences in 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 in this case compared to the higher 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 in the 
taking game in the within-subjects design. 
Numerous explanations have been offered for the taking effect. Bardsley (2008) 
conjectures that it is an experimental artefact, viz., an experimenter demand effect, that is, a 
desire to please the experimenter. In this context, subjects view the offered choice set as 
signaling what the experimenter wishes the subject to do. But in a recent and rigorous analysis of 
experimenter demand effects, de Quidt, Haushofer and Roth (2018) find such effects to be 
modest, and they do not seem plausibly to explain the large magnitude of the taking effect. 
Cappelen et al. (2013) test whether the choice set signals entitlements, e.g., a taking opportunity 
might signal the D is morally entitled to do so. But they find that reinforcing entitlements with a 
real task has no significant effect while the taking effect remains. Korenok, Millner and 
Razzolini (2012, 2018) point to warm glow and taking aversion (or an endowment effect) and, 
indeed, altruism in the current model is equivalent to the melding of these two effects. 
Nevertheless, that alone does not explain the between- versus within-subjects differences. Alevy 
et al. (2014) argue their results on observability and gender are consistent with social- and self-
signaling. As previously discussed, I consider signaling arguments credible, but the present 
framework is offered as a simple account, which also explains the observability effect in terms of 
moral salience, specifically, moral proximity. 
List (2007) proposes a “moral cost function,” which Cox et al. (2019) formalize. They 
propose and test experimentally a theory with moral reference points that depend on choice sets. 
Despite differences in theoretical formulation and some differences in predictions, I view the 
current project as having points in common with Cox et al., which along with Kimbrough and 
Vostroknutov (2016) and Krupka and Weber (2013), underscore the importance of the changes 
in agent sensitivity to the violation of moral norms based on differences in choice sets. Whereas 
these approaches assume certain changes in norms and sensitivity to norms, the present theory 
derives these and other patterns from a general theory of stable moral norms and context-
dependent moral salience. 
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5.2. Sinners and Saints 
This section introduces an experiment that provides an out-of-sample test of the theory 
presented in this paper while also shedding light on prior findings, especially in relation to the 
taking effect. In what I will call the “sinners and saints” game, there is a first stage in which 
dictators may give to or take an amount 𝑥𝑥 from the endowments of the dictators and recipients, 
where 𝑋𝑋 > 𝑌𝑌 > 0. The endowments are always fixed at the same level, but the range of 
permissible transfers varies across “cases.” Cases are varied between subjects, whereby, for a 
given case, the minimum possible transfer, i.e., the most the D can take, is denoted 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 ≤ 0, and 
the maximum possible transfer is denoted 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 > 0. Then, there is an unannounced second stage 
in which a spectator is paid a fixed amount, 𝑧𝑧̅, to allocate an additional larger sum, 𝑍𝑍 > 𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌, 
between the D and the R in the first stage, which is contingent on each possible D choice for 𝑥𝑥, 
i.e., the strategy method is used. To employ a metaphysical conceit, an agent decides how to treat 
a patient during his mortal life, ignorant of the afterlife in which an impartial judge metes out 
sanctions involving even higher stakes on sinners and saints. This experiment, while novel, 
merges design features that have been well validated elsewhere and that, therefore, relate to a 
broad set of results. The focus of most of the analysis is on second stage spectator decisions in 
the game described thus far, although the stakeholder decisions in this treatment also serve to 
replicate prior evidence on the taking effect.16 The results of this experiment, together with 
additional decisions reported later that are designed to rule out alternative explanations, support 
the present theoretical account of previous findings on the taking effect and other anomalies. 
The utility function of the spectator in the sinners and saints game is 
 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑧𝑧̅) + 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 �𝜙𝜙�𝑧𝑧 − 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 − 𝜃𝜃 ∙ 𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑍𝑍 2� ��, 
where, as in section 4.1, moral preferences are formulated with respect to the D from the first 
stage, whose choice provides a signal of the D’s character. Thus, 𝑧𝑧 denotes the amount of 𝑍𝑍 that 
the spectator allocates to D with the remainder of 𝑍𝑍 − 𝑧𝑧 going to R, 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 is the D’s entitlement in 
the second stage, 𝛾𝛾� is D’s estimated notional generosity to R, and 𝛾𝛾� is the spectator’s threshold 
 
16 Spectators in a two stage dictator experiment were introduced in Croson and Konow (2009), but that study 
differed in other ways from the present one: in some treatments, endowments were random and not chosen, in other 
treatments, only Ds were endowed and could choose transfers but Rs were not endowed, the range of permissible 
transfers was not varied, and there were never any taking options. As with the current design, Krupka and Weber 
(2013) use spectators and stakeholders to analyze taking, but their design differs in that third parties are not used to 
sanction but rather to estimate appropriateness ratings of other subjects on a point scale, stakeholder endowments are 
varied, and taking options are not varied. 
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for rewarding or punishing D. The usual assumption that fairness reduces to equal splits in a 




2� + 𝑥𝑥, i.e., 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 calls for equal splits of 
the total endowments and corrects for any shortfall or excess vis-à-vis equality in D’s first stage 
transfer. 
The following theorem states several predictions for this experiment. 
Theorem 5.2.1: In the sinners and saints game, second stage spectators sanction, and sanctions 
are concave in dictator first stage transfers. There is a discontinuous increase in reward 
(or decrease in punishment) at 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻, and a converse discontinuity at 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿. Holding 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 
constant, increasing dictator taking options, i.e., lowering 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿, implies a lower threshold 
for spectator sanctioning, 𝑥𝑥�, and also increases reward, or decreases punishment, of 
dictators by spectators at every level of dictator transfers. 
The proof of this theorem can be found in the Appendix, but the reasoning is illustrated in 
Figures 6 and 7. First, the context of the reference state may be defined to match the salience in 
the first stage of this dictator game, 𝜎𝜎�. In a game with the same set of permissible transfers as in 
the reference state, expected generosity, 𝛾𝛾�, equals notional generosity, 𝛾𝛾, both of which equal the 
dictator’s transfer, 𝑥𝑥, for the full range of dictator types from the least generous, 𝛾𝛾, which is the 
greatest lower bound of notional generosity, to the most generous, ?̅?𝛾, which is the lowest upper 
bound of notional generosity. This is illustrated in Figure 6 by the 45-degree line. Thus, we can 
write notional generosity, 𝛾𝛾(𝑥𝑥,𝜎𝜎�), as a function of 𝑥𝑥 and 𝜎𝜎�. As noted in sections 2.3 and 4.2, 
however, notional generosity may differ from effective generosity, 𝑥𝑥, because of constraints on 
choices. Suppose at least some dictators are constrained to giving less than their preferred 
amount, i.e., 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 < ?̅?𝛾, and/or from taking less than their preferred amount, i.e., 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 > 𝛾𝛾. Due to 
this censoring, a spectator’s estimate of the notional generosity of a dictator who chooses 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻, 
𝛾𝛾�(𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻,𝜎𝜎�), is greater than that of the dictator type, who would choose 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 in the reference state, 
𝛾𝛾𝐻𝐻 = 𝛾𝛾(𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 ,𝜎𝜎�), since it includes not only those who notionally prefer 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 but also others who 
prefer a larger transfer but are prevented from transferring it. Similarly, the spectator’s estimate 
of the generosity of a dictator who chooses 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿, 𝛾𝛾�(𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 ,𝜎𝜎�), is less than that of the dictator type, 
who notionally prefers 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿, 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿 = 𝛾𝛾(𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 ,𝜎𝜎�). 
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 FIGURE 6. – Notional and effective generosity. 
Suppose that the spectator’s character threshold for dictator generosity is 𝛾𝛾� and that 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿 < 𝛾𝛾� <
𝛾𝛾𝐻𝐻. Then, in the interior, 𝛾𝛾� = 𝑥𝑥�, and the spectator rewards all 𝑥𝑥 > 𝑥𝑥� and punishes all 𝑥𝑥 < 𝑥𝑥�, and, 
generalizing Theorem 4.1.2, sanctions are asymmetric due to the concavity of 𝑟𝑟 in 𝑥𝑥. One 
exception to concavity is occasioned by the censoring of 𝛾𝛾 at 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻: the optimal sanction, ?̃?𝑧, is 
increasing in 𝛾𝛾, so the discontinuity here implies a discontinuous increase in reward (or reduction 
in punishment). Thus, the maximum permissible transfer will be treated separately in the 
regression analysis later. 
Other claims of Theorem 5.2.1 are illustrated in Figure 7, which focuses on interior 
solutions. Estimated (and notional) generosity can be written as a function of 𝑥𝑥 and 𝜎𝜎, i.e., 
𝛾𝛾�(𝑥𝑥,𝜎𝜎). The main analysis involves variation in the amounts that may be taken, which, as 
already discussed, affects moral salience. Starting from the reference level of salience, 𝜎𝜎�, 
consider an increase in taking options. Ceteris paribus, salience falls to 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 , 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 < 𝜎𝜎�, and a 
dictator, who would make a transfer, say, equal to the spectator’s threshold of 𝛾𝛾� under 𝜎𝜎�, will 
now give less, 𝑥𝑥�𝑙𝑙. That is, the schedule representing the dictator’s notional generosity shifts to 
the left, 𝛾𝛾(𝑥𝑥,𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙), and the spectator’s threshold for sanctioning falls (the line going through the 
origin that corresponds to the reference state is omitted here to avoid clutter). Similarly, a 
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reduction in taking options increases salience to 𝜎𝜎ℎ, 𝜎𝜎ℎ > 𝜎𝜎�, and the same dictator will now give 
more, 𝑥𝑥�ℎ, shifting the schedule to the right, 𝛾𝛾(𝑥𝑥,𝜎𝜎ℎ), and increasing the spectator’s threshold for 
sanctioning. Finally, changes in taking options also affect the spectator’s estimate of a dictator’s 
type and, therefore, the spectator’s sanctioning of the dictator (which is the same as the dictator’s 
notional type for interior solutions). A dictator, who gives 𝑥𝑥 under low salience, 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙, reveals 
higher intrinsic generosity, 𝛾𝛾�ℎ, than one, who gives the same amount under high salience, 𝜎𝜎ℎ, 
and reveals lower generosity, 𝛾𝛾�𝑙𝑙. Thus, the same behavior may be praiseworthy in the former 
case but blameworthy in the latter, according to spectators. The final claim of Theorem 5.2.1 
concerns the size of the discontinuous increase in 𝑧𝑧 at 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 and the relationship to 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿. An increase 
in 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 reduces 𝜎𝜎, censors fewer dictator types, and increases 𝛾𝛾�(𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻,𝜎𝜎). This reduces 𝐷𝐷(𝜎𝜎), if the 
increase in 𝛾𝛾� is smaller than the change in censored types. 
FIGURE 7. – Generosity and moral salience. 
The parameters of this experiment are as follows: 𝑋𝑋 = 15, 𝑌𝑌 = 5, 𝑍𝑍 = 40, and 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 = 5 
for all of the three main cases, which differ according to the values of 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿, viz., the Give 5 case 
with 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿=0, Take 1 case where 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 = −1, and Take 5 case where 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 = −5. Note that 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 = 5  
allows X to equalize payments between the X and Y. The values for 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 were chosen to permit 
testing of the theoretical predictions and to allow comparisons with prior taking games. The main 





𝑥𝑥�𝑙𝑙 𝑥𝑥 𝑥𝑥 𝑥𝑥�ℎ 
𝛾𝛾(𝑥𝑥,𝜎𝜎ℎ) 
𝛾𝛾(𝑥𝑥,𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙) 
𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 < 𝜎𝜎� < 𝜎𝜎ℎ 
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dictator treatment: subject X chooses how much to transfer to or from subject Y out of their 
aggregate 20 points, and subject Z is paid a fixed $5 to allocate 40 points between subjects X and 
Y for each possible transfer by X to Y, where one point always equals $0.20. In order to examine 
whether the entitlement changes with cases, there is also a so-called Benevolent dictator 
treatment in which X and Y are endowed as in the other treatment, i.e., 𝑋𝑋 = 15 and 𝑌𝑌 = 5, and 
each Z subject is paid a fixed $2 to choose a transfer of these first stage points between X and Y 
subjects. Thus, the design is the same as the first stage of the Double dictator treatment with the 
same cases, except Z instead of X chooses transfers between X and Y, and there is no second 
stage decision. To avoid any spillover effects of roles and decision contexts on allocations, all 
decisions were collected between subjects, i.e., separate subjects were used in the roles of X, Y 
and Z, in the two treatments, and in the different cases. The complete protocol can be found in 
the online Appendix. 
TABLE 1 
SINNERS AND SAINTS DESIGN 
 Treatment 
Case Double dictator Benevolent dictator 
Give 5 66 X, 66 Y, 66 Z 30 X, 30 Y, 30 Z 
Take 1 62 X, 62 Y, 62 Z 45 X, 45 Y, 45 Z 
Take 5 63 X, 63 Y, 63 Z 37 X, 37 Y, 37 Z 
 
The experiment was programmed in oTree (Chen, Schonger and Wickens, 2016) and 
conducted on Amazon MTurk. Table 1 illustrates the experimental design, showing for each case 
and treatment the number of participants in each role, whereby those in decision-making roles 
are denoted in bold font. Similar to many related studies (e.g., Bardsley, 2008, Chowdury, Jeon, 
and Saha, 2017, Grossman and Eckel, 2015, Korenok, Millner and Razzolini, 2012), a minimum 
of roughly 30 triples per case were targeted for the Benevolent dictator treatment, and a 
minimum of twice that number, viz., 60 triples per case, were targeted for the Double dictator 
treatment, since it is the main treatment of interest. The actual numbers usually exceed these 
minimums due to differences in the timing of when subjects were cut off from entering. For this 
study, an MTurk subject pool was preferred for a number of reasons. A substantial literature now 
exists that MTurk participants behave similarly to university student subjects in qualitative 
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terms. Moreover, MTurkers are typically closer to the general population in terms of 
demographic characteristics and average experimental behavior, e.g., Snowberg and Yariv 
(2021) find the average generosity of MTurk dictators intermediate to that of the more selfish 
students and that of a more generous representative sample.17 In addition, the total sample size 
desired for this study was larger than that accessible at any given time from most student subject 
pools (the results are based on a total of 1029 participants). Moreover, this study lends itself to 
the adoption of measures to address typical concerns about an online subject pool (e.g., see 
Hauser, Paolacci, and Chandler, 2019).18 Including the $2 show-up fee (called a reward in 
MTurk), the average earnings were $6.25 for an average of 20-30 minutes of most subjects’ time. 
This is similar to the hourly MTurk wages used by Snowberg and Yariv, which they find is 
robust to cutting in half and report to be several times the usual MTurk pay of $1-$5 per hour. 
TABLE 2 
TRANSFERS BY X TO Y IN DOUBLE DICTATOR TREATMENT 
 Mean transfer (SD) Positive transfers (%) 
Give 5 3.45 (2.105) 78.8 
Take 1 2.16 (2.343) 64.5 
Take 5 1.78 (3.777) 61.9 
 
Turning now to the results, Table 2 summarizes the transfers of X subjects in the Double 
dictator treatment. As predicted, the mean transfers and percentage of positive transfers decrease, 
as 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 falls. According to two-sided t-tests tests of differences in means, the mean transfer is 
 
17 Johnson and Ryan (2019) conclude that quality is not harmed by the lack of control and lower stakes on MTurk. 
Moreover, the equivalency of results from student and MTurk subjects extends to designs involving moral 
preferences, such as prisoner’s dilemmas (e.g., Horton, Rand and Zeckhauser, 2011), public goods games (e.g., 
Arechar, Gächter, and Molleman, 2018), and dictator games (e.g., Snowberg and Yariv, 2021). 
18 To address concerns about English language fluency, participation was restricted to US residents. Numeracy was 
established with a test consisting of three fill-in-the-blank questions on addition and subtraction that permitted at 
most two attempts each before disqualification. To address concerns about attention and comprehension, subjects 
had to complete correctly within two attempts each of three questions in a quiz about the instructions (two quizzes of 
three questions each in the case of Z subjects in the more complicated Double dictator treatment). To minimize 
attrition, each subject faced only one type of decision and the non-strategic design permitted non-simultaneous 
collection so that subjects did not have to wait for other subjects. The simple design helped keep the study short and 
address both subject attention and attrition: subjects were permitted up to one hour, but most completed it in less 
than thirty minutes. Self-selection biases are presumably less problematic with MTurk than with a university subject 
pool, but that concern was further addressed by describing the study in general terms as an “Academic experiment 
involving decisions about the distribution of money.” As an aside, the data collection took place during the 2020-21 
COVID pandemic at a time when laboratory experiments were not feasible, but that fact had no bearing on the 
choice of an online format, which had been previously planned based on its advantages for this experiment. 
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lower in the Take 1 (p=0.001) and in the Take 5 (p=0.002) cases than in the Give 5 case, but 
Take 1 does not differ significantly from Take 5 (p=0.497). Compared to the Give 5 case, two-
sided z-tests tests of proportions show a decrease in positive transfers that is marginally 
significant in the Take 1 case (p=0.073) and significant at conventional levels in the Take 5 case 
(p=0.036), but Take 1 and Take 5 do not differ significantly (p=0.762). These findings are 
similar in direction and significance to prior related taking games except that these X subjects 
are, on average, more generous and less likely to take, when given the opportunity. This is 
consistent with the expectation that the more representative sample here is more generous than 
student subjects, who were used in prior studies. A second contributing factor is surely the 
relatively high ratio of X to Y endowments of 3:1 here versus the lower ones (usually 2:1) used 
in prior studies, including Bardsley (2008), List (2007), and Zhang and Ortmann (2013). 
TABLE 3 
MEAN ALLOCATIONS BY Z SUBJECTS TO X SUBJECTS IN DOUBLE DICTATOR TREATMENT 
Key: Red (blue) allocations are below (above) equalizing ones. Means differ from equalizing transfers according to 
t-tests at the 5%/10% level of significance; lightly shaded results are not significant at conventional levels. 
Having established that X decisions are largely consistent with theoretical predictions for 
stakeholders and qualitatively replicate prior findings, we turn now to the spectator Z allocations 
in the Double dictator treatment. Table 3 provides a summary of Z transfers to X subjects. The 
first row presents the full range of possible X transfers and the second row the corresponding Z 
transfers to X that equalize total earnings between X and Y. The remaining rows report the mean 
allocation by Z to X, 𝑧𝑧, for each level of X transfer, 𝑥𝑥, which permits a preliminary impression of 
the results. As predicted, 𝑧𝑧 is monotonically increasing in 𝑥𝑥 within each case in every instance 
and monotonically decreasing in 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 for each given value of 𝑥𝑥 save in one instance (Take 1, 𝑥𝑥 =
5). Comparison of these means with the equalizing Z allocations suggest that Zs usually punish 
Xs, on average (shaded in red), for transferring less than the 5 points that equalize first stage 
payoffs: 𝑧𝑧 exceeds the value that equalizes total earnings (shaded in blue), only for an 𝑥𝑥 of 4 or 5 
in the Take 5 case and for an 𝑥𝑥 of 5 in the Take 1 case. This is consistent with the predicted shift 
in 𝑥𝑥� with 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿: the change from Take 5 to Take 1 to Give 5 represents a progressive increase in 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 
X transfer -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Equalizing Z allocation 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Take 5 5.17 5.89 6.03 7.13 8.02 13.08 15.27 16.19 17.92 19.40 20.70 
Take 1     6.10 9.53 12.87 15.85 17.73 18.65 21.71 
Give 5      7.82 11.44 12.82 13.68 16.03 19.08 
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and in salience and, therefore, an increase in the threshold for rewarding X transfers. 
 
FIGURE 8. – Scatterplot and logarithmic regression trendlines of Z allocations to X (z). 
Key: Yellow: Give 5, Green: Take 1, Blue: Take 5 
Figure 8 presents a scatterplot of Z decisions, where circle sizes are proportionate to the 
frequency of each choice and colors correspond to cases: yellow for Give 5, green for Take 1 and 
blue for Take 5. The main patterns are consistent with theory: 𝑧𝑧 is increasing in 𝑥𝑥, on average, 
and some Z subjects equalize, indicated by larger circles along a diagonal, whereas others 
sanction, reflected mostly by punishment below the diagonal. Turning to multivariate analysis of 
Z decisions, consider the following regression equation: 
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 ln(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 2) + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇5 + 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the allocation of Z subject i to subject X based an X transfer of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝛼𝛼 is the constant, 
the 𝛽𝛽s are the coefficients on the independent variables, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is the error term. The omitted 
case is Give 5, so Take1 and Take5 are dummy variables for those cases, respectively. 
Discontinuities are predicted at 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 and 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻, so dummy variables are included at the lowest 
possible transfer in each respective case for 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 and at 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 = 5, which is common to all cases. The 
analysis focuses on Tobit regressions with left-censoring using a logarithmic specification of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 
for values between −1 and 5, which is why 2 is added to 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, making the minimum value of this 
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independent variable 1. There are several reasons for these choices. First, the non-linear 
specification is consistent both with theoretical expectations and with the results of regression 
estimations illustrated by the logarithmic trendlines in Figure 8. Second, the fact that second 
stage allocations are twice as large as the stakes in the first stage (viz., 40 vs. 20 points) is a 
feature designed to give wide berth to second stage allocators, and inspection of the scatterplot 
suggests this was largely successful. Nevertheless, scatterplots also reveal censoring of 𝑧𝑧 at 
lower values of 𝑥𝑥 and recommend the use of Tobit. Third, the chief interest is in comparison of 
differences across cases where there are some common values of 𝑥𝑥 for the cases, i.e., from −1 to 
5. Moreover, including additional negative 𝑥𝑥 values for the Take 5 case produces results that are 
qualitatively similar but risks producing estimates that give disproportionate weight to the Take 5 
case and its increasingly censored values (reaching 46% of allocations when 𝑥𝑥 equals −5). 
TABLE 4 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF Z ALLOCATIONS TO X 
 
     (1)    (2) 
   OLS  Tobit 
ln(𝑥𝑥 + 2)  6.516*** 6.822*** 
   (0.509) (0.352) 
Take 1   2.507*  2.662* 
   (1.105) (1.112) 
Take 5   3.587** 3.680***
   (1.169) (1.114) 
𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿   −0.580  −1.533* 
   (0.749) (0.636) 
𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻   1.769*** 1.673*** 
   (0.417) (0.464) 
Constant  4.021*** 3.398*** 
   (1.188) (0.941) 
𝑅𝑅2   0.255 
 N=191. Tobit regressions are left-censored. Standards errors are clustered at the individual subject level and 
are reported in parentheses. */**/*** denotes significance at the 5/1/0.1-percent level. 
Table 4 presents the results of regression analysis, whereby standard errors are clustered 
at the level of the 191 individual Z subjects. Column 1 shows the results of an OLS regression 
and column 2 the results of a Tobit regression with left-censoring. The results are the same 
except for the 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 dummy variable, which is negative in both estimations but turns significant 
when account is taken of the left-censoring that is compromising the OLS estimation. We focus, 
therefore, on regression (2), the results of which are all consistent with Theorem 5.2.1, some at 
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high levels of significance. Spectator sanctions are increasing and concave in X transfers to Y. 
As taking options expand, spectators progressively increase reward, or decrease punishment, 
significantly in the Take 1 and Take 5 treatments. The coefficient for the 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 dummy confirms the 
predicted discontinuous decrease in 𝑧𝑧 and the coefficient for the 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 dummy the predicted 
discontinuous increase in 𝑧𝑧. 
The theory advanced here has been shown to be highly consistent with the results on 
stakeholder and spectator decisions in the sinners and saints game. As always in such instances, 
that fact does not rule out the possibility of alternative explanations, such as those offered by the 
reciprocity theories mentioned in section 2.3. For example, Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger (2004) define fairness as the average of the highest and lowest efficient payoffs, 
which implies fair allocations (𝜂𝜂) vary directly with 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) define 
fairness as equal payoffs, but their theory generates equivalent predictions about the effect of 
variation in 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 by building the effect of the choice set into their “intention factor.” Reciprocity 
theories are typically formulated for stakeholders, but, for simplicity, I will cast them in the 
current spectator framework and analyze the effect of 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 through 𝜂𝜂. 
Theorem 5.2.2: In the sinners and saints game, let the fair allocation in the first stage and the 
threshold for sanctioning be functions of the minimum permissible transfer, i.e., 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿) 
and 𝑥𝑥�(𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿), respectively, where 𝜕𝜕𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿
> 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥�
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿
> 0. Then lowering 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 increases reward, 
or decreases punishment, at every level of dictator transfers. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Reciprocity theories provide a partial account for observed spectator sanctioning: they are 
consistent with the observed shift in the threshold and the level of sanctioning. They do not, 
however, predict the discontinuities we observe at 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 and 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻. Moreover, reciprocity theories and 
the theory proposed here diverge in their predictions for behavior in the aforementioned 
Benevolent dictator treatment, in which a spectator chooses transfers between X and Y. In this 
treatment, the spectator’s utility function is simply 
 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑧𝑧̅) + 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥)�, 
which yields the following predictions. 
Theorem 5.2.3: In the Benevolent dictator treatment, the spectator allocates to subjects their 
entitlements. That means the spectator’s allocation does not vary with 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 according to the 
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theory of moral salience, conditional altruism and virtue preferences, but it does vary 
directly with 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿, according to reciprocity theories. 
Proof: By the first order condition, 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓′�𝜙𝜙(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥)� = 0, which implies 𝑥𝑥 = 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥. In this game, 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 
is fixed in the theory advanced in this paper, whereas 𝜕𝜕𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿
> 0 in reciprocity theories. 
TABLE 5 
TRANSFERS BY Z TO Y IN BENEVOLENT DICTATOR TREATMENT 
   Difference in Means 
p-values (t-statistics) 
  Mean transfer (SD) N 
 
Give 5 Take 1 Take 5 
Give 5 4.47  30 0.034        (1.335) (2.175) 
Take 1 4.04  45 0.000  0.242    (1.673) (3.849) (-1.179) 
Take 5 4.41  37 0.001  0.839 0.249   (1.077) (-3.332) (-0.204) (1.161) 
Give 10 4.68  40 0.245  0.584 0.088 0.420 (1.738) (1.165) (0.551) (1.729) (0.812) 
 
Table 5 presents the results of this treatment for the three main cases as well as for an 
additional case, Give 10, which I will discuss momentarily. For the three main cases, the mean 
transfers range from $4.04 to $4.47. The three pairwise tests reported in the table reveal that 
none of these differences is significant even at the 20% level, whereby all p-values in this table 
are two-sided. This supports the theory proposed here, which assumes a fixed entitlement, over 
reciprocity theories, in which it changes. A different question concerns spectators’ estimate of 
what entitlement is fair. The theoretical analysis has often proceeded from the assumption that 
the entitlement in simple games like these equalizes earnings, i.e., for this decision, that 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 = 5. 
But the tests reported in the Table 5 show that the means for the three main cases all differ 
significantly from 5. The assumption of equalizing entitlements is one of convenience rather than 
necessity, since results rarely depend qualitatively on whether 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 equals 5 or 5 minus some 
epsilon. Nevertheless, while comparisons of mean spectator transfers provide valid conclusions 
about whether the entitlement varies with 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿, they might not provide good estimates of the 
entitlement itself. As with all experiments, subject decisions here are noisy, but variance is 
censored on the right at the value of 5 in the three main cases, which creates a downward bias in 
the estimate of 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥. For that reason, the benevolent dictator treatment includes an additional case, 
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Give 10, in which spectators may allocate any amount from 0 to 10 to subjects X. For this case, 
the mean transfer is $4.68, which does not differ at conventional levels from the other cases, and, 
to the point, does not differ significantly from 5. 
This section introduced an experiment designed as an out-of-sample test of the theory 
proposed here. The results of the experiment are uniformly consistent with the predictions of the 
theory and, in several respects, inconsistent with reciprocity theories. Below we continue to 
apply the theory to additional decision contexts. 
5.3. Joy of Destruction 
People sometimes destroy the wealth of others at a personal cost, often risking 
punishment, and with no material benefit to themselves, e.g., some people vandalize property or 
write computer viruses. There are examples of people, who cooperate over generations but 
suddenly begin engaging in destructive behavior toward one another. For instance, Serbs, Croats 
and Bosniaks lived peaceably, often intermarrying, prior to the breakup of Yugoslavia, but 
subsequently turned on one another, and over 100,000 lives were lost and vast amounts of 
property destroyed in the Bosnian War. Depending on the particular case, such behavior might 
be attributed to ethnic hostility, preemptive retaliation, revenge, etc. Economics experiments, 
however, have documented that, even when such motives can be ruled out by design, some 
people are willing to incur a cost to destroy the wealth of others and that such behavior can be 
easily triggered. 
Various “money-burning” games have found that up to nearly one-half of subjects acting 
individually in simultaneous games with unequal endowments destroy earnings of other 
members of their group, e.g., Zizzo and Oswald (2001), Abbink and Sadrieh (2009), Abbink and 
Hermann (2011). Similar behavior is observed, when players interact over multiple periods in so-
called “vendetta” games, e.g., Abbink and Herrmann (2009), Bolle, Tan and Zizzo (2014). In 
these studies, however, one cannot rule out motives other than a pure desire to destroy. When 
endowments are unequal, subjects can be motivated by inequality aversion to destroy. Moreover, 
as we will see, relatively few subjects destroy in non-strategic decisions (13-15%), but a much 
higher percentage expect others to destroy (38% in Abbink and Herrmann, 2011), which is 
consistent with preemptive retaliation in these experiments. Thus, we will focus, as usual, on 
simple, non-strategic decisions in the cases that follow, such as non-strategic versions of the 
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“joy-of-destruction” (or JD) game, which resembles a dictator game, in that it is unilateral, but 
with options to destroy others’ endowments. In the standard version, endowments are equal, and 
agents can destroy at zero cost, and zero benefit, to themselves.19 The utility function of the 
agent in a non-strategic JD game can be written 
 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋) + 𝜎𝜎 ∙ 𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙(𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂)) + 𝜎𝜎 ∙ 𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥). 
In the standard JD game, 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 0, the context is simple and endowments are equal, so we assume 
𝑋𝑋 = 𝑌𝑌 = 𝜂𝜂 = 𝑀𝑀/2, where 𝑀𝑀 = 𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌. We will also consider cases where endowments are 
unequal and the agent may destroy or create money for the patient, i.e., 𝑥𝑥 can be positive or 
negative. 
SF 5.3.1: In the standard non-strategic JD game with symmetric endowments, a minority of 
agents engages in destruction (13% in Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2013, 15% in Kessler, Ruiz-
Martos and Skuse, 2012, and only 13% even in the strategic game of Abbink and 
Herrmann, 2009). In a JD game where 𝑋𝑋 > 𝑌𝑌, allowing agents not only to destroy but 
also to create reduces the fraction who destroy and increases the average transfer (Zhang 
and Ortmann, 2013). 
Theorem 5.3.1: In the standard non-strategic JD game with 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑌𝑌, only a minority, consisting 
solely of spiteful agents, destroys. Adding creation to a JD game where 𝑋𝑋 > 𝑌𝑌 reduces 
the fraction that destroys and increases the average x, if the addition of creation affects 
altruism salience more than fairness salience. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
If only spiteful subjects destroy when 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑌𝑌, SF 5.3.1 implies 13-15% of subjects in those 
studies are spiteful. Moreover, adding positively valenced opportunities to create wealth to a JD 
game reduces the frequency and mean level of destruction assuming the type of salience affected 
is mostly, or solely, altruism salience. 
SF/Theorem 5.3.2: When endowments are unfair, destruction is directed mostly toward those 
with unfairly high endowments. That is, destruction is largely toward richer subjects in 
games with unearned endowments (Zizzo, 2003, Zhang and Ortmann, 2013), but, with 
earned endowments, destruction is directed toward richer subjects for the most part only 
 
19 Thus, the agent’s endowment is fixed in most JD games, as we assume in the current analysis. Although it shares 
this feature with spectator decisions, this is, nonetheless, treated as a stakeholder decision and, therefore, the 
altruism term is included in the agent’s utility function. This is because the JD context casts the agent in a personal, 
agent-patient relationship, similar to a dictator game, and not as a spectator choosing impartially for others. 
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if inequalities are unfair (Fehr, 2018). 
Proof: See Appendix. 
These findings underscore the importance of inequity aversion, as opposed to spite alone, in 
explaining much of the destruction in JD, money burning and vendetta games such that even 
some altruistic subjects engage in destruction. 
6. Norm Avoidance 
This section deals with three anomalies that have been studied extensively. They involve 
contexts that provide opportunities for agents to reduce the salience of moral norms. Just as some 
of the helping and harming anomalies in section 5 related more to variation in altruism, it is 
natural for some findings discussed in this section to rest on the comparatively greater 
importance of differences in fairness preferences, given the focus here on norms. One may think 
of fairness salience as being more important than altruism salience in these phenomena, although 
that is not a necessary assumption for any claims here. 
I discuss three types of norm avoidance, which involve, respectively, exiting a situation 
with a choice that is high in moral salience, avoiding information that helps identify the moral 
but personally costly choice, and delegating the choice to others. Assumption 8 expresses more 
explicitly statements in section 2.2 about moral salience and applies them to the avoidance of 
moral norms. 
ASSUMPTION 8: Compared to moral salience in the standard dictator game (𝜎𝜎ℎ), moral 
salience is lower with the availability of an option to avoid taking action on or acquiring 
information about the consequences of one’s action (𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚), even if the agent does not exercise that 
option. Moral salience is lower still for those who actually exercise the option and choose to 
avoid the action or information about the consequences of the action (𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙). 
That is, the option to avoid a moral norm, or information about its consequences, is non-moral 
context, which lowers moral salience. Actually exercising that option lowers moral proximity 
and, therefore, moral salience further. These points are fleshed out below for each of the three 
cases in this section. 
6.1. Moral Egress 
Some people will give money to a beggar but prefer to cross the street, if possible, to 
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avoid the beggar. Field experiments have established that avoidance of this kind is widespread. 
Forewarning people of door-to-door charitable solicitations results in a large and significant drop 
in the fraction of homeowners, who open their door at the pre-announced hour, compared to 
those who are not forewarned and who give more generously and at a higher rate (DellaVigna, 
List, and Malmendier, 2012). Placing Salvation Army bell-ringers at both of two entrances to a 
supermarket, rather than just one that can be avoided, increases both the rate and level of 
donations (Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman, 2017). Laboratory experiments have found these 
results to be robust to controls for possible extrinsic motives, such as social pressure or social 
image concerns. I will call this anomaly moral egress: people comply with moral norms, when 
the norms are salient and exit is prohibitively costly or impossible, but many prefer to exit a 
situation with high moral salience, when possible. 
FIGURE 9. – Exit game of Lazear, Malmendier and Weber (2012). 
Dana, Cain and Dawes (2006) introduced an experiment in which dictators first play a 
standard dictator game with $10. Then the Ds are told for the first time that they may either 
implement the division or exit the game with $9, in which case the Rs receive nothing and never 
find out about the D decision. In the standard game, mean D transfers are at the usual level of 
about 25% of the endowment, but up to 43% of Ds choose instead to exit and take the $9. Exit is 
inconsistent with standard social preference models: selfish Ds should stay in the game and take 
$10 instead of $9, whereas fair-minded Ds should also stay but share fairly. The discussion here 
centers on a version of this experiment by Lazear, Malmendier and Weber (2012) that extends 
the Dana et al. design and lends itself to further analysis. This version, which I will call the “exit 
game,” is illustrated in Figure 9. Panel a shows their “no sorting” treatment, which is a standard 
D game, and panel b illustrates a “sorting” treatment. In the sorting treatment, Ds first choose 
whether to enter or to exit the D game. They know that, if they enter, they will then proceed to 
make a decision about how much to transfer of their endowment, 𝑋𝑋. If they choose to exit, they 
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receive 𝑋𝑋 less a cost 𝑐𝑐, where 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 < 𝜂𝜂 = 1
2
𝑋𝑋. That is, in some variations, the exit cost is zero, 
but, when positive, it is smaller than the common entitlement, which I take to be equal splits in 
this simple D game.  
Consider the following stylized facts from some experiments with exit options. 
SF 6.1.1: In dictator games with exit, some dictators enter and transfer zero, some enter and 
transfer a positive amount, and some exit. Those who exit are, on average, more 
generous, than those who enter (Broberg, Ellingsen, and Johannesson, 2007, Dana, Cain 
and Dawes, 2006, Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber, 2012). 
For the analysis, Assumption 8 means that, relative to moral salience in the standard 
dictator game with no exit (𝜎𝜎ℎ), the availability of an exit option lowers moral salience for those, 
who elect to enter (𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚), and moral salience is even lower for those who exit and avoid the 
dictator decision altogether (𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙). To simplify the analysis, I assume, without loss of generality, 
that 𝜎𝜎ℎ = 1, 0 < 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚 ≡ 𝜎𝜎 < 1, and 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 = 0. Denote the utility of a D who enters the game 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 
one who exits 𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋, and one in a standard dictator game without any exit option 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷. Then, their 
utility functions are 
 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂)) + 𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥). 
 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂)) + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥), 
 𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑐𝑐), 
The following theorem addresses entry, exit and ranges of transfers in the exit game. 
Theorem 6.1.1: In the exit game, some dictators enter and some exit. Of those who enter, some 
transfer nothing and some make a positive transfer. The utility of entry, and its 
attractiveness relative to exit, is increasing in 𝛼𝛼 (for 𝑥𝑥 > 0) and decreasing in 𝜙𝜙 (for the 
mean and majority of dictators for whom 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 𝜂𝜂). If variation in generosity in the exit 
game is due mostly to variation in fairness preferences, then more generous dictators 
prefer, on average, to exit, i.e., those with fairness coefficients above a threshold 𝜙𝜙𝑋𝑋. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
A range of optimal transfers among those who enter follows from previously assumed 
differences in generosity in dictator games. The utility of entering varies with the strength of 
altruism and fairness preferences, and the fact noted in SF 6.1.1 that more generous Ds are more 
likely to exit is consistent with generosity in this game being driven chiefly by differences in 
fairness preferences, since fairer Ds prefer to exit. 
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The following stylized fact concerns mean transfers. 
SF 6.1.2: In a dictator game with exit, mean transfers are lower than in the standard dictator 
game without exit (Broberg, Ellingsen, and Johannesson, 2007, Dana et al., 2006, Lazear 
et al., 2012). 
The theory predicts this SF for the different designs with exit, but it is worked out formally for 
the exit game in the following theorem. 
Theorem 6.1.2: In the exit game, mean transfers are lower among those who enter than in the 
standard dictator game without exit. 
Proof: Moral salience is lower in the exit game than in the game without exit, so the optimal 
transfer 𝑥𝑥 is lower by Theorem 2.2.1 combined with SF 6.1.1 that more generous Ds exit at 
higher rates. 
Other findings from games with exit can be explained by changes in moral salience. 
Lazear et al. (2012) and Andreoni et al. (2017) find that exit increases, if agents must confront 
patients face-to-face, and Dana et al. (2006) find that both exit and transfers fall, if Rs are never 
told there was a dictator game regardless of whether the D exits. As described in section 3.2, 
such procedural differences are expected to affect moral salience in the form of moral proximity: 
moral salience increases with personal knowledge of the agent and even of the existence of the 
agent in a capacity that can affect the patient. 
Experiments with exit have produced other findings that are consistent with this model. 
One example comes from Lazear et al. (2012), who report the following result from an exit 
game. 
Theorem 6.1.3: In an exit game with a constant value of exit (𝑋𝑋� − 𝑐𝑐), the frequency of exit 
decreases as the stakes of entering the game (𝑋𝑋) increase. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
There are explanations other than moral salience for some of the experimental results on 
exit. For instance, if the D chooses to exit, Rs do not find out about the dictator game in these 
studies, which raises the question of whether Ds are responding to other forces such as social 
image concerns or guilt aversion, i.e., disutility from giving less than what the R expects. On the 
latter effect, the evidence is mixed, e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find support for guilt 
aversion in a strategic game with communication, whereas Ellingsen et al. (2010) find the effects 
are close to zero in three games, including the dictator game. Regarding the former effect, I am 
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unaware of any tests of social image in experiments with exit, so one cannot rule it out. The 
relative strengths of the moral egress argument are its simplicity and its position in the broader 
theoretical framework of moral salience. It rests on the intuition that people sometimes distance 
themselves from situations in which moral norms are salient, because norm compliance reduces 
utility. In fact, to the extent utility can be thought of as subjective well-being, there is evidence 
suggesting that Ds, who are paired with Rs but given no opportunity to share their endowment 
with them, are happier than Ds in a standard dictator game (Konow, 2010). 
6.2. Willful Ignorance 
An important factor contributing to the 2007-08 financial crisis was the ability of lenders 
to avoid documenting applicants’ incomes and, thereby, avoid knowing about the borrowers’ 
often inflated claims. In the accounting sandals of the early 2000s, CEOs of troubled firms like 
Enron and Worldcom later professed ignorance of the dubious accounting practices at their 
companies. As these examples illustrate, the economic consequences of such information 
avoidance can be staggering, but this phenomenon is widespread and spans other important 
domains. Political polarization, for example, can be traced to the shunning of broadcast and 
online news sources that uncomfortably challenge one’s preconceptions (Dahlgren, Shehata, and 
Strömbäck, 2019, Peterson, Goel, and Iyengar, 2019). People often avoid information that could 
help them better identify the moral, right or socially beneficial course of action, which I will call 
willful ignorance. Experiments indicate that this behavior has an intrinsic component that cannot 
be explained, at least not solely, by extrinsic motives such as unadulterated greed, fear of legal 
culpability, or information costs. 
Consider the binary dictator game introduced by Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007), or 
DWK, which I will call the “information game.” Most subsequent studies of willful ignorance in 
experimental economics employ this design or ones very close to it, although quite different 
designs have also come to similar conclusions, e.g., Serra-Garcia and Szech (2019) and 
Spiekermann and Weiss (2016). There are three possible payoffs, 𝐻𝐻, 𝐹𝐹 and 𝐿𝐿, that can be paired 
between D,R in four ways, {𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷 ,𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅}, where 0 ≤ 𝐿𝐿 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐻𝐻 and 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐻𝐻 < 2𝐹𝐹 (𝐻𝐻 = 6, 𝐹𝐹 = 5, 
𝐿𝐿 = 1 in DWK). The sequence of decisions and payoffs are illustrated in Figure 10. There are 
two states of the world, 𝜔𝜔 ∈ {1,2}, that occur with equal probability, 𝑞𝑞 = 0.5. The D first 
chooses whether to reveal the realization of the gamble (R) or not (NR) and then chooses either 
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option A or option B. If D chooses reveal, D then finds out whether the fairer option is A or B 
before choosing: in state 1, this is 1B, and, in state 2, this is 2A. As usual in a simple dictator 
game, fairness reduces to equality, specifically in the information game, I assume the entitlement 
is the patient’s payoff in the fairest possible state, which is F in this game. If D chooses not to 
reveal, option A or B is chosen without knowledge of the realization of the gamble, whereby the 
fairer option is B in expectations. Since revealing is costless, though, D can always guarantee the 
fairer outcome, although that would mean sacrificing a payoff of H should state 1 obtain. There 
is also a baseline treatment for comparison in which D chooses only between 1A and 1B, the 
payoffs of which are known to D. 
FIGURE 10. – Information game of Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007). 
Consider the following stylized facts for this game. The percentages cited are the 
unweighted averages from DWK plus five other studies that employ this design: Bartling, Engl 
and Weber (2014), Feiler (2014), Grossman (2014), Grossman and van der Weele (2017), and 
Larson and Capra (2009). The various studies are quite consistent regarding the following 
patterns. These percentages as well as the acronyms for the various choices are summarized in 
Figure 10. 
SF 6.2.1: In the information game, Ds are roughly equally split between those who reveal (51%) 
or those who do not (49%). Of those who reveal, a majority (69%) chooses the fair option 
B, if state 1 obtains, and nearly all (98%) choose the fairer option A, if state 2 obtains. Of 
those who do not reveal, almost all (92%) choose the less fair option A. In the Baseline, a 
majority (71%) chooses the fair option B. 
Let the D’s choices of A or B in state 𝜔𝜔 be written 𝑥𝑥𝜔𝜔 = (𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2), where 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵}. 
Then the D’s utility knowing the realization of the state can be written 
 𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥𝜔𝜔 ,𝜔𝜔) = 𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷|𝑥𝑥𝜔𝜔 ,𝜔𝜔) + 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙(𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 − 𝜂𝜂|𝑥𝑥𝜔𝜔 ,𝜔𝜔)) + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅|𝑥𝑥𝜔𝜔 ,𝜔𝜔). 
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The D’s expected utility before knowing the state can be written 
 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥𝜔𝜔 ,𝜔𝜔) = 0.5 ∙ [𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷|𝑥𝑥1, 1) + 𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷|𝑥𝑥2, 2)] +  0.5 ∙ 𝜎𝜎[𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 − 𝜂𝜂|𝑥𝑥1, 1)� 
  +𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 − 𝜂𝜂|𝑥𝑥2, 2)�] + 0.5 ∙ 𝜎𝜎[𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅|𝑥𝑥1, 1) + 𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅|𝑥𝑥2, 2)]. 
Applied to willful ignorance, Assumption 8 means that the option in the information game to 
remain ignorant of the consequences of one’s choices lowers moral salience, even for those who 
reveal (𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚), compared to the standard game (𝜎𝜎ℎ), and moral salience is even lower for those 
who do not reveal (𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙). 
The following theorem reconciles the patterns of SF 6.2.1 with moral salience. The proof 
can be found in the Appendix. 
Theorem 6.2.1: In the information game, suppose the effect of options on altruism is second 
order, i.e., the differences in utility terms between options is smaller for altruism than for 
material utility and, if applicable, inequity aversion. Then reveal and option B in state 2 
(R2B) and not reveal and option B (NRB) are strictly dominated (this need not hold, if 
altruism is not second order and, specifically, if D is extremely spiteful). The fairest Ds 
choose to reveal and then option B in state 1 (R1B) and option A in state 2 (R2A). Less 
fair Ds choose not to reveal and then option A (NRA), except for the least fair Ds, who 
choose to reveal and option A in states 1 and 2 (R1A and R2A). The percentage of Ds 
choosing fair in the baseline is greater than the estimated fraction of R1B2A and less than 
the sum of the fractions choosing R1B2A plus NRA in the information game. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
According to the theorem, two choices are strictly dominated, viz., not reveal and option 
A, and reveal and B in state 2, which is consistent with the nearly zero incidence of these choices 
in the experiments.20 The fairest Ds want to reveal and choose the fairest options, viz., B in state 
1 and A in state 2. The least fair Ds choose to reveal and guarantee themselves the highest 
payoffs by choosing option A in both states. In between are the Ds, who seek to lower their 
inequity aversion through reduced moral salience by not revealing the consequences of their 
choices, i.e., choosing not reveal and A. Finally, the 71% choosing 1B over 1A in the standard 
game lies in the approximately 35% to 80% range predicted by the theorem for the information 
game, inferring types under reveal from the frequency of choices of 1A and 1B. 
 
20 The theorem states this need not hold, if Ds are extremely spiteful: this is noted, not because these are predicted to 
occur, but because of later claims about how agents would respond to them, if they did occur. 
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Bartling, Engl and Weber (2014, or BEW henceforth) adapted the DWK design, adding a 
baseline to state 2 and adjusting the payoffs while maintaining the fundamental relative 
relationships between L, F and H. They also added third party punishment of the D using the 
strategy method and based on D choices to reveal or not and of option A or B as well as of the 
realized payoffs. Below I analyze third party punishment in the information game assuming non-
strategic behavior, e.g., punishment by unannounced spectators. I note two differences from the 
design of BEW. First, the fact of the possibility of punishment was common knowledge in BEW, 
so that could prompt strategic self-interest by first stage Ds and, thereby, distort the punishers’ 
estimates of the Ds’ character. Second, the third parties in BEW were not true spectators, since 
they paid a price of 0.2 per unit punishment. These two facts can be expected to affect the degree 
of punishment, but they would still not impact the predictions qualitatively, as long as strategic 
self-interest does not undo the ranking of character types. The positive price of punishment 
might only affect the quantity of punishment, and, even so, it is relatively small price. 
The following theorem states predictions about spectator punishment in the information 
game. 
Theorem 6.2.2: Suppose altruism is second order, and the mean threshold for generosity is 
between the estimated level for those choosing fair (1B) in the standard game and for 
those choosing not reveal and A (NRA) in the information game. Then R1B and 1B will 
not be punished. There is punishment for all other decisions, specifically, in ascending 
order of punishment, for NRA in state 2 (NRA2), NRA in state 1 (NRA1), R1A and 1A. 
Punishment for R2A is greater than 2A, which lie between that for R1B and R1A. Other 
choices are predicted to be dominated and could only occur, if altruism were not second 
order and Ds were extremely spiteful. If spectators, nevertheless, sanction for the 
possibility of such extremely spiteful Ds, and assuming the estimated character of such 
Ds fall below the character threshold, these choices would be punished in ascending order 
as NRB in state 1 (NRB1), NRB in state 2 (NRB2), R2B and 2B. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
To summarize, this theorem makes the following predictions about the ideal punishment ?̃?𝑧 
(expressed in non-positive terms) in the information game based on conclusions that can be 
drawn from the proofs for Theorem 6.2.1 and on the specification of virtue preferences under 
uncertainty in section 4.2, including the adjustment of the scale. 
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0 = 𝑧𝑧𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵 = 𝑧𝑧1𝐵𝐵 > 𝑧𝑧𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁2 > 𝑧𝑧𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁1 > 𝑧𝑧𝑅𝑅1𝑁𝑁 > 𝑧𝑧1𝑁𝑁 
0 = 𝑧𝑧𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵 > 𝑧𝑧2𝑁𝑁 > 𝑧𝑧𝑅𝑅2𝑁𝑁 > 𝑧𝑧𝑅𝑅1𝑁𝑁 
0 > 𝑧𝑧𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵1 > 𝑧𝑧𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵2 > 𝑧𝑧𝑅𝑅2𝐵𝐵 > 𝑧𝑧2𝐵𝐵 
Table 6 presents the results from BEW on mean punishment points by choice and, where 
outcomes are random, realization. The levels of punishment follow exactly the patterns predicted 
by the theory. In the top rubric, punishment in R1B and 1B is effectively zero, and punishment 
increases monotonically from NRA2 to 1A. In the bottom rubric, punishment in R2A is greater 
than in 2A and lies between R1B and R1A with its greater proximity to R1B consistent with the 
larger predicted share of fair types in R2A. Finally, certain choices are predicted to be dominated 
in this game, based in part on the assumption that altruism is second order. In fact, these actions 
are chosen either never by Ds or at frequencies so low that they are consistent with the kind of 
noisy choice typically observed in experiments, viz., NRB (0% in BEW, 8% in the six studies 
overall), R2B (0% BEW, 2% overall), and 2B (4% BEW). Thus, these results bolster the 
assumption that altruism is second order in this design. Nevertheless, it is not contradictory for 
spectators, who are punishing for all possibilities using the strategy method, to take account of 
the possibility of Ds, whose spite is extreme and punish choices that, in practice, turn out to be 
dominated. In fact, the punishment of extremely spiteful types, or of the possibility of such types, 
also follows the predicted pattern, increasing from NRB1 to 2B. 
TABLE 6 
PUNISHMENT POINTS IN BARTLING, ENGL AND WEBER (2014) 
R1B 1B NRA2 NRA1 R1A 1A 
-0.58 -0.56 -8.00 -11.42 -16.25 -19.72 
2A R2A NRB1 NRB2 R2B 2B 
-1.76 -2.67 -4.42 -6.00 -9.50 -12.41 
 
Numerous explanations have been offered for information avoidance, e.g., see the 
excellent review of Golman, Hagmann and Loewenstein (2017). On the more specific topic of 
willful ignorance, which as used here involves a connection to moral preferences, Gino, Norton 
and Weber (2016) explain willful ignorance based on motivated reasoning, i.e., ignorance allows 
selfish dictators to believe they are being moral. This seems consistent with other evidence of 
self-serving fairness biases, e.g., Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, and Camerer (1995), 
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Konow (2000), although I am unaware of any evidence on the incentivized elicitation of moral 
beliefs in the specific case of willful ignorance. Along other lines, Grossman and van der Weele 
(2017) propose a theory of self-image that is consistent with D behavior in the information game. 
They argue persuasively in favor of an explanation based on self-signaling, although it is unclear 
how that theory might explain patterns of third-party punishment. As I see it, though, the main 
arguments for moral salience are its parsimony and broad range of applications, while being 
potentially complementary to, rather than conflicting with, alternative explanations such as 
motivated reasoning and self-image. 
6.3. Delegation 
Numerous management consulting firms exist largely to recommend or carry out the 
firing of the employees of their client companies, even though those companies could implement 
the firings themselves and, thereby, save themselves the consulting fees. Companies in 
developed nations outsource much of their manufacturing to companies in less developed 
countries where labor standards are lower, even though there are, in some cases, be cost 
advantages from vertically integrating foreign production. When decision-makers delegate such 
choices, it raises the question of whether they seek to deflect blame from themselves for 
undesirable consequences, say, from their personal involvement in firings or from dangerous 
work conditions, such as those that led to the collapse of the Rana Plaza textiles factory building 
in Bangladesh in 2013 that killed more than 1100 workers. In fact, economics experiments 
corroborate the desire of agents to delegate immoral choices to others after ruling out other 
reasons, including liability concerns, the value of outside expertise and advantages of 
specialization. 
Experimenters have studied delegation chiefly using dictator games in which a dictator 
may delegate to an intermediary (I) the decision about the payoffs of the D, R(s), and I. There 
have been wide variations, though, in features of the designs, such as continuous or binary 
choices, single shot or multiple rounds, communication between subjects or not, differing 
numbers of subjects in groups, fixed matching or rematching of groups, selection of Is, different 
opportunities for punishment and of different members of groups, etc. Nevertheless, certain 
patterns are robust across these designs and are summarized in the following stylized facts. 
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SF 6.3.1: When dictators have an option to delegate, average allocations to recipients are lower 
than in a standard dictator game. Some dictators delegate the allocation decision to 
intermediaries, who usually choose unfair allocations, and fewer dictators make fair 
allocations directly themselves (Hamman, Loewenstein and Weber, 2010, Coffman, 
2011, Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012, Oexl and Grossman, 2013). 
FIGURE 11. – Delegation game of Bartling and Fischbacher (2012). 
For the analysis, I focus on a simple, non-strategic design, which I will call the 
“delegation game,” that was introduced by Bartling and Fischbacher (2012, henceforth BF) and 
that has been used and adapted by others, e.g., Oexl and Grossman (2013). Each group of four 
consists of a D, an I, and two Rs, whose payoffs, {𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷 ,𝜋𝜋𝐼𝐼 ,𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅1,𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅2}, can be fair, {𝐹𝐹,𝐹𝐹,𝐹𝐹,𝐹𝐹}, or 
unfair, {𝐻𝐻,𝐻𝐻, 𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿}, where 0 ≤ 𝐿𝐿 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐻𝐻 and 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐻𝐻 = 2𝐹𝐹 (𝐻𝐻 = 9, 𝐹𝐹 = 5, 𝐿𝐿 = 1 in BF). The 
sequence of decisions and payoffs are illustrated in Figure 11. The D chooses either to allocate 
directly or to delegate the decision to an I, whereby the D is assumed to estimate the probability 
that the I will allocate fairly to be 𝑞𝑞, where 0 < 𝑞𝑞 < 1. There is also a baseline treatment with no 
delegation option that corresponds to the Allocate branch of the game tree. Clearly, standard 
theory predicts that a risk neutral or risk averse D will never delegate, since allocating directly 
guarantees the fair or unfair outcome preferred by D. BF include treatments with punishment that 
produce high rates of fair choices, likely motivated by strategic self-interest. But in their non-
strategic treatments of the delegation game without punishment, 66% of Ds choose unfair, 17% 
choose fair, and 17% choose to delegate, whereby 82% of Is then choose the unfair allocation. In 
the baseline dictator game, 65% of Ds choose unfair, almost identical to that in the delegation 
game, but that means that the percentage of Ds choosing fair directly drops from 35% in the 
baseline to only 17% in the delegation game. Thus, the delegation option appears to lead about 
one-half of otherwise fair Ds to delegate. 
Applied to the delegation game, Assumption 8 means that the very existence of an option 
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to delegate the decision in the delegation game to an intermediary lowers moral salience (𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚) 
relative to the standard dictator game (𝜎𝜎ℎ), and moral salience is lower still for those who 
actually choose to delegate (𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙). The moral salience of the intermediary, who allocates, is open 
to some interpretation: since I is aware of the delegation option, salience should be no greater 
than 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚, but the fact that D actually exercised that option might lower salience further to 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 , 
hence, I assume that 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 ∈ [𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 ,𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚].21 Note that the delegation game includes uncertainty about 
I’s choice, which may also impact salience through the aforementioned moral uncertainty. Such 
an effect might be implicitly in salience terms here, but that does not detract from delegation per 
se, especially in light of evidence that delegation affects behavior in the manner predicted by 
moral salience even in the absence of uncertainty (e.g., see results in Study 1 of Coffman, 2011).  
Theorem 6.3.1: Suppose altruism is second order in the delegation game. Then, the fairest 
dictators choose to allocate fairly themselves, less fair ones delegate, and the least fair 
allocate unfairly themselves. Fewer dictators choose to allocate fairly in the delegation 
game than in the standard dictator game. The fraction of intermediaries allocating fairly 
lies between the fraction allocating fairly and the sum of the fractions allocating fairly or 
delegating in the delegation game. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
These predictions are consistent with the patterns observed in the BF treatments discussed above: 
some fair Ds in the baseline switch to delegation, when that is an option. The fraction of 
intermediaries, who allocate fairly is 18%, which lies in the predicted interval of the 17% of Ds 
allocating fairly and the 34% allocating fairly or delegating in the delegation game. 
Most experimental studies of delegation also include the possibility of subsequent 
punishment of dictator decisions. Some of these results are summarized in the following SF. 
SF 6.3.2: There is no significant punishment of fair choices, regardless of delegation. Dictators 
are punished significantly less for unfair allocations that result from delegation than from 
their own decisions, but delegation increases punishment of intermediaries for unfair 
choices (Coffman, 2011, Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012, Oexl and Grossman, 2013). 
 
21 Another question is whether to treat I as an agent or a patient. In the latter, but not the former, case, I’s allocations 
must be included in the moral preferences of the D. In the baseline, it seems clear that I is wholly passive and, 
therefore, a patient. The same is true when the D chooses directly in the delegation game. For simplicity and 




The following theorem considers costless punishment in the delegation game assuming 
non-strategic D choices as with unanticipated spectator punishment. 
Theorem 6.3.2: Suppose the mean threshold for character is below the value for allocating fairly 
and above the level for allocating unfairly in the delegation game, inclusive. Then 
spectators do not punish those, who make no decisions or who directly choose fair 
outcomes. They do punish those, who directly choose unfair outcomes, whether in the 
delegation or the dictator game. In addition, if the threshold is above the expected 
character of a D who delegates, spectators will punish dictators who delegate, but less 
strongly than they punish unfair choices and even less strongly, if fair obtains after 
delegation. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
These predictions are summarized below, whereby 𝑧𝑧𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 denotes the ideal punishment by the 
spectator, ?̃?𝑧, of person P in game G, who chose C resulting in, if uncertain, outcome O. 
0 = 𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝑧𝑧𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝑧𝑧𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 > 𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 
0 = 𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 = 𝑧𝑧𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 = 𝑧𝑧𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 > 𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 
0 = 𝑧𝑧𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 ≥ 𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 ≥ 𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 > 𝑧𝑧𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 
The assumption that the character threshold lies below the level for allocating fairly and above 
the level for allocation unfairly in the delegation game is consistent with intuition and the 
condition that there be some degree of both reward and punishment. The further question of 
whether it is located sufficiently above the level for unfair choices that spectators punish 
delegation is an empirical matter. 
I am unaware of any delegation experiment with unannounced spectator punishment, but 
in some treatments of BF, a randomly chosen R could spend one point to assign up to seven 
punishment points to each of the other three subjects for each possible decision (i.e., using the 
strategy method). In these treatments, punishment was common knowledge, which potentially 
confounds inferences about the motives behind D choices because of possible strategic self-
interest. Nevertheless, if R estimates of D types in these treatments produces the same ranking of 
Ds as that of unannounced spectators, then the results remain qualitatively the same. Thus, this 
comparison must be taken with a grain of salt, but these results are worth examining given the 
negligible cost of punishment in BF, the absence of a compelling reason to believe the possibility 
of strategic self-interest would undo rankings of Ds, and the consistency of predictions with the 
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patterns observed in this study. The results for punishment in the BF experiment are summarized 
in Table 7 and are in accord with all of the predictions of Theorem 6.3.2. On the two 
theoretically ambiguous effects, DDF/D and DDU/D, there is a hint that some sanctioners wish 
to punish Ds for delegating, but the evidence on this is weak. 
TABLE 7 
PUNISHMENT POINTS IN BARTLING AND FISCHBACHER (2012) 
Dictator Game: 
Baseline 
BF/D BF/I BU/I BU/D 
-0.41 -0.34 -0.42 -3.70 
Delegation Game: 
Allocate 
DF/D DF/I DU/I DU/D 
-0.19 -0.15 -0.75 -4.27 
Delegation Game: 
Delegate 
DDF/I DDF/D DDU/D DDU/I 
-0.20 -0.24 -1.31 -3.96 
 
7. Moral Point Salience 
So far in this paper, moral salience has referred to what is more properly called moral set 
salience, but now we turn briefly to what I will call moral point salience. As I use the terms here, 
set salience relates to properties of disjoint subsets of the decision context, viz., moral and non-
moral context, whereas point salience refers to individual elements of the context. The latter 
provides a simple explanation for the well-established pattern from economics experiments of 
atoms at certain points in choice distributions. I will discuss three examples of actions that are 
chosen with greater frequency than alternative choices in their neighborhood. I believe these are 
important examples of point salience, but I do not claim that this is necessarily an exhaustive list. 
First, equal splits are a frequent choice in many experiments, such as in ultimatum and dictator 
games (Camerer, 2003). Second, zero transfers have also emerged as a frequent choice in 
dictator experiments where taking options rule out a corner solution as an explanation, e.g., List 
(2007), Cappelen et al. (2013), and Alevy et al. (2014). Finally, many studies have found that, 
when certain actions are explicitly highlighted (e.g., actions of previous subjects, experimenter 
suggestions, actions of role models), they tend to be chosen more frequently, including in 
dictator games, e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), public good games, e.g., Croson and Marks 
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(2001), COVID-19-related contributions and volunteering, e.g., Abel and Brown (2020), and 
field experiments on charitable contributions, e.g., Shang and Croson (2009). 
Researchers have explained or modeled these patterns in various ways, but each account 
has its limitations, and I am unaware of a unified explanation for all three. For example, 
theoretical explanations for equal splits include a kinked inequality aversion term (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999), infinite inequity aversion on the part of some subjects (e.g., Konow, 2000), or a 
signaling game in which agents value social image (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). A strength 
of the first approach is that it provides a simple explanation for results from numerous bargaining 
and market experiments, but it is inconsistent with other findings, such as the frequent choice of 
transfers between zero and one-half in dictator experiments. The second approach accounts for 
the heterogeneity of types according to their degree of inequity aversion observed in many 
experiments and also accommodates concepts of equity other than equality, but it is inconsistent 
with variation in the percentage of subjects making equitable choices, for example, with the price 
of giving (Andreoni and Miller, 2002). The third approach offers a persuasive account for equal 
splits in the dictator game that avoids seemingly ad hoc assumptions about non-differentiability 
of utility, but it relies on a complicated theoretical apparatus the extension of which to other 
games is not straightforward. Moreover, none of these approaches provides explanations for all 
three examples above. Zero transfers, even in dictator games with taking, might be explained by 
dictators, who experience an endowment effect, but that explanation does nothing to account for 
the first or third examples. The masses at highlighted choices can be understood as focal points 
that facilitate coordination in strategic games, but that does not explain masses at dominated 
choices in non-strategic decisions. One might invoke experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010), 
but they also do not provide a coherent and unified explanation for all three effects. 
Moral point salience offers a simple and parsimonious account for these three types of 
masses based on moral considerations. Specifically, it concerns elements, P, of the set of actions, 
X, that are, for moral reasons, more salient than other elements of X, whereby 𝑃𝑃 ⊂ 𝑋𝑋. Moral 
point salience is a term that is applied to fairness preferences, f, of agent i and takes the form: 
 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥) = �
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ≥ 1
1
 if 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥 ∉ 𝑃𝑃. 
That is, morally salient actions may be more heavily weighted in some agents’ fairness 
preferences than other elements of the set of actions, whereby the weight can vary by person. 
This discontinuity in utility can prove irksome, and, in fact, the analysis in this paper thus 
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far has not required point salience to be invoked, largely for that reason. Without point salience, 
the theory has been applied to explain a wide range of classic and anomalous results while 
retaining differentiability of the utility function. Nevertheless, point salience is helpful to account 
for masses that often materialize when examining the distribution of choices. So, I wish to 
outline and justify briefly the position that moral point salience not only earns first place in an 
Occam’s razor contest to explain such masses but also that it is also a persuasive part of a 
coherent morals-based framework. I propose three categories of moral point salience below. 
First, norm salience, where 𝜂𝜂 ∈ 𝑃𝑃, is the most intuitive type of moral point salience. 
When first hearing about the standard dictator or ultimatum game, I suspect almost everyone 
thinks the same thing: the morally right choice is to split the stakes equally. We can torture 
ourselves for alternative, and more elegant, explanations, but I believe the most compelling one 
is staring us in the face: the morally preferred choice is obvious, in this case. I take obvious to 
imply, formally, that a discrete positive increment is applied to moral preferences of many agents 
for that choice. Of course, stakeholders, such as dictators or proposers, might make another 
choice due to self-interest, but, as stated in Assumption 3, the moral norm, 𝜂𝜂, can be identified 
from the choices of spectators. A concrete and intuitive way to operationalize this is to associate 
the entitlement in experiments with the modal choice of spectators and the salience of the 
entitlement as being in direct proportion to spectator consensus, specifically, whereby consensus 
can be conceptualized as inversely related to variance in spectator judgments (Konow, 2009). 
As discussed in section 3.1, the norm defaults to equality in simple decision contexts, like 
the standard dictator game. In fact, equal splits emerge frequently in most of the games examined 
in this paper. But what if the norm is not as simple and obvious as equality? As argued in section 
3.1, when the context provides information relevant to other norms, behavior shifts towards those 
norms, such as efficiency (see section 4.2), but does that produce masses at those norms? 
Consider a more demanding test of point salience based on a more complicated rule: equity calls 
for allocations that are proportional to contributions. Figure 12 summarizes results from 
experiments that illustrate point salience. In Konow, Saijo and Akai (2020) subjects first perform 
a real effort task, and then dictators allocate the resulting earnings. Panel a shows the amounts 
stakeholding dictators allocate to recipients, and panel b shows the amounts spectators allocate to 
one member of each pair. Specifically, the horizontal axis represents the difference in points 
allocated to recipients from the amount they produced, which is their entitlement and the 
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equitable amount. The mode and choice of 50% of stakeholders in panel a and of 52% of 
spectators in panel b is the equitable amount. Thus, in general, with norm salience, 𝑃𝑃 is a rule 
and 𝑥𝑥 a point that might be conditioned on another variable in the context. For example, when 
the norm is equity, x is conditioned on individual contributions, and when the norm is basic 
needs, it is conditioned on individual needs. Konow (2001) and Konow, Saijo and Akai (2020) 
argue that equality is the norm by default, when there is no or insufficient information to apply 
another norm. 
FIGURE 12. – Moral point salience. 
Sources: Konow. Saijo and Akai (2020) stakeholders (a) and spectators (b), List (2007) Take $5 (c) and Earnings 
(d), Adena, Huck and Rasul (2014) No suggestion and €100 (e), and Edwards and List (2014) No ask, $20 ask and 
Unusual ask (f). 
Second, null salience is the salience of inaction, i.e., the choice neither to help nor to 
harm, such as neither giving nor taking in a dictator game, denoted 0 ∈ 𝑃𝑃. Null salience is 
related to the distinction in ethics between sins of commission for the wrongs one chooses versus 
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sins of omission for the acts one should perform but does not. Various experiments in economics 
and psychology suggest people have a stronger aversion to acts of commission than to ones of 
omission (e.g., Cox, Servátka, and Vadovič, 2017, Spranca, Minsk, and Baron, 1991). That is, an 
individual, who otherwise might prefer to harm another, say, take $1 in a dictator game, might 
experience a discontinuity in the marginal moral disutility of doing so. One way to model this is 
with moral point salience, where utility is discretely greater at zero. Of course, in many 
experiments, such as the standard dictator game, a mass at zero logically emerges as a corner 
solution due to selfish, spiteful or insufficiently fair dictators. But such censoring is not a 
problem in dictator games with taking, and, in fact, those studies typically find a mass at zero. 
This is illustrated in panels c and d of Figure 12, which depicts the Take $5 and Earnings 
treatments, respectively, of List (2007), and show between 30% and 66% of dictators choosing 
inaction, i.e., transfers of zero.22 
Third, and finally, threshold salience refers to the action, 𝑥𝑥� ∈ 𝑃𝑃, that corresponds to the 
agent’s preferred character threshold, 𝛾𝛾�, given the context and its moral set salience. Remember 
that 𝑥𝑥� is the action that is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy and that it is less than the 
objectively fair transfer, 𝜂𝜂, if salience is below a sufficiently high level. Thus, this can be thought 
of as the action that is “fair enough” given the context. In the case of a stakeholder, we can think 
of this as the stakeholder’s (potentially biased) belief about what constitutes “fair enough.” The 
current theory assumes heterogeneity in the value of 𝛾𝛾�, even among spectators, so it is not clear 
why a mass would materialize at any particular stakeholder choice. But experimental evidence 
establishes that beliefs about the sufficient level of norm compliance, 𝑥𝑥�, are malleable and can be 
manipulated, e.g., Bicchieri and Chavez (2010) and Bicchieri, Dimant, Gächter and Nosenzo 
(2020). Indeed, compliance with norms responds to and sometimes coalesces around 
information, including about past trusting behavior of others (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 
1995), recommended contributions to a public good (e.g., Croson and Marks, 2001) and default 
levels of transfers to recipients in dictator games (e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). Such 
evidence is consistent with an effect of specific information on beliefs about appropriate norm 
compliance and, as a result, on behavior itself. 
 
22 Another way this could be modeled is as a kink in the altruism function at zero. This is consistent with a mass at 
zero but one disadvantage of this approach is that a kink is not consistent with the paucity of transfers typically 
observed just above and just below zero whereas point salience is. 
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Voluntary contributions to charities or public goods lend themselves to examination of 
this effect, since many people feel morally obliged to donate but plausibly have non-degenerate 
distributions of beliefs about the appropriate amount. Studies of such contributions that include 
suggested donations yield evidence consistent with threshold salience. Panel e of Figure 12 
shows contributions to a public good (viz., an opera house) in a field experiment of Adena, Huck 
and Rasul (2014). When solicitations explicitly suggest a €100 contribution, the fraction of such 
donations is significantly greater than that when no suggestion is made (p<0.001), according to 
the two-tail z-tests used in all comparisons here.23 The results of the field experiment of Edwards 
and List (2014) on alumni donations to a university are summarized in panel f of Figure 12. The 
fraction of $20 contributions is significantly greater (p<0.001), when that amount is explicitly 
stated in solicitations. A further treatment in which solicitations suggest unusual amounts, like 
$20.01 or $20.04, produce a similar increase in the frequency of choices of stated amounts 
(p<0.001), corroborating the robustness of this effect, even when suggestions are not round 
numbers. 
An advantage of the way these three types of moral point salience are formulated is that 
they can be specified and identified empirically. Norm salience can be inferred from spectator 
choices, null salience defines itself, and threshold salience can be inferred from behavioral 
responses to information or from incentivized solicitation of beliefs. This discussion on moral 
point salience indicates some commonsensical concepts to account for certain patterns that are 
not explained by moral set salience and indicates possible avenues for future research. 
8. Conclusions 
This paper proposes a tractable theory to explain not only classic results on allocative 
preferences and reciprocity but also a wide range of anomalous findings about moral behavior, 
including moral proximity, moral uncertainty, the outcome bias, the taking effect, joy of 
destruction, moral egress, willful ignorance and delegation. At various stages, I have discussed 
alternative explanations for specific phenomena, such as experimental artefacts (e.g., Bardsley, 
2008), motivated reasoning (e.g., Gino et al., 2016) and image concerns (e.g., Andreoni and 
 
23 A further treatment shows that, when solicitations suggest €200, the effect dissipates. This seems consistent with 
agents having prior beliefs about the distribution of appropriate donations, whereby suggestions provide signals that 
impact 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 in direct relationship to their proximity to priors such that outlier suggestions are ineffectual. Nevertheless, 
formal analysis of this question goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Bernheim, 2009), including what I see as the strengths of those alternatives. As stated at the start, 
the goal is not to dismiss or conduct a beauty contest with other accounts of specific phenomena. 
Instead, one goal was to present an until now neglected explanation, which plausibly sweeps up 
much of the variance in observed behavior. Another goal was to illustrate the theory’s flexibility 
and ease of application, that is, to argue its appeal on the basis of Occam’s razor. A related aim 
was to demonstrate the generality of the theory across an unprecedented set of sometimes 
enigmatic empirical results on moral preferences. Finally, the theory was tested out-of-sample 
and its predictions corroborated in a new experiment. 
Future research could explore possible roles for moral salience and virtue preferences in 
relation to other types of moral preferences apart from allocative preferences, e.g., trust, 
trustworthiness, honesty, and cooperation. Further work could also analyze the factors that affect 
how different moral and non-moral contexts might be integrated across different decisions at a 
point in time as well as over time. That is, one could examine the effects on moral salience of 
presenting similar decisions while varying the moral and non-moral context, which could, for 
example, account for order effects. In addition, this paper focused on non-strategic decision-
making in order to simplify the analysis and avoid factors that might confound inferences about 
the forces being studied. But future work might extend the theory to situations involving 
strategic interaction, such as bargaining. A theory incorporating moral salience and virtue 
preferences could be applied to decision-making in experimental games, like the ultimatum 
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Proof of Theorem 2.2.1: 
 𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥� =  −𝑢𝑢
′(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) +  𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′�𝜙𝜙(𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂)� +  𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥) = 0 
Applying the implicit function theorem to solve for 𝑥𝑥(𝜎𝜎), substituting into the first order 




+  𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′ +  𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙2𝑓𝑓′′
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎




 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎� =  
−𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′−𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′
𝑢𝑢′′+𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓𝜙𝜙2𝑓𝑓′′+𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼2𝑔𝑔′′
>  0. 
 
Proof of Theorem 2.2.2 
By Theorem 2.2.1, 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕
> 0  and we assume 𝑑𝑑
2𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕2
≥ 0. Write 𝑥𝑥(𝜎𝜎) by the implicit function theorem 
and note that, by assumption, 𝜎𝜎(𝑝𝑝, 𝑛𝑛), 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛
< 0 and 𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛2
> 0. Then, we can write the composite 



























Proof of Theorem 2.2.3 
Solving for 𝑥𝑥(𝜙𝜙), substituting, and proceeding as before, 
𝑢𝑢′′ 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝜙𝜙









⋛ 0 if 𝑓𝑓′ ⋛ 0 as 𝑥𝑥 ⋚ 𝑌𝑌 − 𝜂𝜂. 
 
Proof of Theorem 2.2.4 














Proof of Theorem 2.2.5 












< 1 if 𝛼𝛼 ≥ 0. 
 
Proof of Theorem 3.1.3: 
In the standard dictator game, the minimum and maximum transfers are zero and X, respectively. 
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Denote the null transfer 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁, where 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 = 0, and its frequency 𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁. Denote the average super-fair 
transfer 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻, where 
1
2
𝑋𝑋 < 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 ≤ 𝑋𝑋, and its frequency 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻. Denote the average transfer between 0 
and one-half 𝑥𝑥𝐺𝐺 , where 0 < 𝑥𝑥𝐺𝐺 ≤
1
2
𝑋𝑋, and its frequency 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺. Suppose 𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 , 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 , 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ∈ (0,1). Finally, 
note that 𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 + 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 + 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 = 1, and, according to SF 3.1.2, 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 < 𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁. Then the average transfer 
equals 
𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 + 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝐺𝐺 + 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 = 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝐺𝐺 + 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻. 
First, note that 𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥) > 0, since 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 = 0 and 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 > 0, 𝑥𝑥𝐺𝐺 > 0, 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 > 0, and 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 > 0. Next, show 
𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥) < 1
2
𝑋𝑋. Consider 𝑥𝑥𝐺𝐺  at its maximum value 
1
2
𝑋𝑋, and 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 at its maximum value 𝑋𝑋. Note that 
𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 + 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ∙ 𝑋𝑋 = (𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 + 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻)
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻
𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁+𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻
∙ 𝑋𝑋 < (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺)
1
2









𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 ∙
1
2
𝑋𝑋 + [𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 + 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ∙ 𝑋𝑋] < 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 ∙
1
2







Proof of Theorem 3.1.5 
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢�𝑀𝑀 − 𝑌𝑌 − 𝑥𝑥� + 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂)� + 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥). 
𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥� = −𝑢𝑢
′�𝑀𝑀 − 𝑌𝑌 − 𝑥𝑥� + 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′�𝜙𝜙(𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂)� + 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥) = 0. 
Substituting 𝑥𝑥(𝑌𝑌) and differentiating, 
𝑢𝑢′′ + 𝑢𝑢′′ 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑















Proof of Theorem 3.1.6 
Let Y denote the preset experimenter donation and y the amount by which the experimenter 
reduces the recipient’s (R’s) earnings. Then R earns 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑌𝑌 since 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦. 
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝑦𝑦 − 𝜂𝜂)� + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔(αx), 
𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥� = −𝑢𝑢
′(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥) = 0 
in the case of interior solutions. The assumptions that 𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛼𝛼∗) > 0 and 𝛼𝛼∗ ≡
{𝛼𝛼|𝑢𝑢′(𝑋𝑋 − 𝜂𝜂) = 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′(𝛼𝛼𝜂𝜂)} > 0 ⟹ 𝑢𝑢′(𝑋𝑋) < 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′(0) ∋ 𝛼𝛼∗ > 0∀𝛼𝛼 > 𝛼𝛼∗, who form the 
fraction 0.5 > Α(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛼𝛼∗) > 0 plus some 𝛼𝛼 for whom 𝛼𝛼∗ ≥ 𝛼𝛼 > 0. 
 
Proof of Theorem 3.1.7 
Since the total stakes, 𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌, vary, the entitlement, 𝜂𝜂, would be impacted according to most 
distributive principles. Given the simple context, equality is a reasonable assumption, but I make 
the weaker assumption that 𝜂𝜂 = (1 − 𝑡𝑡)𝑋𝑋 + 𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌, 0 < 𝑡𝑡 < 1. 
Then 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂 = (1 − 𝑡𝑡)�𝑌𝑌 − 𝑋𝑋� + 𝑥𝑥, and 





′�𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥� + 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′′ �𝜙𝜙 �(1 − 𝑡𝑡)�𝑌𝑌 − 𝑋𝑋� + 𝑥𝑥�� + 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥) = 0. 
Substituting 𝑥𝑥(𝑌𝑌) and differentiating, 
𝑢𝑢′′ 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑















Proof of Theorem 4.1.1  
𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈
𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� = −𝑢𝑢




− 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥�) 𝑍𝑍
2
�� + 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥) = 0. 
Substituting 𝑧𝑧(𝑥𝑥) and differentiating, 














If 𝑥𝑥 is randomly assigned, then 𝑟𝑟 = 0 and 0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
< 1. 
Otherwise, 𝑟𝑟′ > 0 and sanctioning increases the value of 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥� . 
 
Proof Theorem 4.1.2 
𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈
𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� = 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓






− 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥�) ∙
𝑍𝑍
2
�� = 0 















which equals 1, if 𝑥𝑥 is randomly assigned and 𝑟𝑟 = 0, and is greater than 1, if 𝑥𝑥 is chosen and 





< 0 ⟹ asymmetric sanctioning. 
 
Proof of Theorem 4.2.1 
Since 𝛽𝛽 = 0, 
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟) + 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 �𝜙𝜙 �𝑧𝑧 −
1+𝑏𝑏
2
𝑍𝑍 − 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑥𝑥′��. 
𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈
𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� = 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓
′ �𝜙𝜙 �𝑧𝑧 −
1 + 𝑏𝑏
2
𝑍𝑍 − 𝜃𝜃 ∙ 𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑥𝑥′�� = 0 
⟹ 𝑧𝑧 = 1+𝑏𝑏
𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍 + 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑥𝑥′. 
Distributive preferences imply the fixed amount 1+𝑏𝑏
𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍. The fact that 𝛾𝛾�𝑓𝑓 > 𝛾𝛾�𝑢𝑢 implies the 
corresponding 𝑧𝑧𝑓𝑓 > 𝑧𝑧𝑢𝑢 for a given value of 𝑥𝑥′. 
 
Proof of Theorem 4.2.2 





𝑍𝑍 + 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾�𝑓𝑓 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹, since 𝑥𝑥′ = 𝐹𝐹 
𝑧𝑧𝑢𝑢𝐵𝐵 = 1+𝑏𝑏
𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍 + 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾�𝑢𝑢 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹, since 𝑥𝑥′ = 𝐹𝐹 
𝑧𝑧𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵 = 1+𝑏𝑏
𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍 + 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾�𝑓𝑓 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ (𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹 + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐿𝐿), since 𝑥𝑥′ = 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹 + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐿𝐿 
𝑧𝑧𝑢𝑢𝐵𝐵 = 1+𝑏𝑏
𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍 + 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾�𝑢𝑢 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ �(1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐹𝐹 + 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿� since 𝑥𝑥′ = 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑢𝑢 = (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐹𝐹 + 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 
𝑧𝑧𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵 > 𝑧𝑧𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵 as long as 𝑧𝑧𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵 < 𝑍𝑍 since 𝑟𝑟 > 0 and 𝐹𝐹 > 𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹 + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐿𝐿 
𝑧𝑧𝑢𝑢𝐵𝐵 < 𝑧𝑧𝑢𝑢𝐵𝐵 since 𝑟𝑟 < 0 and 𝐹𝐹 > (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐹𝐹 + 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 
If D chooses with certainty, then for Rs 
𝑈𝑈 = 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙 �𝑧𝑧 −
1 + 𝑏𝑏
2
𝑍𝑍 − 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹� 
⟹ 𝑧𝑧 = 1+𝑏𝑏
2
𝑍𝑍 + 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹. 
If D chooses fair, 
𝑧𝑧𝐵𝐵 = 1+𝑏𝑏
𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍 + 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾�𝑓𝑓 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹 = 𝑧𝑧𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵. 
If D chooses unfair, 
𝑧𝑧𝐵𝐵 = 1+𝑏𝑏
𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍 + 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾�𝑢𝑢 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹 = 𝑧𝑧𝑢𝑢𝐵𝐵. 
 
Proof of Theorem 5.2.1 
Define salience in the reference state to be at the level of a given first stage sinner and saints 












�  𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻







�  𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿
 
The first order condition is 
𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈
𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� =  𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓
′ �𝜙𝜙 �𝑧𝑧 − 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 − 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�),
𝑍𝑍
2
�� =  0 













When 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 < 𝑥𝑥 < 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 , 𝛾𝛾� = 𝑥𝑥, and 
𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥� = 1 + 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟





































since 𝛾𝛾�(𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿) < 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿. 































since 𝛾𝛾�(𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻) > 𝛾𝛾𝐻𝐻. This implies ?̃?𝑧 is concave in 𝑥𝑥 with a discontinuous decrease at 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 and a 
discontinuous increase at 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 . By Assumption 7, 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿�  < 0, by Definition 1, 
𝜕𝜕𝜎𝜎
𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛� < 0, and 
by Theorem 2.2.3, 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎� > 0. Then if a D gives 𝛾𝛾� at the reference salience 𝜎𝜎�, then increasing 





























< 0 since  𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾�
= 1 























Proof of Theorem 5.2.2 
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑧𝑧̅) + 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙 �𝑧𝑧 −
𝑍𝑍
2






′ �𝜙𝜙 �𝑧𝑧 −
𝑍𝑍
2
+ 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿) − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟�𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥�(𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿)� ∙
𝑍𝑍
2























Proof of Theorem 5.3.1 
When 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑌𝑌 = 𝑀𝑀, 𝜂𝜂 = 𝑀𝑀
2
, and 
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋) + 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥). 
𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥� = 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓
′(𝜙𝜙𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥) = 0 
⇒ 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥) = −𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′(𝜙𝜙𝑥𝑥) 
⇒ 𝛼𝛼 ⋛ 0 ⇒ 𝑓𝑓′ ⋚ 0 ⇒ 𝑥𝑥 ⋛ 0. 
If 𝑥𝑥 is constrained, 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 0, then 𝑥𝑥 = 0 for 𝛼𝛼 ≧ 0 and 𝑥𝑥 < 0 only for 𝛼𝛼 < 0, which is a minority 
according to the assumption that 0 < Α(0) < 0.5. When 𝑋𝑋 > 𝑌𝑌, the agent’s utility function is 
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋) + 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 �𝜙𝜙�𝑥𝑥 − 𝑌𝑌 −
𝜇𝜇
2� �� + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥) 
allowing separate variation in 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 and 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔, where I assume 0 ≤
𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓
𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔





′ �𝜙𝜙�𝑥𝑥 + 𝑌𝑌 −𝑀𝑀 2� �� + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔
′(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥) = 0 













If 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 = 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 = 𝜎𝜎, then 𝜅𝜅 = 1, and 
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔
= 0 from the first order condition. Suppose 𝛼𝛼 > 0, and 
initially 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 = 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 and 𝜅𝜅 < 1, or 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 ≠ 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 but 𝜅𝜅 = 0. Then 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔� > 0. If 𝛼𝛼 < 0, then altruism 












Proof of Theorem 5.3.2 
If endowments are fair, then 𝑌𝑌 = 𝜂𝜂, and Theorem 5.3.1 applies, including to cases when 𝜂𝜂 ≠ 𝑀𝑀
2
. 
If a patient is unfairly advantaged, i.e., 𝑌𝑌 > 𝜂𝜂, whether with earned or unearned endowments, 
then, by Theorem 5.3.1 while simplifying to a single moral salience term, 
𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥) = −𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′(𝜙𝜙(𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂)) 
All spiteful agents destroy, since 𝛼𝛼 < 0 ⇒ 𝑓𝑓′ > 0 ⇒ 𝑥𝑥 < 𝜂𝜂 − 𝑌𝑌 < 0. Also, 𝛼𝛼 = 0 destroy: 
𝑓𝑓′ = 0 ⇒ 𝑥𝑥 = 𝜂𝜂 − 𝑌𝑌. The critical 𝛼𝛼 for destroying, 𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷, solves 𝑥𝑥 = 0 for 





which implies even some altruistic agents destroy. 
 
Proof of Theorem 6.1.1 
A dictator enters if 
 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂)� + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥) > 𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋 = (𝑋𝑋 − 𝑐𝑐) 
Of those who enter, more self-interested Ds transfer nothing: at a minimum, those with 𝛼𝛼 = 0 
and 𝜙𝜙 = 𝜙𝜙 by Theorem 3.1.1. Some who enter make positive transfers: at a minimum, super-fair 
Ds by Theorem 3.1.2. From Theorem 2.2.3, 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝜙𝜙� > 0 and from Theorem 2.2.4 
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥













= (−𝑢𝑢′ + 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′ + 𝜎𝜎𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔′)
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝜙𝜙
= 𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂)𝑓𝑓′ 
= 𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂)𝑓𝑓′ < 0 
90 
 
for the mean case and since –𝑢𝑢′ + 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′ + 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′ = 0 for an interior solution and 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝜙𝜙� = 0 for 
a corner solution. 
 𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼� = (−𝑢𝑢
′ + 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′ + 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′) 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼
+ 𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔′ 
= 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′ > 0 since –𝑢𝑢′ + 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′ + 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′ = 0 
for an interior solution and 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼� = 0 for a corner solution. If altruism is second order, then 
fairer Ds exist since the utility of entering is decreasing in 𝜙𝜙. The threshold 𝜙𝜙 for exiting is 
𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 
𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑐𝑐) > 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥) 
𝜙𝜙𝜆𝜆𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) < 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑐𝑐) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) − 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥) 
𝜙𝜙 > 𝜙𝜙𝑥𝑥 = �







Proof of Theorem 6.1.3 
𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋 is fixed at 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋� − 𝑐𝑐), since 𝑋𝑋� and 𝑐𝑐 are fixed. The first order condition for the mean D with 
an interior solution who enters is 
𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥� = −𝑢𝑢
′(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′�𝜙𝜙(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂)� + 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥) = 0 
Assume quite generally that 0 ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂
𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋


















𝑢𝑢" + 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙2𝑓𝑓′′ 𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋�
𝑢𝑢′′+𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙2𝑓𝑓′′ + 𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼2𝑔𝑔′′
< 1 


















= 𝑢𝑢′ − 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′
𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂
𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋








since, by the first order condition for the mean D, 𝑢𝑢′ > 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′ and since 0 ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋� < 1. That is, 
as 𝑋𝑋 rises, so does 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, and more Ds choose entry. 
 
Proof of Theorem 6.2.1 
To simplify notation, let salience under reveal be 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚 = 1 and under not reveal 0 < 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 ≡ 𝜎𝜎 < 1. 
𝑅𝑅2𝐵𝐵 is dominated 
𝑈𝑈(𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴) > 𝑈𝑈(𝑅𝑅2𝐵𝐵) 
𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + 𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝐹𝐹 − 𝐹𝐹)� + 𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹) > 𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + 𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)� + 𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿) 
since all 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 terms > all 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 terms for the mean and most Ds. For a minority 𝛼𝛼 < 0, which 
could reverse the inequality if D were extremely spiteful, but we assume 𝑢𝑢 and 𝑓𝑓 dominate 𝑔𝑔. 
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𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 is dominated 
𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵,𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴) = .5𝑈𝑈(𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵) + .5𝑈𝑈(𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴) > 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵) 
. 5𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + .5𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹) + .5𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + .5𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹) 
> 𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + .5𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹) + .5𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)� + .5𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿) 
𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) − 𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) − 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)� + (2 − 𝜎𝜎)𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿) > 0 
if 𝛼𝛼 ≥ 0. This inequality could only be reversed, if D were very spiteful but less than for 𝑅𝑅2𝐵𝐵. 
Note also that 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 is dominated by 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴, since 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴) − 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵) = 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) − 𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) > 0. 
Fairer Ds choose R1A and R2A over NRA 
𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵,𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴) = .5𝑈𝑈(𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵) + .5𝑈𝑈(𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴) > 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴) 
. 5𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + .5𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹) + .5𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + .5𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹) 
> 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + .5𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)� + .5𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿) + .5𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹) 
⇒ 𝜙𝜙 > 𝜙𝜙𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 = �
1
𝜎𝜎 [𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) − 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻)] + �
2 − 𝜎𝜎






since g is second order. 
Least fair Ds choose 𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴 and 𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴 over 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 
𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴,𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴) = .5𝑈𝑈(𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴) + .5𝑈𝑈(𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴) > 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴) 
. 5𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + .5𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)) + .5𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿) + .5𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + .5𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹) 
> 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + .5𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)) + .5𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿) + .5𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹) 







for 𝛼𝛼 > 0 and corner solution at zero for 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 0. Note 𝜙𝜙𝑅𝑅12𝑁𝑁 < 𝜙𝜙𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 since g is second order. In 
light of dominated strategies, the choices reduce to 𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴2𝐴𝐴, 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 and 𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵2𝐴𝐴. Letting fairness 
types be denoted, in ascending order of strength of fairness preferences, we have the following 
choices ordered by fairness type: 
𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴2𝐴𝐴 < 𝜙𝜙𝑅𝑅12𝑁𝑁 < 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 < 𝜙𝜙𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 < 𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵2𝐴𝐴. 
Standard game versus information game 
In the standard game, salience is the highest, 𝜎𝜎ℎ, and D chooses 1𝐵𝐵 over 1𝐴𝐴 if 
𝑢𝑢(1𝐵𝐵) > 𝑢𝑢(1𝐴𝐴) 
𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎ℎ𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙(𝐹𝐹 − 𝐹𝐹)) + 𝜎𝜎ℎ𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹) > 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + 𝜎𝜎ℎ𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)) + 𝜎𝜎ℎ𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿) 
⇒  𝜙𝜙 > 𝜙𝜙1𝐵𝐵 ≡ �
1






Assuming g is second order, 𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵1 > 𝜙𝜙𝑅𝑅12𝑁𝑁, and also noting 𝜎𝜎ℎ > 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚 = 𝜎𝜎, 𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵1 < 𝜙𝜙𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁. Thus, 
the fraction choosing 1𝐵𝐵 in the standard game should be greater than the fraction choosing 
𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵2𝐴𝐴 and less than the fraction choosing 𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵2𝐴𝐴 or 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 in the information game. DWK did 
not run a baseline for 2𝐴𝐴 versus 2𝐵𝐵, but BEW did, and we will use the following result in the 
next proof. In the standard game,  𝑢𝑢(1𝐵𝐵) > 𝑢𝑢(1𝐴𝐴) if 
𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + 𝜎𝜎ℎ𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙(𝐹𝐹 − 𝐹𝐹)) + 𝜎𝜎ℎ𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹) > 𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎ℎ𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)) + 𝜎𝜎ℎ𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿) 
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⇒  𝜙𝜙 > 𝜙𝜙2𝑁𝑁 ≡ �
1






Note 𝜙𝜙2𝑁𝑁 ≥ 0 only if D is extremely spiteful. 
 
Proof of Theorem 6.2.2 
Fairness and altruism are assumed not to be negatively correlated, so generosity in the reference 
state, 𝛾𝛾, is positively correlated with 𝜙𝜙 and 𝛼𝛼, according to Theorems 2.2.3 and 2.2.4, 
respectively. The possible exception is super-fair Ds, but they are ruled out by design in the 
information game. Thus, 𝛾𝛾 is replaced by 𝜙𝜙 and 𝛼𝛼 in the following proofs, since only order 
matters with respect to 𝛾𝛾. From the proof for Theorem 6.2.1, one can conclude that the estimated 
𝜙𝜙 for each choice is, in descending order, 𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵(𝜙𝜙�𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵), 1𝐵𝐵(𝜙𝜙�1𝐵𝐵), 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝜙𝜙�𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁), 𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴(𝜙𝜙�𝑅𝑅1𝑁𝑁), and 
1𝐴𝐴(𝜙𝜙�1𝑁𝑁). Also, 𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴(𝜙𝜙�𝑅𝑅2𝑁𝑁) lies somewhere between 𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵 and 𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴, since it consists of a mix of 
these two types and is less than 2𝐴𝐴(𝜙𝜙�2𝑁𝑁). Two other choices are predicted to be dominated, but, 
if they occurred, would indicate very spiteful types, where 𝑅𝑅2𝐵𝐵(𝛼𝛼�𝑅𝑅2𝐵𝐵) is more spiteful than 
𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝛼𝛼�𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵), but 2𝐵𝐵(𝛼𝛼�2𝐵𝐵) is more spiteful than both. The thresholds for 𝜙𝜙 and 𝛼𝛼 are assumed to 
be, respectively, between 1𝐵𝐵 and 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 (𝜙𝜙�1𝐵𝐵 > 𝜙𝜙� > 𝜙𝜙�𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁) and above 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 (𝛼𝛼� > 𝛼𝛼�𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵). The 
utility function of a spectator is 
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑧𝑧̅) + 𝜎𝜎(𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙(𝑧𝑧 − 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 − 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑥𝑥′) 
where 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 = 0 since 𝛽𝛽 = 0 and 𝑧𝑧 ≤ 0. 
𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈
𝑑𝑑𝑍𝑍
= 𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓′(𝜙𝜙(𝑧𝑧 − 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�)) ∙ 𝑥𝑥′) = 0 
⇒ ?̃?𝑧 = 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑥𝑥′ 
The remaining analysis is based on replacing 𝛾𝛾� with 𝜙𝜙� and 𝛼𝛼� to save the notation 𝛾𝛾�(𝜙𝜙�) and 𝛾𝛾�(𝛼𝛼�), 
and similarly for 𝜙𝜙� and 𝛼𝛼�. For 𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵, 𝜙𝜙�𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵 > 𝜙𝜙�, and for 1𝐵𝐵, 𝜙𝜙�1𝐵𝐵 > 𝜙𝜙� ⇒ ?̃?𝑧 > 0, but 𝑧𝑧 is 
constrained to 𝑧𝑧 ≤ 0, so 𝑧𝑧 = 0. 
𝑧𝑧𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 =  𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟�𝜙𝜙�𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 − 𝜙𝜙�� ∙ 𝑥𝑥′ < 0 
𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 is an unfair choice, since 𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵 was possible and 𝜙𝜙�𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 < 𝜙𝜙�, so if the unfair state 1 obtains, 
𝑥𝑥′ = 𝐹𝐹. If the fair state 2 obtains, 𝑥𝑥′ = 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑢𝑢 = .5𝐹𝐹 + .5𝐿𝐿 = 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓 ≡ 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋 < 𝐹𝐹 in this game. Thus, 
the punishments based on realizations are 
𝑧𝑧𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁1 =  𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟�𝜙𝜙�𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 − 𝜙𝜙�� ∙ 𝐹𝐹 
𝑧𝑧𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁2 =  𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟�𝜙𝜙�𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 − 𝜙𝜙�� ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋 
For the remaining choices involving 𝜙𝜙�, ?̃?𝑧 is 
𝑧𝑧𝑅𝑅1𝑁𝑁 =  𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟�𝜙𝜙�𝑅𝑅1𝑁𝑁 − 𝜙𝜙�� ∙ 𝐹𝐹 
𝑧𝑧1𝑁𝑁 =  𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟�𝜙𝜙�1𝑁𝑁 − 𝜙𝜙�� ∙ 𝐹𝐹 
𝑧𝑧𝑅𝑅2𝑁𝑁 =  𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟�𝜙𝜙�𝑅𝑅2𝑁𝑁 − 𝜙𝜙�� ∙ 𝐹𝐹 
Similarly, 
𝑧𝑧𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵1 =  𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛼𝛼�𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 − 𝛼𝛼�) ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋 
𝑧𝑧𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵2 =  𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛼𝛼�𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 − 𝛼𝛼�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹 
𝑧𝑧𝑅𝑅2𝐵𝐵 =  𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛼𝛼�𝑅𝑅2𝐵𝐵 − 𝛼𝛼�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹     < 𝑧𝑧2𝐵𝐵 = 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝛼𝛼�2𝐵𝐵 − 𝛼𝛼�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹 
< 𝑧𝑧2𝑁𝑁 = 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟�𝜙𝜙�2𝑁𝑁 − 𝜙𝜙�� ∙ 𝐹𝐹 
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These imply the following 
𝑧𝑧𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵 = 𝑧𝑧1𝐵𝐵 = 0 > 𝑧𝑧𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁2 > 𝑧𝑧𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁1 > 𝑧𝑧𝑅𝑅1𝑁𝑁 > 𝑧𝑧1𝑁𝑁 
𝑧𝑧𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵 > 𝑧𝑧2𝑁𝑁 > 𝑧𝑧𝑅𝑅2𝑁𝑁 > 𝑧𝑧𝑅𝑅1𝑁𝑁 
0 > 𝑧𝑧𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵1 > 𝑧𝑧𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵2 > 𝑧𝑧𝑅𝑅2𝐵𝐵 > 𝑧𝑧2𝐵𝐵 
 
Proof of Theorem 6.3.1 
In the baseline, salience is high, 𝜎𝜎ℎ, and the D chooses fair if 
𝑈𝑈(𝐹𝐹) > 𝑈𝑈(𝑈𝑈) 
𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎ℎ3𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹) 
> 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + 𝜎𝜎ℎ𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝐻𝐻 − 𝐹𝐹)� + 𝜎𝜎ℎ2𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)� + 𝜎𝜎ℎ𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻) + 𝜎𝜎ℎ2𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿) 
𝜙𝜙 > 𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵 ≡ �
1
𝜎𝜎ℎ [𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) − 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻)]− [𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻) + 2𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿)] + 3𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹)





In the delegation game, the D chooses fair with salience 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚 over delegating with salience 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙  if 
𝑈𝑈(𝐹𝐹) > 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝐷𝐷) 
𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚3𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹) > 𝑞𝑞𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝐻𝐻 − 𝐹𝐹)� 
+(1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙2𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)� + 𝑞𝑞𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙3𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙2𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿) 




⎡ 1𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 [𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) − 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻)]− [𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻) + 2𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿)] +
𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚 − 𝑞𝑞𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙
𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝑞𝑞) ∙ 3𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹)








In the delegation game, the D chooses unfair over delegating if 
𝑈𝑈(𝑈𝑈) > 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝐷𝐷) 
𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝐻𝐻 − 𝐹𝐹)� + 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚2𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)� + 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻) + 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚2𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿) 
> 𝑞𝑞𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝐻𝐻 − 𝐹𝐹)� + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙2𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)�
+ 𝑞𝑞𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙3𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙2𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿) 







𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 + 1𝑞𝑞 (𝜎𝜎
𝑚𝑚 − 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙)
[𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) − 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻)]− [𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻) + 2𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿)] + 𝑞𝑞𝜎𝜎
𝑙𝑙
𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚 − (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 ∙ 3𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹)










Since altruism is assumed second order, we focus on the other terms. Then, Ds with 𝜙𝜙 > 𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵 
allocate fairly. Note 𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵 > 𝜙𝜙𝐷𝐷 since 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 < 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 + 1
𝑞𝑞
(𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚 − 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙), so Ds with 𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵 > 𝜙𝜙 > 𝜙𝜙𝐷𝐷 delegate. 
Then those with 𝜙𝜙 < 𝜙𝜙𝐷𝐷 allocate unfairly. 𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵 > 𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵 since 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 < 𝜎𝜎ℎ, so fewer Ds allocated fairly 
in the delegation game than in the dictator game. Note the fraction allocating unfairly in the two 
games is ambiguous since 
𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵 ⋛ 𝜙𝜙𝐷𝐷 as 𝜎𝜎ℎ ⋚ 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 + 1
𝑞𝑞
(𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚 − 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙). 
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The intermediary chooses fair if 
𝑈𝑈(𝐹𝐹) > 𝑈𝑈(𝑈𝑈) 
𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼3𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹)
> 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝐻𝐻 − 𝐹𝐹)� + 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼2𝑓𝑓�𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)� + 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻) + 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼2𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿) 
𝜙𝜙 > 𝜙𝜙𝐼𝐼 ≡ �
1
𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 [𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) − 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻)] − [𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻) + 2𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿)] + 3𝑔𝑔(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹)





Disregarding altruism terms, 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 = 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 ⇒ 𝜙𝜙𝐼𝐼 = 𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵 , and 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 = 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚 ⇒ 𝜙𝜙𝐼𝐼 > 𝜙𝜙𝐷𝐷 since 
 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚 > 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 + 1
𝑞𝑞
(𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚 − 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙), 
hence, 𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵 ≥ 𝜙𝜙𝐼𝐼 > 𝜙𝜙𝐷𝐷, and the fraction of Is allocating fairly are, therefore, those with 𝜙𝜙 greater 
than this range of values. 
 
Proof of Theorem 6.3.2 
The spectator’s utility function is 
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑧𝑧̅) + 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓(𝜙𝜙(𝑧𝑧 − 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟(𝜙𝜙� − 𝜙𝜙�) ∙ 𝑥𝑥′, 
replacing 𝛾𝛾 with 𝜙𝜙, as in section 6.2, where altruism is second order, 
⇒ ?̃?𝑧 = 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟�𝜙𝜙� − 𝜙𝜙�� ∙ 𝑥𝑥′. 
Whenever fair is chosen, 𝜙𝜙� > 𝜙𝜙�, and reward is optimal, but this is ruled out by 𝑧𝑧 ≤ 0. Those, 
who are in passive roles, cannot reveal their character, so 𝑧𝑧 = 0 for those cases, as well. That 
leaves the following cases. In the baseline, the dictator who chooses unfair has an estimated 
𝜙𝜙�𝐵𝐵 ,𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵 > 𝜙𝜙�𝐵𝐵 > 𝜙𝜙, where 𝜙𝜙�𝐵𝐵 < 𝜙𝜙�. The optimal sanction solves 
𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟�𝜙𝜙�𝐵𝐵 − 𝜙𝜙�� ∙ 𝐹𝐹 < 0 
In the delegation game, the D who chooses unfair has 𝜙𝜙𝐷𝐷 > 𝜙𝜙�𝐵𝐵 > 𝜙𝜙 and the optimal sanction is 
𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 = 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟�𝜙𝜙�𝐵𝐵 − 𝜙𝜙�� ∙ 𝐹𝐹 < 0 
Note 𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ⋛ 𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 as 𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵 ⋚ 𝜙𝜙𝐷𝐷. The I who chooses unfair has 𝜙𝜙𝐼𝐼 > 𝜙𝜙�𝐼𝐼 > 𝜙𝜙 and the sanction is 
𝑧𝑧𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 = 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟�𝜙𝜙�𝐼𝐼 − 𝜙𝜙�� ∙ 𝐹𝐹 < 0 
Note 𝑧𝑧𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 < 𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 depending on 𝜙𝜙𝐼𝐼 > 𝜙𝜙𝐷𝐷. Finally, if the threshold is above 𝜙𝜙�𝐷𝐷, then the D is 
also punished for delegating. Note 𝜙𝜙�𝐷𝐷 < 𝜙𝜙� ≤ 𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵  and 
𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟�𝜙𝜙�𝐷𝐷 − 𝜙𝜙�� ∙ 𝑥𝑥′ 
where if unfair obtains, 𝑥𝑥′ = 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑢𝑢, and if fair obtains, 𝑥𝑥′ = 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓, where 𝑞𝑞 < 0.5, so 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑢𝑢 > 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓, 
resulting in 0 > 𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 > 𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵, if 𝜙𝜙� < 𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵, and 0 = 𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 = 𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵, otherwise. 
 
 
